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Turkish Foreign Policy

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WITH A FOREWORD

By

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FOREWORD

Philosophers and sages have often compared human life to a game of chess in which no error goes un-noticed and none passes without penalty. A reference to this can equally hold good in the life history of nations and countries more specially in their international dealings. In such dealings sharp eyes and revengeful sentiments are seldom wanting to make use of the occasions and turn them to account. In our inter-state efforts to deal with one another one has to take extra care so as not to expose the world to a big calamity. If the general trend of events, past history and traditions are overlooked in inter-state dealings, it often happens that these and other such things become a disturbing feature and their magnified form brings about war. Modern society is living in times of extremely rapid changes all over the world. Some are good and some are bad. One has to keep a vigilant eye to exclude the bad things and adopt the good ones. In this way hope can be established of restoring peace in this chaotic world.

The present war, as we were told was fought to defend human rights and liberty and to

establish ideals for the preservation of peace and order in the vast jungle of brute force, tyranny and injustice, established as the order of the day, because of the totalitarianism of the Nazis and Fascists all over the world in general and in Europe in particular. Thanks to the endeavours of the Allied Nations victory has been achieved over brute force. But the question which confronts every sensible and self-respecting human being is how to win peace and establish a salutary world order in which the menace of recurring crisis may be eliminated. It is a matter of great regret to admit that power politics is now showing signs of stepping in the deliberations of the Allied Nations. When such is the state of affairs, how is it possible to live up to the ideals for which this world war No. 2 was fought and won ?

The small states of Europe and Asia were menaced and threatened by the rise of Fascism and Nazism in Europe and in pre-war days one could have easily gauged the extent of their feelings of insecurity. Power politics and bungled diplomacy were rampant, corruption of people and politicians was common and re-alignment of groups was fastly being pursued by Hitler and Mussolini. The worst feature of this bungled diplomacy was noticeable in the Balkan cockpit which ever since its liberation from the

Ottoman Empire had become a field of rivalry between Russia, Germany, Italy, France, and Britain. Even before the liberation of the Balkan countries the Ottoman Empire had to face the ambitions of the new Empire builders. Tsarist Russia was always inspired by the desire of territorial expansion in this region on the pretext of being the defender of the Christian population of the *'grand porte'* which later on assumed the form of Pan-Slavism. Hence a crusade against the Turks was led by Russia throughout the nineteenth century and a series of staggering blows were rendered to clip the Ottoman Empire. Great powers like Britain and France promptly provided assistance to the *porte* to fight against the Russian Imperialism. It was solely because of the British and French opposition that the Tsars could never get control of the Straits. In this way, Turkey, the Straits and the Balkans became the constant subject of tactful handling in all the foreign chancellories of the Great powers. But more or less a simultaneous revolution both in Turkey and Russia considerably changed the outlook in respect of foreign policy. Russia under the aegis of communist leaders, Lenin and Stalin, rendered great assistance to Mustapha Kemal and renounced all the old imperialist claims of Russia against Turkey. Thus the Republic started its career with the

assistance of the Soviet Union and faced the temporary hostility of Great Britain and France. Kemal was an extremely practical statesman. He fully realised the new geographical location of modern Turkey and chalked a *via media* in the foreign dealings of the Republic. He avowed a policy of friendship to all and did not like to bind his country to any one power. In this way the healing of the old breaches with Soviet Russia, Britain and France was, in the light of past history, a remarkable success of Ataturk. A policy of reconciliation and concord was followed all along even after the death of Ataturk.

Modern Turkey, a Republican form of Government, is built on the ruins of the vast stretches of the Ottoman Empire. Kemal Ataturk became convinced of the futility of this empire, and in the life and death struggle of the Turkish people between 1914-1921 he very ably guided the nationalist movement and crowned it with laurels of success. He was a realist and so is his successor Ismet Inonu. The strategical, economic and political importance of Anatolia was very well realised by Kemal and his associates, and he considered the fact that so long as the Turks remained masters of their soil and land of heritage no one power could singly oust them. The outbreak of the present global war once

again placed her in difficult, tiring, and trying ordeal. The whole of Europe was divided into two hostile camps on ideological and economic grounds viz. Democracy versus world Fascism. Throughout the war there was constant search for new allies by both the belligerents and Turkey was wooed by all because of her central position and extremely strategical important location. President Ismet Inonu, a shrewd and an able diplomat, remained firm like rock in his Government's foreign policy of neutrality but at the same time avowed firm friendship to the Allied Nations and even admired the cause for which this war of liberation was fought. On many occasions he gave proof of Turkey's loyalty and fidelity to Great Britain and other Allied Nations. In spite of all this Russia and Turkey did not get on well ever since the time of the signing of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23rd, 1939. The Russians have now developed an exaggerated dread of insecurity. No doubt the contribution of the Soviet Union towards victory has been great and commendable and because of that she has emerged as one of the Great Powers in Europe and Asia. She now considers two regions in the Near and Middle East as of vital importance for her, viz., the Straits and the Persian Gulf. She seeks an exit into

the Mediterranean through the Straits which she can always have in accordance with the terms of Montreaux Convention, but her present attitude in demanding cession of Kars and Aradahan bases in the Straits and a joint Turco-Russian control over the Straits is beyond comprehension. At the recent Foreign Ministers Conference Russia has even put the demand of trusteeship over Tripolitania, and Eritria. In this way she wants not only an exit in the Mediterranean but her attitude definitely shows signs of securing control of the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. She wants to realise the age-old ambition of her Tsars to get the Straits and enter the Indian Ocean. Turkey, therefore, once again finds herself in the throes of a painful dilemma. The Tsars had duplicity of purpose in their relations with Turkey and other powers. They wanted the exclusive control of the Straits when they thought they were powerful enough to control it and exclude others, and sometimes they professed friendship with Turkey and wanted her to remain the "Guardian of the Straits" when they thought they were weak and not in a position to exclude others. Exactly the same policy is being pursued by modern Russia.

The present book 'Turkish Foreign Policy' by Dr. M. H. Rehman deals with all these difficult,

delicate, and intricate problems in their historical perspective. The book is extremely engaging and the manner in which Turkey's foreign policy, from various angles and aspects, has been dealt with upto contemporary period is highly commendable. It is not only of great interest to the students of international affairs but is equally useful, instructive and stimulating to the general public. Dr. Rehman has undoubtedly produced a learned treatise and deserves congratulations. This is the first book of its kind ever written on the "Turkish Foreign Policy."

28 September, 1945.

6, King Edward Road,

New Delhi.

} S. SULTAN AHMED.

PREFACE

Turkey is one of the most important 'Key States' of Eurasia. The strategical, economic, and political importance of this country has been significant in international affairs and shall remain so as long as the Turks are the masters of the land of their heritage. Prof: Cooleridge wrote in his famous book "Claimants of Constantinople" that "never in all its history save perhaps when it fell into the hands of the Turks in 1453 has the fate of Constantinople meant more to the world than it does in the present struggle." Even Napoleon I had tried his best to get control of this famous city declaring that "Constantinople was in itself worth half an empire." A glance at the map reveals the fact that it separates and at the same time it connects, Europe, Asia and Africa, the three great continents, which afford shelter to the nine-tenths of the human race. The Ottoman Empire achieved a commanding position merely because of the possession of the narrow Straits which unite and separate the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. That is why all along the

history of the Turkish people the question of the control of the Straits remained in the forefront of international politics.

Ever since 1774 when Russia became a great power, the question of Turkish supremacy became a difficult problem. The latter Sultans of the Ottoman Empire conferred on Russia and other Great Powers a benefit to clip portions of this Empire. Consequently Turkey became the hot-bed of many foreign intrigues. After the decay and defeat of the last Ottoman ruler, during the world war No. 1, it was the intention of the Great Powers, more or less, to reduce the Turkish State to the barest possible minimum, but the dauntless and valiant spirit of the Turks resurrected under the leadership of Ghazi Mustapha Kemal Pasha, foiled the whole of this scheme and the Turks once again showed their will to remain the masters of their hearth and home. Turkish foreign policy since its inception as a Republic in 1921 changed considerably and it became the motto of the Kemalists to live in peace with the whole world because they were surrounded by hostile powers. Kemal forged out a foreign policy which concerned primarily with Turkey's relations with England, France, Germany and Italy on the one hand, and Russia and the Balkans on the other, and at the same time, he wanted to cultivate friendly

relations with the countries of the Middle East. This policy has been quite successful during the formative period of the Turkish Republic, but the rise of new powers, new ideologies, and the new conceptions of life, gradually began to make a change in the re-alignment of the European Powers which had a corresponding effect on Turkish Foreign policy. Russia remained a paramount factor in the determination of the position of the Turkish State in international affairs. Turkey, then, began to profess feelings of good neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union but she stood in incessant fear of the Moscow Giant. In recent times, Russia once again began to show signs of casting covetous eyes either on the possession or at least, the control of the Straits and today Turkey likewise faces the age-long menace of Russian Imperialism.

This book on Turkish Foreign Policy has been written with a view to place in the hands of the English-knowing public interested in the Middle Eastern and Near Eastern affairs, an easy, clear and up-to-date treatise so that they may see and appreciate the motives of various powers both in disturbing and maintaining the *status quo*. I have attempted to state the diplomatic views of all the powers interested in these affairs without any bias or prejudice. During my long stay in nearly all the capitals

of Europe, I had endeavoured to collect authentic materials from reliable sources on Turkey and interested European powers. But even then I am not unmindful of my shortcomings.

In the end I feel bound to acknowledge the great obligation that I owe to my well wishers and friends. I have first of all to acknowledge my deep sense of gratitude to the Hon'ble Sir Syed Sultan Ahmed for his painstaking care to go through the manuscript and for his very kindly writing the Foreword in spite of his busy time. I am very much indebted to Prof. Ilyas Ahmad of the Department of Politics in the Allahabad University for his useful criticisms and suggestions and for his kindness in having agreed to bring the matter upto date. The late Dr. Beni Prasad, Head of the Department of Politics in the University of Allahabad, was also very kind to give me his own criticism and suggestions and though he is no more in the land of the living, I feel morally bound to acknowledge his kindness. My thanks are due to Dr. Bisheshwar Prasad, M. A., D. Litt. of the Department of History, as also to Dr. S. P. Khattry, M.A., D.Phil. of the Department of English Studies, both of the Allahabad University, for their kindly help in many ways. I also feel obliged to Mr. Mohan Lal, M. A. of the Politics Department, Allahabad.

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9 August, 1945.

20-A Muir Road,
Allahabad.

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SHAH M. H. REHMAN.

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Amir Khan

CHAPTER. I

TURKEY'S GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION AND STRATEGICAL IMPORTANCE

There is hardly a region in the world which at once enjoys so many advantages and is at the same time so exposed to perils as Turkey. Its situation and sharply marked relief have had an important bearing on its history and its people. In the world's history there has scarcely been a great power which did not fight for the mastery of this geographical region. History furnishes us proof of its having been invaded from all the three known continents of the old world. The fighting hordes of the ancient, mediæval and modern times that have engaged in war, have had one or more of these three objectives, in respect of Turkey, namely, first a through land route, which Turkey provides, between Europe and Asia; second, the control and possession of the Straits, and third, the benefit of the economic advantages arising from agricultural, pastoral, and, in modern times,

mineral wealth conferred by nature on this country and the lands adjoining it.) It lies open to the plains of South-Eastern and Central Europe on the one hand, and the steppes and the grassy highlands of Asia on the other. The sea of Marmara and the narrow Straits alone separate Asia from Europe. Passing across Turkey and through the Balkans, the migrating people of Asia intruded into Europe. The Seljuk, the Tartars and the Osmanis surged forward when Europe was still semi-civilised. In our own times the vigilant Europe has thrust itself out into the strategically important Middle East. This region is of special interest to Germany, Italy, France and Russia for the agrarian economy of Turkey and the countries within its geographical orbit and their products of foodstuff, timber, tobacco, oil and livestocks are complimentary to their industries. These facts themselves prove the special significance of this strip of land from the economic as well as strategic point of view. It serves to explain why Turkey, Balkanistan and the Middle East are constantly threatened with foreign interference

and pressure, and have remained a prey to international jealousy. The troubled history of Turkey therefore largely proceeds from its exposed frontier and its bridge position between the two great continents of the world—Asia and Europe. The factors which have been chiefly responsible for all these turmoils and disturbances arise from its geographical location and its configuration. The influence which geography and relief have exercised upon Turkey has few parallels elsewhere in the vast continent of Eurasia, and no discussion of politics or international affairs would be complete which fails to take account of these factors.

At first sight Turkey appears to resemble other Mediterranean countries but a critical examination reveals the contrast. It projects far into the Mediterranean and is washed on three sides by lake-like seas. Bounded by the Pontic ranges and the Black Sea in the north and the Mediterranean Sea in the south, in the west it is separated from Europe by the narrow Straits and the Sea of Marmara, and in the east is bordered by the Armenian knot.

The interior has a plateau formation with an altitude varying from 2000 to 4000 feet above sea level. This plateau is the western extension of the Armenian knot and the Kurdish highlands. It has several loosely connected hilly ranges and its central part has several scattered salt lake prippets, morasses, and water courses. The whole of it is known to us as Asia-i-Kochak (Asia Minor). It is so named relatively to the Greater Asia of which it forms the western most projection. The Greeks used to call it Anatolia and the Italians attributed to it the name of Levant, the land of the rising sun, that is the 'Orient'. Both these terms mean "to rise" and are the exact equivalent of the 'Orient' from the latin word *Oriri*. The Turks call it Anadolu. It has in the north and south a series of high mountain ranges, which run westward from the Armenian knot and continue into the mountain chains of south-eastern Europe. These are the famous Pontic and Taurus mountains which form great northern and southern parapet. These chains of high mountains, direct the trend of traffic movement east and west.

In the north, the Pontic mountains consist of a complex succession of ranges placed *en echelon*, with an east-west trend along the Black Sea coast. These mountains at some places descend down to the sea. There are a few larger rivers flowing in a north-easterly direction through this high and difficult mountain rampart to the Black Sea and provide in their lower courses some rich and important plains. Among these may be mentioned the Bafra plain of the Kizil river and the Charshembe plain of the Kalkid river. The chief passes providing access from the Black Sea coast to the centre are those leading from Ineboli to Kastamtuni and Ankara, from Sinope to Amasia, and from Trebizond over the Kolat Dagħ to Erzerum.

In the south, the Taurus mountains are narrower and less complex than the Pontic. South of these mountains there are rich agricultural plains between the Adalia and the Alaya. The hinterland of Izmir (Symrna) region and the rich plains of Adana (Cilicia) are of great agricultural value. Across Taurus are many passes

which are both low and easily accessible. Of these the most important is the Geulek-Boghaz, better known as 'the Cilician Gate, which connects Anatolia with Syria and the valley of Euphrates beyond. This famous gate-way has been used alike by invaders, traders and migrating peoples. Through it passed Alexander when he went to conquer Persia and India. About a hundred miles to the west of it is another pass leading across the Taurus from Karaman southward to the valley of Gok-su. A third pass, 150 miles farther west, connecting Isbarta southwards with the fertile plains of Adalia is more important.

The north coast of Turkey has a heavy rainfall. The Aegean coast has a climate akin to that of the Mediterranean. Both these coastal regions are very famous for their fruits, nuts and tobacco products. The south has a somewhat mild tropical climate, and has rich gardens, orchards and farms. Extensive parts of the central region are arid or semi-arid. The western part of the plateau has good pastures and valleys suitable for farming. In the east, the Armenian uplands have cold and bleak

winters and late summers. This area provides magnificent pastures and grazing grounds sloping down to the foothills and then to Syrian and Mesopotamian plains.

Across the Straits, the basins of the river Ergene and the lower Maritsa known as Eastern Thrace bear to a large extent, steppe-like in character, owing to their configuration, to the permeability of their soil, cold winter winds and late summer drought. These basins are bounded on the south by a line of bare hills with a core of ancient rocks. They border on the Sea of Marmara and the Gulf of Zeros. To their south lies the most important region of the Straits which has possessed great international importance since the days of the Trojan and Greek conflicts for the mastery of Anatolia. The narrowness of the Straits which connect the Black with the Mediterranean seas postulates that this strip of water can be effectively controlled only by a power in possession of Anatolia and Eastern Thrace. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus both are the drowned valleys of an ancient river, and the harbour of Istanbul known as the 'Golden Horn' is also a drowned valley

in which vessels could lie safely out of the reach of strong winds and storms that advance through the Bosphorus from the Black sea. Napoleon once said that 'Istanbul is the Empire of the world'. It is said that there are four cities in the world that belong to all men rather than to the people of one nation—Istanbul, Rome, Jerusalem and Athens. The capture and possession of each one of them at one time or another has decidedly been a turning point in the history of human affairs. Istanbul is one of the most beautiful cities of the world and has a history of its own, full of colour, tragedy and romantic adventure.

From the days of Alexander and of Zerxes down to its capture by the Turks in 1453, because of its nodal geographical location, it has continued to be a point of immense military importance and strategic value. For over a thousand years, Istanbul remained one of the chief centres of culture and commerce. The Turks encouraged the settlement of foreign colonists to build up its trade and commerce, and thus it became a cosmopolitan city and an international port. Its

position at the cross-roads of Asia and Europe enabled it to profit enormously by the trade flowing from Russia, Iran, Iraq and India, and also, in earlier times by the great overland trade route to inner Asia and the Far East. Being the greatest market of mediæval times Istanbul dominated all the Mediterranean ports of the Near East; and that is why the Turkish Sultans styled themselves "Lords of the Upper and the Lower Seas" and they became known to history as the "Sublime Porte".

"Until the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, the region thus defined formed the nerve centre of the world's commerce. From times immemorial the trade between the east and the west has followed well defined routes. The most ancient is the caravan route which from the dawn of history down to the sixteenth century, was commanded by the Semites. From the Far East goods found their way to the head of the Persian Gulf, thence by caravan they ultimately reached the Syrian sea-board, and from Tyre and Sidon were distributed by the Phoenicians to the people of the west. Basra, Baghdad and Damascus were

the dominating stations on this trunk line. The Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century gravely impaired the security of the Mesopotamia-Syria route, and proportionately increased the importance of the northern and southern routes. The former reached Europe by the Oxus, the Caspian, and the Black Sea, its outer gate being commanded, of course, by Constantinople; the latter came by way of the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the valley of the Nile, debouching from 32 B. C. on, onwards to Alexandria."¹

The lands adjoining the Straits provide easy entry into the Balkans and Central Europe. The Balkan Peninsula is separated from Asia only by the narrow waters of the Bosphorus, which in places is only about a mile wide. Geographically Balkanistan is more open to Asiatic than to European penetration. Its rivers and valleys run eastwards or southwards, while the alignment of its mountains which is in the same direction hinders communication with the north and the west. It seems as if the country has turned its back on Europe and

1. Marriott. *The Eastern Question*, p. 22.

is looking towards Asia. It was therefore natural that Asiatic races and cultures should have from time to time infiltrated into Balkanistan, while it was equally natural that Europe should have tried to check and stop these infiltrations. Turkey was in this way fated to be the borderland and the battle-ground of these two continents and predestined to be a land of chronic turmoil and unrest. It might have been otherwise if there had arisen a strong and stable people, who could have welded Anatolia and Balkanistan into a single political entity and kept out fresh waves of invasions. But this was rendered extremely difficult by the complexity of the relief of this region. Broken up by mountains and rivers into small districts, each more or less isolated from the other, there quite naturally grew up separate political groups. Every new stream of invaders tended to concentrate in one particular region instead of spreading out over the whole of the peninsula. The situation was made still more complex by the constant influx of new, ethnographic groups, sharply marked off one from another

in race, religion language and culture.

The significance of all this can fully be grasped by a glance at the historico-geographical factors of these borderlands—Balkanistan and Turkey. The ancient dwellers of Balkanistan belonged to the Mediterranean stock, and occupied the southern part of the peninsula. These were the primitive Greeks, who had developed the prehistoric culture of Mycenae and Crete, as a result of the stimulus they had received from Nordic invasions about 3000 years ago. We see that Homeric Greece was ruled over by the tall blonds of Nordic races. A partial fusion of the two races produced "Hellas" attributed to classic times. Ancient Greece was broken up in many small states some of which extended as far as central Turkey. The quarrels of these states led to their early absorption by the powerful Macedonians of the north. Alexander the Great founded a mighty empire which stretched far into Asia. It broke up after his death, and the political confusion that followed lasted till Greece was conquered by Rome. Rome was able to give temporary peace to

this borderland but after its decline this region again lapsed into disorder. A series of invasions then swept Turkey and Balkanistan. These invaders belonged to different racial types of both Asiatic and European stocks. Of these the Slavs became predominant in Balkanistan. They mixed with the older population and the Asiatic invaders in varying proportions. Meanwhile, the older element had stood the ground round about Constantinople and spread far into Asia Minor. Throughout mediæval times the whole country was torn by incessant struggles between the Byzantines and the Slavs. During the fifteenth century, however, they were both overwhelmed by the mighty waves of the conquering Turks from Central Asia. The Turks gave the region a political unity which lasted for centuries. But even the Turkish power crumbled after the rise of Russia and the west European powers and after World War I the old land-marks reappeared. There is thus something special about the geography of this land which leads to its political instability.

The two valleys of the small and the

great Maritza, the plains of Thessaly, the valley of river Mozawa, the lower Vardar valley and above all the lower valley of river Danube provide passage-ways between the East and the West. The Danube constitutes, in effect, an important corridor which not only links together Central and South Eastern Europe but also connects the Asiatic continent round the Black Sea with the Asiatic steppes. The vital strategic keys to this gateway are Vienna, the Iron Gate, Nis and the Straits. At Belgrade, three important routes converge; (1) the land and waterway route along the Danube; (2) the route through the valleys of the rivers, passing through Nis and Sofia, and Adrianople; this route is followed also by the trans-Continental railway to Istanbul; (3) the route passing through Nis and Skoplje, through the valleys of rivers Vardar and Morava, to Salonika, thence by steamer, or by the centuries old coastal route to the old Byzantine and Ottoman capital, Constantinople. Along these routes and corridors have passed great waves of migrating and invading hordes and each of these movements has

left behind it vestiges that still remain.


“Upto modern times, hardly a century has failed to bring its migration from the East: Scythians, Samatians, Huns, Bulgars, Avars, West Turks, Magyars, Petchenegs, Uz, Cumans, Mongols, Osmanli Turks have poured in succession down the road from Asia. These invaders haven given the Danube basin a character all its own. Exceedingly mobile, skilful, and savage fighters, these invaders were more than a match for anyone of the indigenous nations of the basin. Easily conquering these, they founded great supernational empires which sometimes embraced a score of nationalities.”¹ The effects of all this are only too obvious in the enthography of South-Eastern Europe. The configuration of Balkanistan is such that it is difficult to establish a strong centralised power. Nature points imperiously to a congeries of relatively small states and the geographical presuppositions are re-inforced by the principle of ethnography. The result is that Balkanistan consists of good many debatable and controversial regions and

1. Gaillard, Turkey in Europe, 1921.

districts, the political destiny of which always remained a source of international friction. Consequently the Ottoman Turks felt the great geographical necessity of conquering the whole of Balkanistan, so that they could easily defend their Empire and keep the central and west European powers away from this region. In modern times the European powers specially Germany, France, Italy and Russia have endeavoured to establish their hegemony and spheres of interest in this region. This survey shows how great is strategic significance of Turkey.

Turkey's peninsular position in the midst of so many states is in no way less important than its continental position. The Aegean Sea to the west is strewn with a number of islands, which provide stepping stone for an entry into Eurasia. The Maritza, the Struma, the Mista, Vardar and the Vistritza all flow into this sea with the result that people like streams and rivers flowed towards the littoral of the Aegean Sea.

Thus the geographical location of Turkey has conferred on it the position of



a bridge between Asia and Europe; the lands that surround it have been a coveted object throughout history. Between the years 1453 and 1516 the Ottoman Turks conquered these lands and the Mediterranean ports and cities of Constantinople, Alexandria and the Syrian Coast. Constantinople has been the metropolis of the Near East from the time of Byzantine Empire down to the days of Ataturk Mustapha Kemal. That this should be so is dictated by geography. During the mediæval period Byzantium was a great centre of culture. Later it remained the capital of the vast empire of the Turkish Sultans which extended over the whole of South-Eastern Europe and indeed as far as the gates of Vienna. It was also the greatest sea port of the Mediterranean which continued to be dominated by the Turkish fleet till its defeat by Don John of Austria at the famous battle of Lepanto.

The Caliphate was the symbol of a great power. It was also the symbol of the impact of the Orient upon the semi-civilised Europe. It was respected by the whole of the Muslim world and the call of the

Muezzin from the St. Sophia mosque was heard from Atlas Africa right upto India, China and Malaya. The conquest of the Near East, South-Eastern Europe and Northern Africa by the Ottoman Turks constituted a decisive event in human history. For the Western commercial world being deprived of its long established commercial privileges, was now confronted with three alternatives, either to forego its trade with the east, or to turn out the Ottoman intruders from the nerve centre of ancient and mediæval trade routes or to discover an alternative route to the Orient. The last one was the only practical course for them to pursue.

The latter half of the fifteenth century was a period of extraordinary activity by the merchants of Lisbon, Cadiz and Bristol. In 1498 the Cape route to India and the east was discovered by Vasco da Gama. This resulted in what was virtually an economic blockade of the static East by the more dynamic West. The ancient route was rendered obsolete and the bazars and serais of Istanbul ceased to serve as vital links between Asia and Europe.

Towards the end of the last century, through the enterprise of M. De Lesseps, the Suez canal was excavated; it joined the Red and the Mediterranean Seas, and to a very large extent restored the commercial and strategic importance of the Mediterranean and its littoral. The present century before the last war witnessed the initiation of an enterprise by the Germans which, if it had been successful, would have been of as far reaching consequence to the politics and economics of Europe and Asia as the building of the Suez Canal. The new industrial Germany being devoid of sea power appeared on the scene with the avowed intention of controlling the overland route from Berlin to Baghdad. The old caravan route across Asia Minor was to be revitalised. This project with the German cry of *Drang Nach Osten* once more emphasised the commanding geographical position of Turkey and the locational significance of Istanbul.

The peace settlement of Versailles and Sevres sought to introduce an entirely new factor in the history of the Turks and their country. It recognised

the principle of the internationalisation of the Straits and their control through an international commission. However, this settlement was soon wrecked by the new vitality of the Turks, resurrected under the leadership of Mustapha Kemal. The Allied powers were forced to recognize that Turkey alone had a right and title to control the Straits.

The recent trends in international affairs have once more exposed Istanbul, the Straits and Turkey to the covetous gaze of European Powers. So long as international politics continue to be based on power-politics, the problem of Turkey and the Straits must remain a source of constant anxiety to the Turkish diplomats and statesmen.

CHAPTER II

THE TURKS

The varied physical features of Turkey and the differences of climate in its various parts have exercised a marked effect upon the outlook, occupations and the mode of life of its people. Lying at the gateway of Asia and Europe, Anatolia from time to time remained part of several empires founded by people of different races and speaking different languages. The people there are a product of their history. The people known to us as Turcoman and speaking various Turkish dialects are spread over Central and Western Asia. They are Tartars by race and in their customs, usages and language, are very akin to the Turks now living in the plateau of Anatolia.

The early inhabitants of Anatolia, as is chronicled by Turkish historians, were Turanian in origin and had come from the lands lying between the Altai and Ural mountains. They were also known as

“Hittite” or “Armenoid”. In the process of their migrations and invasions they reached Anatolia and successively invaded Europe and settled in its eastern parts. They seem to have also entered into matrimonial alliances with their Iranian and Mongol neighbours whose lands they had earlier crossed while on their way to South Eastern Europe. The unification of these groups strengthened the position of Turco-Mongol peoples which greatly contributed to the establishment of the “Hittite” empire. Its disintegration was followed by incursions of the people of the Indo-European race. The Phrygians, Bithynians and others crossed the narrow Straits and settled in the greater portion of Asia-Minor and South-Eastern Europe. After a long time the Celtic Gauls succeeded in subduing and settling in the province of Galatia near Ankara. Later the Greeks occupied the Western and South Western region of Asia-Kochak and settled there. The Macedonian, Roman and Byzantine Empires each in its turn absorbed the people of Anatolia and left the influence of their race, culture, and language on them. In

addition, there were important Semitic influences also.

The Turkish conquest of Anatolia which has given the country its present name and language was carried out by a major migration of the Turkish-speaking people from Central Asia. Their invasions brought them not only to Asia-Minor but also carried them to Europe in the west and India in the east. The most formidable of these groups of invaders arrived from the central steppes of Asia and captured all the territory lying between the Black and the Caspian Seas. Since then the Turks have become an important factor in the history of Europe and Asia. During the 9th century A. D. they established contact with the Arabs and embraced Islam. They willingly joined the Muslim army under the Caliphs and by virtue of their war-like nature and their conquests were able to occupy positions of great importance in the Arabian Commonwealth.

Some important ethnologists seem not to agree with the view of the mixed ethnic element of the Tartar-Turk group but it nevertheless certain that those who

came to Asia. Kochak earlier were of the same stock as the people of Central Asia, and indeed Vambéry is of opinion that a Turkish group crossed into Europe at a very early date.¹

The Slavs spread westwards towards the Baltic and southward they occupied the Valley of the Danube and portions of Balkanistan. About the same period the Bulgars advanced from the Valley of Volga and settled on the banks of the Danube. The 9th century witnessed, it is said, a new wave of migration, mostly of the people of Slavonic origin, who settled in the Valley of Tirezah. The Magyar Turks settled in Hungary, and the Kajar Turks went and settled as far as Macedonia. It follows therefore that in the course of these large scale migrations, the people of Turkish origin changed considerably. The Turks of the eastern groups mixed with the Tunguses, the Urgians and the Mongols, whereas those of the western group mixed with various Indo-Afghan,

¹L. Cahun, *Turcs et Mongols, des origines a 1405*.
Vambéry. *Das Turken Volk*.

Arab, Assyrian and European peoples.

In the 10th century a Turkish chief Seljuk gathered together a band of his racial brothers, plundered Persia and after gaining a foot-hold there turned towards western Asia. In 1055 they captured the famous city of Baghdad and put an end to the Arab hegemony by appropriating the function and power of the Caliphate. From that time in their zeal of westward conquest they began to harass the eastern borders of the already established Byzantine Empire. They defeated Emperor Romanus IV (1067-71) in the famous battle of Manzikert in 1071 in Armenia. In this way, beginning with nomad raids, the Seljukian Turks established an important empire. In 1081 they captured Nicaea near Sea of Marmara. Generally Asiatic conquests were of a transient nature but the conquest of Asia-i-Kochak by the Seljukians was an exception. Its great significance lies in the establishment of a permanent empire which held sway over a large portion of Europe, Asia and, later on Africa. For about two centuries they were able to maintain the

Sultanat-i-Rum with Konia as their capital, and dauntlessly opposed the European crusaders.

Alauddin Kaikobad I, the Seljukian king, bestowed on Erthogrul, a son of Sulaiman Khan, the ancestor of the dynasty of Seljuk in Konia, the lands adjoining the eastern borders of the Byzantine Empire in the south of the plains of Brusa. Erthogrul strengthened, consolidated and enlarged his *jagir* and for a long time remained the watch dog of the Seljukian Empire against the crusaders. About the end of the thirteenth century, the time when the Seljukian Empire was being rocked by incessant invasions of the Mongols, Osman settled at Karahi and conquered several of the principalities of his master. Orkhan, his son, set up his capital at Brusa, penetrated into and found a permanent footing in Europe in 1335.

Amurath I captured Adrianople, subdued Macedonia and Albania. He and his successors pursued the policy of shattering and conquering the Byzantine Empire without which they felt themselves quite insecure in Anatolia. In Asia and Africa

the same policy was doggedly pursued by the Osmanis who sought to become the supreme masters of the whole of this region. The invasion of Europe by the Osmanis brought them in contact with their kindreds the Kajars, the Pomaks and the Tchitaks who were either heathens or Christians. Most of them, later on, embraced Islam, for the Anatolians had been largely Turkified and had accepted the religion of the conquerors.

The capture of Constantinople on the 29th May, 1453 gave the Osmanis complete mastery over the Straits and greatly enhanced their prestige and power both in Europe and Asia. No sooner were they masters of the important Imperial Capital of the Byzantine Empire than they made it clear to the world that henceforth they regarded themselves as the inheritors of that Empire.

By 1890 in Turkey itself, there were only about five million Greeks and Armenians out of a total population of about 13 millions. There has also been migration of Turkish and non Turkish peoples to and from the conquered pro-

vinces of the Ottoman Empire. The Turks are largely concentrated in the semi-desert highlands of Anatolia, and in the mountainous rim of the north and the south. The Armenians occupy the high valley floors about lake Van spreading northwards to the valley of Transcaucasia, and southwards to the plains of Cilicia round about the Gulf of Alexandretta. The semi-nomad Kurds live mostly in or near-about the mountain pastures at the headwaters of Euphrates and Tigris.

“The Peninsula, the western end of the fore part of the continent was a place where the warlike, wandering, or trading tribes, coming from the south-east and north-east, converged naturally. Semitic peoples inhabited the southern parts of Anatolia, and in the centre of that country their race, dialect and names seem to have prevailed among numerous populations ; in the south-west they seem to have intermingled with coloured men, perhaps the Kushits. In the eastern provinces the chief ethnic elements seem to have been connected with the Persians, and spoke languages akin to Zend ; others represented the

northern immigrants that bore the generic name of Turanians. In the west migrations took place in a contrary direction to those that came down from the Armenian uplands ; Thracians were connected by their trade and civilisation with the coastlands of Europe and Asia sloping towards the Propontis, and between both parts of the world Greeks continually plied across the Aegean Sea." (1)

It is thus wrong to assume that the Turks are all Moslems. The present population of Turkey is no doubt preponderantly Turkish in speech and the majority of them are followers of Islam. The figures of the 1935 census, show that 85 p.c. of the population of the republic speak the Turkish language and 98 p.c. are Musalmans by religion. Only 2 p.c of the population declared itself either Jews or Christians. The following are the figures.

¹ E. Reclus : *Nouvelle Geographie* p. 547.

Languages	In Thousands	Religions	Number
Turks	13,828	Jews	79,000
Kurds ✓	1,473	Christians	78,000
Arabs	145		
Greeks	109		
Circassians	92		
Jews (Spanish & Yedish etc.)	79		
Armenians	77		

Judging from its size and extent, the Turkish Republic is underpopulated and unlike Japan or Germany *Lebensraum* is not a problem there. The population of the Republic after the acquisition of the territory of Hattay in 1939 from France was 18.25 millions. This paucity of population may be accounted for by the Imperialistic wars which the Sultans fought for the preservation of their hold on the subject nations and peoples, the soldiers being mainly recruited from among the Turkish population of Anatolia. The drain on manpower by war, epidemic and pestilence was mainly responsible for such a big shrinkage of the population. It was also due to the neglect of the Sultans and their corrupt

bureaucracy in neglecting the economic development of the country.

In modern Turkey the problem of the minorities is not a serious one. The Kurds are the largest linguistic minority group inhabiting the borderland of Turkey, Iran and Iraq. In 1925 they revolted against the secularisation policy of Ataturk but were suppressed and are speedily being Turkified in language, dress and customs. The constitution of the Republic provides that all persons born within Turkey are to be Turks, irrespective of race, language or religion. Many of the immigrant Moslems such as Albanians, Bosnians and Circassians who have come from Balkanistan and other erstwhile provinces of the Ottoman Empire, are not Turkish speaking people, but proper care is being taken that they do not form separate minority and groups, and are being encouraged to learn the Turkish language. There remains now no difference between the Turks, the Jews, the Armenians and the Greeks who have made Turkey their home. The recent elections have returned two Greeks, one Armenian and one

Jew to the membership of the National Assembly (Kamutay). Outside the Republic there still remain about a million and a quarter Turkish speaking people ; they are mostly in the former European provinces of the Ottoman Empire. There are about 800,000 of these in Bulgaria, 200,000 in Roumania (Dobrudja), 150,000 in Macedonian Yugoslavia and 8,000 in Greek western Thrace. About 772,000 Turks migrated to Turkey between 1923-37 following an amicable settlement between the Greeks and the Turks after the Treaty of Lausanne. The statistics for 1934-37 reveal a total migration of 144,000 persons mostly from Roumania and Bulgaria. These immigrants are settled mostly in eastern Thrace, which lies outside Istanbul, has now been transformed into a solid Turkish region in contrast to the extremely mixed population of the Ottoman days.


Akin to the Europeans neither in race, language nor in creed, nor in social usages nor in political aptitudes, the brave and brilliant sons of the house of Osman for more than five centuries defied the Europeans. M. Elisee Reclus thus wrote, "For many

a year nas the cry 'Out of Europe' been uttered not only against the Osmanli leaders, but also against the Turks as a whole, and it is well known that this cruel wish has partly been fulfilled ; hundreds of thousands of Muslim emigrants from Greek, Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace, and Bulgaria have sought refuge in Asia-Minor, and these fugitives are only the remnants of the wretched people who had to leave their ancestral abodes ; the exodus is still going on, and, most likely, will not leave off till the whole of lower Rumelia has become European in language and customs. A new cry arises, 'Into the Steppes' and to our dismay we wonder whether this wish will not be carried out too. Is not conciliation possible between the hostile races, and must the unity of civilization be obtained by the sacrifices of whole peoples, especially those that are the most conspicuous for the noblest qualities—uprightness, self-respect, courage, and tolerance''¹

Kemal Ataturk was able to show to the world that the Turks have the guts to

¹ *Ibid* p. 547.

defy the cruel wishes of those who opposed the Turks in their right to live and let live. The rejuvenated Turkey stands with her fearless sons, to-day, to show to the world how they justified their existence.



Extent of the Ottoman Empire

CHAPTER III

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The conquest of Anatolia and the Straits by the Turks is one of the most important events of history. It brought peoples of antagonistic groups, different in race, cultures and religions, face to face with each other. The Dardanelles holds the key to the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas and the Bosphorus provides ingress and egress to and from the Black Sea. In this respect its capture by the Turks was of great significance. The Italian merchants were now as greatly concerned with the Turkish foreign policy, as they were in former days. By skilful diplomacy, by war and threats of wars, they were able to secure concession from the Turks of a free passage through the Dardanelles. Constant intrigues and threats such as these by the Europeans compelled the Ottoman Sultans to secure a permanent foothold in Balkanistan, which could never have been attained unless Bosphorus and Constanti-

nople lay in their hands. For so long as the Turks did not possess the Black Sea shores as well as Thrace they could not dictate their own terms to the European merchants. Thus the trade and political movements of Eurasia were responsible for many regions being added to the Ottoman Empire. Armenia was a meeting place of all the inner trade routes; Syria was the rich maritime hinterland whose ports provided an outlet to Europe for Asiatic trade. Iraq with the Persian gulf was the eastern counterpart of Syria. At all the key points important towns like Haifa, Mosul, Basra and Konia came into existence. The capture of Constantinople brought all these routes, towns and their hinterlands within the orbit of the Ottoman Empire.

Selim I (1512-1526) extended his dominions by conquering Persia, Kurdistan, Syria and Egypt. His son Sulaiman the Magnificent got as far as Hungary and defeated the Hungarian King Louis II at the battle of Mohacs in 1526. He also besieged Vienna in 1529. His admiral Khairuddin conquered North Africa. Turkey was thus able to control the entire trade of the Orient.

During the whole of this formative period, the foreign policy of the Sultans was motivated mainly by three objectives, *viz.* (a) to extend the Turkish power in the west and thereby finally defeat and destroy the European coalition against them, (b) to control all the trade routes of the east to the west (c) and to become undisputed leaders of their co-religionists by wresting the Caliphate from the Abbasids. The importance of the last ambition lay in the fact that if a Sultan could call himself 'Amirul Momineen' he could muster the entire Mussalman world against his European foes. No doubt the Sultans were the despots, nevertheless they were obliged to respect and obey the Islamic laws. They could not alter the sacred laws of Shariat which imposed restrictions on their despotic power and which they were obliged to observe in war and peace, in punishment of criminals, in the treatment of non-Muslims and generally in enforcing the supreme command of the Almighty. Within the domain of the Sultans there lived people of various religions, creeds, customs and traditions, a fact which made the task

of government delicate and difficult. Above all, there was the conflict of religions and cultures ; eastern and western. The non-Muslim population was organised in different 'Miliyats' (communities) according to their respective religion. They were granted a considerable measure of self-government and autonomy. Each of these 'Miliyats' looked after its own religious affairs, and provided for the education of its young folk, without any Imperial interference. These miliyats communicated with the Sultans through their officially recognized commune leaders. Thus in a sense Turkish domination affected them only superficially and in many respects these ethnic groups enjoyed fuller measure of autonomy than did similar groups in the most advanced countries of Europe. Sir H. Buller once stated, thus, "As to freedom of faith and conscience, the prevailing religion in Turkey grants other religions a tolerance that is seldom met with in Christian countries."

To the detriment of the Turks, the Greeks captured all the trade, industries and liberal professions. As dragomans and

journalists they were the only informers to the outside world and controlled public opinion in the west. "Though he is not lazy, the Turk does not like to hurry, 'Haste is devilish, patience is Godly,' he will often say. He cannot do without his 'kief' and idle dream in which he lives like a mere plant, without any exertion of his mind and will, who as rival, always in earnest, can derive profit even from his hours of rest. The very qualities of the Turk do him harm: honest, trustworthy, he will work to the end of his life to pay off a debt, and the business man takes advantage of this to offer him long credits that shall make a slave of him for ever. There is an axiom among business men in Asia-Minor: 'If you wish to thrive do not grant a Christian more credit than one tenth of his fortune; risk ten times as much with a Mohammedan.' Encumbered with such a credit, the Turk no longer possesses anything of his own; all the produce of his work, even his land will go to the usurer. His carpets, his wares, his flocks, even his land, will pass gradually in the hands of the foreigners." ¹.

¹Gallard, *Turkey in Europe*.

The governing class in Turkey never paid any heed or attention to the economic development of the country and did not care to improve the plight of the peasantry and the working class. These masters had no special interest except in so far as they hit or affected the income of the Imperial treasury. They never cared to take advantage of their commanding position in Asia, Europe and Africa in respect of commerce and trade.

The 'Miliyat' system split the Empire into heterogeneous and warring groups. These non-Muslim communities often intrigued with foreign powers against the Imperial power and were made use of by them to advance their political ends. A similar role was played by the trading companies of foreign origin.

Mohamad II in 1434 granted to the Republic of Venice extra-territorial privileges consisting of certain commercial immunities. These privileges constituted the framework of the system of capitulations of later years. In 1528 the Catalonians and the French were given some concessions in matters of commerce and trade by Sulai-

man II. Francis I, the King of France, having been beaten by Charles V of Spain made friendly rapprochement with the Turks and instigated the Sultan to march against the Hungarians. The Ottoman Empire in Asia, Egypt and Europe was by now consolidated and the entire Oriental and western trade was in the monopolistic hands of the Sultans. It was the desire to share in this trade which impelled France to make overtures to Turkey. The result was the signing of a treaty in 1536. By the terms of this treaty Francis I secured the help of Turkey against his enemies and in return promised the protection of France to the Ottoman Empire. At the same time he obtained for the French traders and merchants great trade privileges in the eastern seas ; preferential custom duties on their merchandise, the obligation of all foreigners engaged in eastern trade within the domain of the Sultan to sail under the French flag, and above all the privilege of appointing consuls in the Levant who would have jurisdiction over the French Subjects.

¹ *Le regime des capitulations.*

This treaty also conferred on France the protectorate of the Holy Places and entrusted her with the defence of the Christian religion.

This treaty is the starting point in any serious study of Turkey's foreign policy. The reaffirmation and renewal of these concessions to France in 1569, 1581, 1604, and 1673 lent permanency to the system of "capitulations." The great French capitulation of 1740 secured permanency of rights, on which were based all the extra-territorial claims of the French and other foreigners upto the outbreak of the Great war of 1914. In the last quarter of the 16th century Turkey was forced to grant concessions to Great Britain and to the Netherlands in 1598 and in 1612. The Hapsburg Empire was granted the first capitulation in 1718. By the end of the 18th century nearly all the European countries were able to extort concessions of a similar nature. These privileges soon became a bone of contention between the rival European states and the Imperial Turkey

"Such privileges, which were justifiable

at the outset, soon brought on unrestricted and unjustifiable interference by foreign powers in Turkish affairs. The powers attempted to justify the establishment and maintenance of this regime by alleging that they had to protect their subjects against the delays or evil practices of the Turkish courts of justice, though the powers that had managed to gain great influence in Turkey were already able, through their embassies, to defend fully the rights and interests of their own subjects."¹

The trading personnels from England, France, Germany, Russia, Holland and Italy were organised in a form of autonomous communities under the presidency of their respective ambassadors. In virtue of these rights all matters concerning the foreigners of one nationality were subject to the consuls of that power whose jurisdiction included the right of arrest and imprisonment. Any case arising between foreigners of different nationalities was heard in the court to which the defendant belonged. From the economic view point

¹. Gaillard : *Turks in Europe*.

these privileges and capitulations severely injured the Imperial treasury by binding the government and preventing it from levying differential duties. In addition to these the Great Powers established their own post offices in the different parts of the Empire, where they enjoyed extra-territorial rights.

Turning again to purely political events we notice that after the death of Sulaiman, the Magnificent, corruption set in and spread with fatal rapidity throughout the Empire and its bureaucracy. Internal and external difficulties complicated the situation and signs of exhaustion and decline were soon evident. The successors of Sulaiman were called on to solve the problem of efficiently securing an Empire which had no natural frontiers, and which was surrounded by unfriendly powers. The more extensive were the territories of the Empire, the more of a liability were they upon the resources of the State.

The relations during this period between the Venetian Republic and the Hapsburg Empire on the one hand and the Ottoman Empire on the other are of special

interest. Ever since the rise of the Turks the Venetian Republic had been hit by the loss of her trade and commerce. She had already been deprived of her rich possessions on the mainland of the Peloponnese and in the Aegean archipelago. But in spite of her reverses at the hands of the Turks and her loss of territory she still held an important position, a position which was threatening to the Sultans. Firmly established in Dalmatia she harassed the Sultan's provinces of Herzegovina and Bosnia from the Adriatic Sea. Her possession of Cyprus and Crete rendered the hold of the Turks in the Levant precarious and offered a convenient base of operations to the Christian enemies of the Empire. Selim during his reign demanded from the Republic the cession of the island of Cyprus. This immediately led to a coalition of the Christians under the leadership of Pope Pius V. The Holy League of 1570 chose Don John of Austria as its naval leader to encounter the Sultan's navy at the famous battle of Lepanto. Don John won the laurels of victory on the 7th October, 1571. This was the first great reverse the Turks had suffered in Europe

and its lesson was never lost upon the world. The Ottoman naval power, as Davis says, never entirely recovered from this great shock. Nevertheless in spite of their defeat the Turks still held a commanding position in the Mediterranean, and later on completed the conquest of the island of Cyprus in May 1573. The Venetian Republic was obliged to cede Cyprus and pay an indemnity.

In a period of about seventy years, between the death of Selim (1574) and the middle of the 17th century, the forward movement of the Ottomans was either slowed down or completely stopped. Friction with the neighbouring states was frequent. In the west the raids along the Austro-Hungarian borders were a perpetual menace to the Turks. The vassal rulers of Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia allied themselves openly with the Hapsburg monarch and other enemies of their suzerain, the Sublime Porte. Thus went on a war between the Hapsburg Empire and the Turks. In 1606, however, peace was concluded at Sitvatorok. The Sultan had to renounce his claim over

Transylvania, and Austria was liberated from the obligation of paying tribute for the western portion of Hungary. Since then it became clear that the Turks had reached the limits of their expansion in Central Europe beyond the valley of river Danube. And when from 1618 to 1648 the Hapsburg Empire was engaged in the thirty years war, there was a grand opportunity for the Turks to reconquer and re-establish their lost position. But unfortunately the Turks failed to avail of the chance. After the treaty of Westphalia Austria emerged as a great European power. In the second half of the seventeenth century both the Ottoman and the Hapsburg Empires were contesting for supremacy in the valleys of the rivers Save and Danube. After a brief spell of victories over Europe under the leadership of Mohammad and Ahmad, the Grand Viziers, better known as Kiuprilis, an era of degeneration set in. The Turks were defeated in 1683 and this was the signal for a concerted action against them by the Christians. The war was conjointly begun by Austria, Venice and Poland in 1684 and lasted till 1698. It revealed to the

world that the Ottoman Empire was no longer invincible and no longer had the strength to dominate the affairs of Europe. The Austrians captured Duda, delivered Transylvania and won the battle of Zenta. The Venetian forces invaded Morea and in three campaigns (1685-87) captured it from the Turks. In 1687 their armies crossed the isthmus of Corinth and took Athens. The Ottomans were forced to sue for peace and at Carlowitz in Hungary a treaty was signed in 1689. Among the Christian powers which signed this treaty was Russia, for Peter the Great too had at the eleventh hour entered the war so as to be able to claim a share of the territories of the declining Turks.

The treaty of Carlowitz marked the advent of a new era in the history of the Near East. 'From this time all serious dread of the military power of Turkey ceased in Europe' (Creasy). Henceforth the ambitious and empire-building Turks were to adopt a defensive policy. Throughout the 18th century Austria and Russia were the leaders of European aggression against Turkey.



Demilitarisation of the Straits

By gradually absorbing the East European plains Russia had by the 17th century begun to come in contact with the Sultans in the region lying to the north of the Black Sea. Upto this time Russia had no claim to be regarded as a European power. She was shut off almost on all sides. She had no access to the outside world either through the Baltic or the frozen seas to her north; towards the south were the Ottomans occupying the Black Sea outlet of the narrow Straits. Considering the geography of Russia and direction of her southern rivers, Peter decided that he should have an entry into the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. He found the Turks in difficulty and immediately pounced on the important port of Azov at the mouth of river Don in 1686. The treaty of Carlowitz secured him the coveted outlet to the Black Sea. This reverse opened the eyes of the Turks to the Russian menace and within ten years of it they turned the table upon the Tsar. Since then the Christian subjects of the Sultan have continued to look to Russia for their liberator; and their excitement was great when,

in the summer of 1711, Russia declared war on Turkey.

The Russians crossed the river Pruth but were encircled by the superior forces of the Sultan. Russia sued for peace, and on July 21, 1711 the Treaty of Pruth was signed. By the terms of this treaty their lost territory was restored to the Turks and Peter undertook to raze to the ground the fortress of Taganrog on the Sea of Azov. Turkey was once again the master of that region and Black Sea became a Turkish lake completely under Porte's control. France objected to every Russian move for obtaining the right of free navigation in the Black Sea, for France feared the installation of a rival in the Mediterranean.¹

So long as Black Sea remained a Turkish lake into which flowed most important rivers of Russia like the Don, Dniester, the Buga, the Dnieper, and the Kuban, which seem to be the natural highways of Russia, they were rendered quite

¹Art 1. 3, Dumont, *Corps diplomatique du droit des gen.*, Vol. 8, Pt. 1, p. 275.

useless for commercial and navigational purposes. "From the moment that Russia achieved something of political unity, from the moment she realised her economic potentialities, the question of access to the Black Sea, of free navigation of waters, and free egress from them into the Mediterranean became not merely important but paramount. To have accepted as final the terms extorted in 1711 would have meant for Russia economic strangulation and political effacement. Without access to the Black Sea Russia could become no more than second class power ; without command of the narrow straits which stand sentinel over the outer door she can never fulfil her destiny as one of the leaders of world civilization".¹

For the realization of her ambition Russia began to seek the friendship of strong European allies. France never liked the idea of increasing Russian influence in Europe and Asia-Minor. England was far too busy in courting the Sultans for the expansion of her own trade

¹Marriott : *The Eastern Question* p. 197.

and commerce in the Orient. Austria was then the only power on whom Russia could depend. Henceforth we notice both the powers striving constantly to molest the Turks. This attitude lasted till the rise of Prussia as a great power. However, Marquis de Villeneuve by his skilful and shrewd diplomacy succeeded in turning the table on the Austro-Russian coalition and saved Turkey from the humiliation of a major defeat. Indeed what resulted from the treaty of Belgrade of 1739 may be regarded as a major victory for the Turks, pregnant as it was with fruitful consequences. France acquired tremendous prestige in the court of the 'Sublime Porte' and wielded great influence on the politics of the Orient. The new lease of life thus obtained by the Turks was largely owing to France which greatly relieved her of the worries resulting from the pressure of the Austro-Russian coalition. Shortly after the signing of the treaty of Belgrade in 1740 the Austrian Emperor, Charles VI, died. His daughter's accession to the throne was challenged by the enemies of Austria who formed a league against her. Meanwhile

Frederick the Great, the Prussian king, advanced claims which threatened Austrian hegemony in Europe. The critical situation thus created in Europe, granted a further respite to the Ottoman Empire. But nothing was done by a succession of imbecile Sultans to consolidate their power or regain their lost prestige.

In 1763 Catherine II ascended the throne of Russia. She was one of the ablest monarchs that ever succeeded to the Tsarist crown. She did not lose any opportunity of translating into practice the cherished ambitions of Peter the Great in the foreign policy of Russia. France, the traditional ally of the Porte, now felt compelled to join Russia, and because of the reversal of diplomatic balance in Europe, had to surrender her interests both in Poland and Turkey. Soon by another turn of events Prussia was also brought within the Russian fold to wage war against the Ottoman Empire. Russian agents were employed to stir disaffection among the subjects of the Sultan in Greece, Crete, Bosnia and Montenegro. They were led to believe that their

deliverance from the yoke of the Turks would come through Catherine II. After great preparations, and diplomatic manou-
vering in October, 1768 war was declared by Russia against Turkey. France was alarmed at this development and withdrew herself from the Russian side. M. Vergennes, the French Ambassador at the court of Constantinople, thus wrote, "We must at all costs break the chain fastened upon the world by Russia.....The Ottoman Empire is the best instrument for doing it; and most interested in the success of the operation. True, the Turks are hopelessly degenerate, and the attempt will probably be fatal to them, but that does not concern us so long as we attain our objects."¹ In this war Catherine wanted to capture Constantinople and in 1770 sent her fleet all the way round Gibraltar to blockade the Dardanelles from the west. Turkey was defeated and forced to sign the humiliating treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, in 1774. The diplomatic world at once rejoiced in the treaty as it marked

¹ Sorel, *la Question d'orient au dixhuitieme Siecle*.

an epoch in the history of the west. "The Voltaireans and the Encyclopaedists, several of whom were on terms of friendship with the Russian Empress, acclaimed the treaty as a prelude to the re-establishment of the Greek Empire. Indeed, sometime before its conclusion, Potemkin presented a project to Catherine for expelling the Turks from Europe and establishing a Greek Empire under a Russian grand duke. The treaty conferred great powers on Russia. Thugut, the Austrian envoy at Constantinople, observed that the stipulations taken in their entirety testified to the diplomatic ability of the Russian negotiators and to the imbecility of the Turks and he even wrote that if the Porte could possibly be saved it could be only by very new measures. The cumulative effect of the articles of the Treaty was that the Turkish Empire was well nigh reduced to the status of a Russian province. The Russians claimed to have acquired by the treaty a moral and juridical right of intervention in the internal affairs of the Ottoman dominions, and a civilizing mission in general in the interest of all the Christian popula-

tions subject to Mussulman rule.”¹

No doubt this treaty marked the first milestone in the forward movemnt of Russia. Although the territorial gains of the Russians were not large in the Black Sea littoral yet she had won a definite foothold from where to jump forward for further conquest and adventures. Following is the text of Article XI, “For the convenience and advantage of the two empires there shall be a free and unimpeded navigation for the merchantships belonging to the two contracting powers, in all the seas which wash their shores ; the Sublime Porte grants to Russian merchant vessels, namely, such as are universally employed by the other powers for commerce and in the ports, a free passage from the Black Sea into the White Sea and reciprocally from the White Sea into the Black Sea, as also the power of entering all the ports and harbours situated either on the coast, or in the passages and channels which join the

¹ Phillipson and Buxton : *The Question of the Bosphorous and Dardanelles* p. 27.28.

seas".¹ Thus it was that Turkey lost her supremacy in the Black Sea and consequently in the lands adjoining it.

By her treacherous diplomacy Austria managed to obtain far more territory from the Turks than Russia could by war. She would attack Turkey whenever there was a chance for her to obtain something from the Turks and otherwise half-heartedly help them. Austria and Russia entered into a secret agreement whereby they agreed to make a common war against the Turks with a view to appropriating the whole of Turkey-in-Europe. This was the beginning of the second phase in the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. For Turkey the best defence against the liquidation of her empire was disagreement among her enemies and in fostering these disagreements Ottoman energy was not yet a spent up force. In 1789 war was again resisted by the Turks, Britain, Germany and Holland intervening and pledging help to her in case Russia did not listen to their counsels. Further in 1789 in France the fa-

¹F. Martens: *Etude historique Sur la politique russe dans la question d' Orient.*

mous 'French Revolution' broke out, and this too hampered the pernicious designs of Russia and Austria. On January 9, 1792 a treaty was signed by Russia and Turkey at Jassy, which led to the confirmation of the commercial treaty of 1783. The Sultan got back Moldavia; the Russian frontier was extended to the Dniester, and lastly the Sultan was forced to recognise the annexation of Crimea by Russia. The latter thus acquired all the coast line of the Black Sea between the rivers Dniester and the Bug.

Turkey was placed in a very difficult situation; dissension and misrule followed by revolts, plots and anarchy at home led to the further weakening of the empire. From the very beginning of the 19th century, the minds of European statesmen grew excited owing to the danger of Russia absorbing the Ottoman Empire bit by bit. In a Europe composed of warring states the security of the Ottomans more and more depended upon the maintenance of a sort of rough-and-ready balance of power. Napoleon's campaigns in Egypt drove Russia, Turkey and England into one camp to put a stop to his drive towards the

east. But In 1799 Napoleon's ambassador at Constantinople Sebastiani won over the Turks to his side. This forced England to oppose the Franco-Turkish coalition. The alliance of Tilsit in 1807 produced the coalition of Russia and France and carried Napoleon to the zenith of his power. He gave Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia, but the Sultan refused to acquiesce in it. This was followed by a declaration of war between Russia and Turkey. In May, 1812, the peace of Bucharest terminated the Russo-Turkish War, the Tsar renouncing his claim to the principalities seized by him, with the exception of Bessarabia. By the acquisition of Bessarabia Russia was able to push her boundary nearer Constantinople.

Various events of importance to Turkey must now be passed over, such as, for example the formation of Holy Alliance in 1815 and the renewal in November of the same year of the the Quadruple alliance between Britain, Germany, Austria and Russia. The Russian policy during all these years had aimed, at the deliberate exclusion of Turkey from

Europe on the ground of her fundamental incompatibility with the other European states in respect of religion, culture and civilization. This foreshadowed another onslaught on Turkey by Russia. At the Congress of Vienna Britain supported Metternich's plan to guarantee the integrity of Turkey. The Sultan was much too suspicious of these guarantees and plans of the Europeans, plans which he thought would lead to the establishment of some sort of protectorate over the declining empire of the Turks. In the meantime the revolt of Ali Pasha of Janina inspired the Greeks to rise against the Sultan. There was already in Greece a good deal of discontent, fomented largely by the secret society of *Hetaria Philike*, which was established at Odessa with the Tsar's consent. In March 1821 the Greek insurgents openly revolted. The Ottoman Government was forced to take stringent measures for the maintenance of law and order. The Greeks in desperation turned to England and asked her to accept a protectorate over the Ionian Peninsula. In the meanwhile, Tsar Nicholas I who had in 1825 succeeded to the Russian throne

forced the Sultan to sign a treaty at Ackerman in October 1826. The terms of this treaty granted absolute freedom of navigation to Russia in all the seas and waters of the Ottoman Empire for its merchant shipping. Britain and France both wished to intervene now in the 'Eastern Question' and through England's good offices an accord was brought about between Russia and France for their joint intervention in the Ottoman Empire. By the terms of the Treaty of London (1827) the three powers forced the Sultan to grant autonomy to the Greeks under his suzerainty. Unfortunately however certain unimportant events again led to the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Turkey. The treaty of Adrianople in 1829 brought added humiliations to the Turks. This treaty made the Sultan's Danubian principalities practically independent and confirmed Russia's right of freedom of trade in Turkey, and of freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and the Straits.

In 1832 there came another threat to the existence of the Ottoman Empire. This was

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers Vol. 3, p. 839.*

from Mohammad Ali, the Sultan's vassal in Egypt. Mohammad Ali's troops threatened Asiatic Turkey and rocked the very existence of the Empire. The Sultan in despair sought the help of Russia. France backed Mohammad Ali but Britain remained neutral. It was thus a heaven sent opportunity for Russia to extort more concessions from Turkey, and this time by professing her friendship. A Russian fleet soon entered the Straits and their troops entered the country, ostensibly for the defence of the empire against the insurgents. A treaty was signed at Unklier-Skelessi in 1833 by which Russia guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire with a secret clause which runs as follows, "His Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, wishing to spare the Sublime Porte the expense and inconvenience which might be occasioned by affording substantial aid, will not ask for that aid if circumstances should place the Sublime Porte under the obligation of furnishing it. The Sublime Porte, in place of the help which it is bound to furnish in case of need, according to the principle of reciprocity in the open treaty, shall limit its action in favour of the

Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Straits of the Dardanelles, that is to say not to permit any foreign ship of war to enter therein under any pretext whatever.”¹

This treaty was an eye opener to the western European powers as Russia had now obtained from the Sultan rights which amounted to the establishment of a Russian protectorate over Turkey. England and France presented notes of protest against this treaty which they alleged was in contravention of the pact of 1809. None of these powers however wished to be embroiled in any war and through the good offices of Metternich the Tsar was persuaded to declare that he had no intention of enforcing this treaty.

In 1839 Sultan Mahmood declared war on Mohammad Ali of Egypt who defeated the Ottoman army near Nessib on the Syrian frontier. The Ottoman Empire again seemed to be disintegrating. Russia was on her alert to share in the loot in the north and the east, while France was manoeuvring to profit in Egypt by backing

¹ Phillipson and Buxton : *The Question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles* p. 64.

Mohammad Ali. Britain was opposed to both of them. France was firm in keeping her hold on Algeria. She was in alliance with Spain and was hoping to be able to convert the Mediterranean into a French lake. In 1839 Britain took the first precautionary measure by occupying Aden.

The proposal of the Russian ambassador for the formation of a coalition of the four great powers to settle the Turco-Egyptian dispute was accepted. In July, 1840 it was decided at the London Conference that the Sultan should be protected against the Egyptian adventurer and that the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire relative to the closure of the Straits to every flag so long as the Sultan was at peace should be respected.¹ The Straits convention was a severe blow to Russian supremacy in the Ottoman Empire. She had to secure this supremacy at a great cost of life and treasure, and now was forced to surrender it because none of the powers would agree to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Tsar Nicholas was quite conscious of this diplomatic defeat and henceforth concentrated

¹ *Life of Lord Palmerston, Vol. II.*

more and more on the task of regaining his lost prestige and influence. Russia began to make occasional references to Turkey as the "Sickman of Europe" whose territories should be divided up among his prospective inheritors. In these circumstances England, France, and Austria grew more and more suspicious of Russia's designs on the Ottoman Empire. In 1844 and 1847 the Sultan prohibited the entry of foreign vessels in the Straits by night. From sunset to sunrise these were to be treated as ships of war. In June 1844 Tsar Nicholas visited England and declared his aim of maintaining the status quo in Turkey. The suggestion of the Tsar for the distribution of the spoils after the destruction of Turkey created further suspicions in the minds of the British statesmen.

Nicholas dissatisfied with his visit to England, sought to find some plausible excuse for once again interfering in Turkish affairs. In 1850 he turned his attention to the question of the control of the Holy Places, as protector of the ortho-

dox churches which was refused by the Sultan. He had already proposed to the British Ambassador in 1852, that they ought to agree about the funeral of the Sickman ; and invaded Turkey in 1853. Turkey naturally turned to England and France for help. The British and French fleets were immediately sent to the Straits on a treaty being signed at Constantinople between Turkey and the other two above named powers. The war was fought in Crimea and the main problem at issue was the Straits Convention, which might be regarded as the cause of the Crimean War. After the war, at the peace conference also, the problem of the Straits and of the Black Sea proved to be the most difficult one. Turkey hoped that Russia would, after the losses she had sustained in the Crimean War, surrender all the advantages that had been previously extorted from her. Four points were laid down at the peace conference. The first provided for the abolition of the Russian suzerainty over the Danubian provinces ; the second for the free navigation of the river Danube ; the third for the neutralization of the Black Sea

and the fourth guaranteed the position of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. According to the terms of the Treaty of Paris (1856), Turkey was admitted to the advantages of the public law and the international system of Europe.' The Black Sea was declared a neutral sea and Russia was forbidden to maintain any fleet on its southern shores or keep any arsenal there. It was also declared that if there should arise any dispute between the Sublime Porte on the one hand and any or more of the signatories on the other, which might endanger their relations, the Sublime Porte, and each of such other powers, before having recourse to the use of force, should afford opportunity of mediation. The contracting powers also recognized that they could not, in any case, either collectively or separately interfere in the relations of the Sultan with his subjects, or in the internal administration of his Empire. It was also agreed upon that, in order to facilitate commerce and maritime interests, the Sultan and Russia would admit consuls into their ports and upon the coast of Black Sea, in conformity with the principles of international law.

Upon the proposal of Austria a further convention, to be signed by Britain, Austria and France, was executed, securing the integrity and independence of Turkey on their joint and several guarantee. It was also settled that any infraction of this treaty would be considered by the signatories as a *casus belli*.¹

✓ This convention precluded Russia because it was mainly directed against her. Britain adhered to her purpose of preventing Russia from becoming the master of the Straits, a contingency which would endanger her commercial and political interests in the Orient. Austria too had similar apprehensions against Russia in the Danubian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Opinions on the real significance of the Crimean War have varied. Robert Morir's view is, "The only perfectly useless, modern war was the Crimean War for in the absence of Russian folly, the Porte could have been easily liquidated." But it is only an extreme view. Marriott gives a saner view when he says, "The Crimean War was

¹ Hertslet, *Map of Europe*. P. 12 Vol. II 80.

fought ostensibly to maintain the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. That principle received its consecration in the Treaty of Paris. The supreme purpose which inspired the Western powers in their joint enterprise was to repudiate the claims of Russia to an exclusive protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte, and to arrest her progress in the Black Sea and the narrow Straits. That purpose was apparently achieved in 1856. But contemporaries were as usual slow to apprehend the things which really belonged unto their peace. Beneath the surface of the Balkan politics there were fires smouldering, forces silently at work ; which, in the middle of the nineteenth century, few people could have perceived.....They set out to repel Russia and save Turkey. What they really saved was not effete rule of the Ottoman Sultans, but the future of the nations which were not yet reborn.”¹

Later on we notice that during the early period of his reign the entire foreign policy of Alexander II was directed towards the

¹ Marriott, *Eastern Question*, P. 285.

removal of this incubus. The years following the treaty of 1856 witnessed a rapid growth of national consciousness of the European states. Italy unified herself, Germany consolidated herself and Britain developed a world wide trade and an Empire. But Russia was reeling under the blows of humiliations and restrictions on her development. In 1870, the Franco-Prussian war broke out which afforded a chance to Russia to try to recover what she had lost, since Europe was much too preoccupied with her own affairs. Prussia agreed to help Russia in abrogating and denouncing the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris. Much resentment was roused in England when, in August 1870, it was reported from Budapest and Vienna that negotiations were being carried on between the Russian ambassador at Constantinople and Ali Pasha, the Sultan's Grand Vizier, for the abrogation of that treaty. Ignatieff, the Russian ambassador, mentioned in a despatch that 'as the condition of Western Europe was favourable to his country's eastern interests, he thought it his duty to prepare the minds of the Turkish ministers

for grasping the aims of the Russian policy in this respect, centred, as it was, around a revision of the treaty of 1856. He felt himself convinced that there were only two methods of influencing the minds of the Turks in the most effective way; first by adopting a brusque and menacing attitude; second by gradually winning them over to their side by persuasive means. The second method, he thought, was more practicable for the moment.

Russia, having prepared the ground for the final step, protested that while she was disarming in the Black Sea, Turkey was garrisoning and maintaining large naval forces in the Straits and the Black Sea, and Britain and France were mobilizing their squadrons in the Mediterranean. The Russians maintained that this was contrary to the treaty and the Straits convention which exposed their country to great danger. England protested and Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary, refused to admit the Russian interpretation of the treaty and openly said that he was unable to admit that one signatory could release itself from its obligations by adopting these

virulent methods. The result was the calling of another conference in London which after much deliberation agreed to close the Straits as it was under the treaties of 1841 and 1856, but conferred on the Sultan greater power to open the Straits to friendly powers if he so desired. The Black Sea was neutralised and Russia was left at liberty to build and maintain a fleet. This was a menace to the very existence of Turkey.

Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of London, a fresh crisis arose in the Balkans culminating in the rise of the subject peoples against their Sultan. The panslavist movement and propaganda of Russia made it worse. In July 1875 revolt broke out in the province of Herzegovina and soon spread to Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro. All attempts to pacify, and promises of reform and of grant of rights by the Sultan failed. But the interested powers too failed, for the insurgents would not rely on their promises. Russia definitely was at the back of all these troubles. She was at that time determined to reopen the question of the Straits by aggressive methods. On April 16, 1877 she made a pact with Ru-

mania and obtained permission for the passage of her troops through that country. Ultimately on April 19, the Tsar declared war against Turkey. Turkey appealed to the signatories of the previous treaty for help. The British Foreign Office was determined to oppose any change in the status quo so far as the Straits and the Imperial capital of Constantinople were concerned. The other powers, namely Austria, Prussia, France and Italy observed benevolent neutrality. Turkey was suffering reverse after reverse but her appeal for help was not paid any heed by any of the signatories except England. England persistently protested to the Russian Government against the policy which could only result in the occupation of the Straits and Constantinople by Russia. On January 31, 1878 Turkey was forced to sign an armistice. Britain's suspicions against Russia had become further intensified. It was now becoming quite clear that the problems of the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire could not be settled only by Russia but that they would have had to be solved by a full Euro-

pean conference. The treaty of San Stefano which Russia had imposed on Turkey was shelved after heated discussions, protests and diplomatic manouevrings, and at last the objective of diplomacy shifted to off-setting Russian dominance in the Balkans. It was apprehended that once Russia was able to establish herself in the vicinity of Constantinople she would without doubt regain control over the Straits.¹

Shortly before the European Congress met in Berlin, England tried to strengthen her position by making a separate arrangement with the Russians agreeing to certain territorial concessions for them, and also by signing a pact of defensive alliance with Turkey. To Turkey Britain gave promise of military help in case the Tsar threatened any of her Asiatic possessions. To be able to defend Turkey she demanded the island of Cyprus from the Sultan which was to be occupied and administered by Britain. It was with this background that the powers met at Berlin on June 13, 1878 and proceeded to settle the 'Eastern Question'.

¹ *British Foreign and State papers, Vol. 69 pp. 794-849.*

The decline of the Ottoman Empire had produced a vacuum which had to be filled now. For sometime past the view that had been popular in European political circles was that a satisfactory substitute for the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans would be the creation of the Christian states in the countries which had been struggling for national independence on the Balkan soil. Therefore the Berlin Congress conferred independence on Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania and Greece. The greater Bulgaria was shorn off the greatness envisaged for her by the Treaty of San Stefano. The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina passed on to the administration of Austria and Hungary which was confirmed by the conference. Russia was allowed to come closer to the Straits. Turkey was greatly weakened by being deprived of the rich portions of her Empire. On the other hand we notice that Austrian expansion in the Balkans was unsatisfactory to and irritated the Italians. Materially France got nothing from the Berlin Congress but she was assured of non-interference in her interests in Tunisia. In a

way this congress was another milestone in the would-be partition of the remnant of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, Asia, and Africa. To sum up the whole position it would be right to say that this congress brought the doom of Turkey in Europe and of Russian ambitions in the Black Sea and the zone of the Straits.

“To pass from the congress of Berlin to the early struggles of the reborn Balkan states means more than a change of temperature and environment. It involves abrupt transition from drab prose to highly coloured romance; from a problem play to transpontine melodrama; from the traditional methods of the nineteenth century diplomacy to those of primitive political society. Transported to the Balkans we are in the midst of bouleversements and vicissitudes, political and personal; sudden elevations; sudden falls; democratic constitutions and autocratic *coup d'etat*; plotting and counterplotting; the hero of yesterday, the villain of to-day, and again the hero of tomorrow; abductions, abdications and assassinations; the formation and dissolution

of parties ; of tragedy and comedy , of obscuratation and progress.”¹

In this passage Marriott correctly depicts the confused and unstable conditions of the Balkans, relieved of Turkish rule, behind a facade of small states. European diplomacy had willed that the existence of these small states should prevent Russia from dominating Turkey and the Balkans and that on the other hand, Turkey should grow weaker and depend more and more upon her western allies. None of the newly born states was in itself satisfied with the situation thus created. Besides there existed intense rivalry amongst the bigger ones of them over the Balkan and Oriental strategy. Within a period of about thirty years, after the congress of Berlin, throughout the whole of Europe there were secret and open diplomatic manouevs and counter monouevs which were responsible for the establishment of two political blocks, the Triple alliance and the Triple Enente. They were jockeying for position and influence in the Balkans and Turkey. The secret conclusion of an agreement in June, 1881

¹ *Ibid.*

between Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary better known as "*Dreikaiserbund*" or the "League of three Emperors" sought to maintain the existing status quo in the Balkans and the territorial integrity of Turkey in Europe. Their purpose was to maintain the regime of the Straits in accordance with terms of the treaties of 1856-71. No doubt there was much higgling and bargaining for spheres of interest and influence and many secret arrangements were then made in anticipation of any slow or sudden shift in the Balkan politics ¹.

During all these years the Ottoman Emperors, their officials and advisers were generally unscrupulous and it was only when their haughty imperialist attitude was challenged that they realised how false was their sense of strength and confidence. After encountering several crushing defeats at the hands of their European rivals some of them began to think seriously of introducing reforms and others sought refuge from the cares of their public duty in life of the harem. Complete

¹ A. F. Pribram : *The Secret treaties of Lust-Hung* 1879-1914, Vol. I, P. 37.

degeneracy had set in their social and political systems. The economic condition of the country was growing worse steadily and the Imperial treasury was on the verge of bankruptcy. In 1881 an international financial commission was appointed to control and manage certain sources of the Ottoman revenue and Turkey was obliged to accept its terms.

Until 1822 there was no German capital invested in Turkey ; but from this time onward upto the declaration of the last Great war the Reich Government took a keen interest in the economic affairs of the Turks. The German share of the Ottoman Government debt rose from five to twenty per cent while her investments in various industrial ventures rose from forty to sixty million marks. But the French investment exceeded these, because they controlled the Ottoman Bank and many other commercial concerns in Turkey. The European capitalists found it more lucrative to invest their money in Turkey and within a very short time the whole economic life of the country was mortgaged to the foreigners.

“It was only in response to Govern-

ment demands that foreign capital moved into Turkey. All organised large scale enterprise was dependent upon it and owned by it. The Turkish Banking system was entirely foreign and foreign banks conducted the official business as well as private business. The railroad was financed almost entirely from outside as were irrigation work, posts and bridge construction mineral exploitation and municipal public utilities." ¹

The foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire was more complicated by the appearance of Germany in the arena of Eastern Question'. Prussia at first was not concerned with the problems of Turkey and Near East and was quite satisfied to leave the matters in the hands of the Habsburg monarchy which was, at that time, the ardent exponent of *Drang nach Osten*. From the congress of Vienna down to the coming in power of Bismarck, Germany, was far too much occupied in waging wars against Denmark, Austria and France. In 1866 Bismarck turned Austria out of Germany and by

19. H. Feis, *Europe, The World's Banker.*

helping Italy against Austria gave the final blow to the Hapsburg hegemony in Europe. England was no longer considered in Turkey as a sympathetic and faithful ally for after her occupation of the island of Cyprus in 1878 and of Mr. Gladstone's coming to power relations between the two countries became strained.

The Turks were haunted by the fear of Russian aggression and naturally they stood in need of an ally who could act as a check against the avarice of Russia, England, France, and Austria. Count Hatzfeld, the German ambassador in Turkey was quick to realise that in the Turkish search for an ally there was a chance for Germany. As we have seen in the preceding pages that from the days of Sulaiman the Magnificent, France had the confidence of the Sultans and held a very important position in their counsels early in the last century but the position of France had deteriorated and since then it was the constant endeavour of the English to win the *beaux yeux* of the Sultan. Germany entered the field at the right moment. The occupation of Egypt by England in 1882 finally shattered the reliance

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and confidence which Turkey reposed in her.

In 1841, the young German Emperor William sent a friendly mission under Von Moltke to Turkey and in 1889 William II himself went to pay a visit to Sultan Abdul Hamid. In the wake of the German Emperor went Prussian soldiers, traders, and diplomats. The branch of a German bank was opened in Constantinople and the German traders and commercial travellers began to penetrate every nook and corner of the Ottoman Empire. In 1918 with the next visit of the German Emperor to the Sultan concessions were secured in the port of Haider Pasha for the German-Anatolian Railway. This bestowed a reality to the German dream of *Drnag Nach Osten*. Dr. Sprenger a great German orientalist thus wrote, "The east is the only territory in the world which has not passed under the control of one of the ambitious nations of the globe. Yet it offers the most magnificent field for colonization, and if Germany does not allow this opportunity to escape her ; if she seizes this domain before the Cossacks lay hand upon it, she will have secured the best share in the partition of

the earth. The German Emperor would have the destinies of nearer Asia in his power if some hundred thousand armed colonists were cultivating these plains; he might and would be the guardian of peace for all Asia."¹

The Pan-German League in an article under the title 'Germany's claim to the Turkish Inheritance' wrote as follows "As soon as events shall have brought about the dissolution of Turkey, no power will make any serious objections if the German Empire claims her share of it. This is her right as a World power, and she needs such share far more than the other Great Powers because of the hundreds of thousands of her subjects who emigrate, and whose nationality and economic subsistence she must preserve."²

England, France and Russia grew restive and began to entertain great apprehensions about the German penetration of the East. In 1888 all the rights of the Anglo-Greek syndicate working in Turkey were transferred on more attractive terms to the Deut-

¹A Spregner, *Babylonian das reichste*

²*La question D'Orient* by Cheradame P. 5-7.

sche Bank of Berlin and of another Bank of Stuttgart. A year later the Ottoman Company of Anatolian Railways was floated under its auspices. This was the fore-runner of the German ambition of constructing the Berlin-Baghdad Railway which was to stretch from Hamburg to Vienna and thence through Budapest, Belgrade, Nish and Constantinople to Basra, linking the Persian Gulf region with central Europe, all under the control of German militarism.

The German Foreign Office shrewdly did not open its mind or disclose its real interest in the 'Eastern Question' for sometime. It pretended that Germany's aspirations were nothing but economic. The German monarch assured Tsar Nicholas II that he had no desire of interfering in his interest in the Straits. But following the German Railway concessions, Russia proposed in March, 1899 a conference for arriving at an understanding over the question of the Straits and the future of the Ottoman Empire. The German Chancellor, Bulow, informed Count Osten-Sacken, the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, that no such

conference was necessary since Germany had no desire to intervene or interfere in Russian sphere of interest in the Straits and the Near East.¹

But in 1905 Russia was defeated by Japan in the Far East. Further, there rose in Russia important and militant political parties which demanded drastic changes in the system of government. The effect of all this was evinced in weakening the position of the Tsar and his Government. Russia was thus once again forced to turn towards Europe to regain her lost influence and power. To achieve this aim Izvolski, her Foreign Minister, turned to France and England. On August 31, 1907 an agreement was reached between Britain, France and Russia at the Russian capital, St. Petersburg of discuss the question of the opening of the Straits. At Racconigi² Russia secretly entered into a treaty with Italy by which Italy undertook to maintain the attitude of a benevolent neutral should Russian Government succeed in forcing the other powers to open the

¹ *Die Grosse Ploitik* Vol. 14, Pt. ii.

Straits in her favour and as a prize for that attitude Russia would acquiesce in Italy's claim to Tripoli.¹

In December 1909 another secret agreement was reached at between Russia and Bulgaria with the object of checking Austria-Hungary's advance in south-eastern Europe. Therefore Tsar became the champion of the Pan-Slav movement in Europe, which, it was thought, would further weaken the Turks and compel the other powers to open the Straits in Russia's favour. A vivid account of this chapter of the foreign policy of Great Powers is given by H. A. Gibbons. He says "The history of international relations during the last hundred years shows in almost every decade the decisive influence of the question of the devolution of Mohammedan lands in the foreign policy of the Great Powers. Who can deny that the 'Eastern Question,' created by the decadence of Islam and kept in the foreground of diplomatic pre-occupations by the fear that every other power was trying "to get in on the ground

¹*Une Livre Noire* Vol. I pp. 375-378

floor "in Mohammedan countries, has been the principal factor in European alliances and European conflicts since the Congress of Vienna? Napoleon's lack of success in holding Alexander after the Tilsit interview; the impairment of the Holy Alliance over the question raised by the Greek War of Independence, the policy of England towards France in regard to Mohammad Ali; the Crimean War and the Treaty of Paris; French intervention in Syria; Bismarck's bribe to Russia in 1870; the attitude of England and Austria towards Russia in the Turkish War of 1877 and the congress of Berlin, Italy's entrance into the Triple Alliance after she took Tunis; the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, with Egypt and Morocco as the principal "Compensation"; the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, for which Persia paid the piper and Russia's use of her opportunity in Serbia after Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina; the effect of maritime considerations upon Italy's international relations when she found herself in Tripoli and Rhodes, the change in the attitude of the Balkan States towards one another

when the powers imposed the Albanian embargo—had these events no part in preparing and precipitating the Great War?"¹

At the outbreak of the Turco-Italian War in 1911 Izvolski's proposal was taken up by his successor and efforts were made for a convention of the powers to re-open the question of the Straits. But no headway was made because Turkey was deadly opposed to any such proposal. France evaded it and Germany, because of her economic and political interests in Turkey, was by now an open friend of the Ottoman Empire. Britain too shrewdly evaded it, being afraid of becoming embroiled in any adventurous war. Immediately after the outbreak of the war between the Turks and the Italians, Turkey closed the Straits. This inflicted severe losses on Russia's trade and commerce. Russia was becoming more and more conscious of the advantages and disadvantages accrued to her respectively by the opening and the closing of

¹Gibbons, *The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East*, pp. 140-160.

the Straits and would not tolerate the installation over them of any other power than the Turks so long as she herself was not strong enough to occupy them. Her occasional espousal of the cause of Turkey was never motivated by friendship or *bon voisinage* but by selfish considerations. The outbreak of the Balkan wars introduced changes in the territorial *status quo* which again made important shifts in the balance of power.

During this period of turmoil and misfortunes in the Ottoman Empire there were amongst the Turks two groups of people—the Turks and the Ottoman Imperialists. The latter class was the ruling class. Their idea of State was not based on race, which they thought should have nothing to do with the State. The State to them was a geographic entity within the bounds of which people of diverse origins and cultures could be united under a common political tie. The simplicity and austerity of the Turks had been exposed to a severe infection of the luxuries of the Byzantines which ultimately degenerated them. The Ottoman imperialists had adopted some of the

vile traditions of their predecessors and after the lapse of some time they were no longer the pure and simple, brave and honest people as they had been earlier. Harem life was re-oriented on the exact model of the Gynaecaea of the Empress Helen. They became strangers to the Turkish masses and looked upon them as an inferior people. The result of these earlier transformations was felt more and more acutely as the Empire declined and began to disintegrate. In order to keep the remnants of the Empire intact they turned to exploit the religious feelings not only of the Turks but also of their co-religionists throughout the world. Side by side with this there grew upon them an urge to adopt western methods and on Pastuerian principle they wanted to fight the disease by its own serum. In this confusion there came in being a curiously hotch potch intelligentsia which soon after the Greek War of Independence in 1830, came out with a programme of reforms on western lines. High Admiral Khalil Pasha once said, "I am convinced that unless we speedily reform ourselves on European lines we

must resign ourselves to the neccessity of going back to Asia. Thus we notice the inauguration of the 'Committe of Union and Progress' which undertook to reform the system of the government. "The Committee of Union and Progress was really formed as early as 1891, but it was properly established with its headquarters at Salonica near about 1806. The party revolted against the Government and acquired great popularity in the beginning of the present century. The revolution of 1909 was widely proclaimed as being both non-racial and non-religious, and was joined by a number of subject people of different races, cultures, languages and religions."

The establishment of the constitutional government was their primary aim. Sultan Abdul Hamid was forced to accept a constitution. A strong group in the party was completely *bourgeoisie* and wished to maintain and keep the Empire intact. The ideas of reform and progress were opposed by all the reactionary elements both within and outside Turkey. No doubt the rivalry of the Great Powers was a big obstacle in the attainment of the reforms which the Young

Turk Party wished to initiate both in home and foreign affairs. The non-Turkish subjects of the Sultan by virtue of the special privileges granted to them by Sultan Abdul Hamid opposed the programme of the party. The non-Muslim Miliyats who had enjoyed for a long time considerable autonomy, and their leaders because of their vested interest, too were opposed to any reforms and stood by the despotic Sultan to help him in his move for a counter revolution. The counter revolution was unsuccessful.

The Sultan was conscious of the fact that both his position and throne were menaced chiefly by the progressive elements of the Young Turks. To counteract this he adopted the doctrine of pan-Islamism. This appealed the entire Mussalman world which acclaimed him as a hero and bestowed on him a popularity that still persists. Abdul Hamid also envisaged the possibility that his pan-Islamic movement would compel the two Great powers, France and England to side with him in keeping in continued subjugation the big muslim population of his empire in Asia and Africa. His next step in the foreign policy was to align

Turkey with Germany as a counter force against Russia, England and France. Being tired of Abdul Hamid's policy of repression and its consequences, of the alignment with European powers, the Young Turks in 1909 deposed him and with the help of the army restored order in the capital. But unfortunately the new regime was not given a fair chance of survival and the initiation of the reforms was checked by the European *agents provocateur* with the result that a series of rebellions started within the Empire. As a counter measure to Russia's Pan-Slav movement the party started the Pan-Turanian movement. The motive of this movement was to deter Russia in her aggressive policy. Their plan of action was two fold : firstly, an agreement with all the branches of Turco-Tartar people within and outside the Empire to join, and exert together to get rid of all the foreign domination ; secondly, to try to Turkify the non-Turkish elements of the Empire. But all the hopes of the new regime were shattered when in quick succession, Bulgaria declared war and threw off the Turkish yoke, Austria annex-

ed Herzegovina and Bosnia, Greece annexed the island of Crete and Italy captured Tripoli in Africa. These Turkish reverses created a false hope amongst the Europeans of the final extinction of the Ottoman Empire. It was the outcome of this hope that they began to take a very curious attitude in Turkish affairs which persisted from the beginning of the Balkan Wars right upto the declaration of the last Great War of 1914. No doubt the question of the Straits remained dormant during the Balkan Wars, but the policy of the powers towards this question still remained a very controversial one. England proposed the internationalisation of the Imperial Capital while France was extremely apprehensive of Russian strength in the Near East.

For a while there was lull in the Balkans. But the question of the Straits sprang up again all of a sudden, consequent on the appointment of Von Saunders the German trainer of the Turkish army. Von Saunders was also made the commander of the Turkish forces quartered at Constantinople. The Balkan Entente, Russia and the West European powers became extremely

suspicious of German designs and intentions in their *drang nach Osten* policy.

"The German anticipation unquestionably was that by means of the Turkish alliance she would be able to exploit Mesopotamia, to penetrate Persia commercially and politically, to deliver powerful attack upon the British position in Egypt and to threaten the hegemony of Great Britain in India. For all these ambitious schemes Constantinople was regarded as an indispensable base."

The Germans were able to consolidate their influence in the Balkans during all this period of comparative quiet. Russia now realized that her policy of opening of the Straits, though not at that stage opposed by Britain and France, would be the bone of serious contention with the Austro-German combination and that her interests in the Ottoman Empire would be greatly jeopardized through the tremendous influence that Germany had gained at the court of the *Sublime Porte*. Austro-German diplomacy was engaged in the breaking up of the Entente of the Balkan States by stirring up dissension among

them in furthering their own economic and political penetration. The Germans succeeded in convincing the Ottoman Government that there was a secret understanding between England, France and Russia which recognized as rightful Russia's claim in the Straits and over the Imperial Capital, Constantinople. This made Turkey more suspicious of Russia and the West European countries, with the result that she began to drift towards Germany more and more. It should also be noted that Germany's Turkish plans, such as the construction of Berlin-Baghdad Railway, would without doubt have conferred great economic benefits on Turkey, by the opening up of the rich hinterland of Anatolia. The Turks were called upon to make a choice between the two evils. She was less afraid of Germany than of her traditional enemy, the Tsar. With the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 Turkey was placed in a somewhat awkward position. In the early days of the war she observed neutrality for some time until she was goaded by Germany to come on her side. Unfortunately certain incidents for which the

allies were responsible provided a good excuse to the Turkish War party headed by Enver Pasha to declare war against France, Britain and their allies. The spirit in which Turco-German negotiations were carried on is depicted in the following statement of M. Bompard, the former French Ambassador at the Turkish Imperial court. "Owing to the treaty of August 2, Turkey was *ipso facto* a belligerent; yet though the military authorities acted in conformity with the treaty, the civil authorities *i.e.*, the Government, properly speaking—had a somewhat different attitude. In the first place, the Government declared that it was not at war with France and England. The Grand Vizier had even made formal declaration of neutrality with Paris and London; it only had to do with Russia; besides, the thing was not urgent, as the Russian decree of mobilisation had just been issued."¹

The ostensible neutrality so far observed by Turkey was compromised when she allowed two German warships to enter the

¹ Bompard's *Letter to Eclair*, June 25, 1921.

Straits in violation of the Straits convention of 1841, 1856, 1871. The allies immediately protested. Later the German vessels were purchased by the Turkish Government though in fact they virtually remained under the command of the Germans. On September 12, 1914 Turkey closed the Straits and when a British destroyer halted a Turkish battleship and forced her to return to the Sea of Marmara, the Young Turks under the leadership of Enver Bey openly sided with Germany. It was their earnest desire to recover as much of their lost territories and prestige as was possible by allying themselves with Germany. The entry of Turkey into the war threw the Balkans in serious embarrassment chiefly owing to the closing of the Straits.

Meantime France and Britain gave assurances to Russia in respect of her interest in the Straits and in the spoils of the Ottoman Empire and persuaded her to agree to a concerted attack on the Dardanelles. Russia had the same old apprehension against her allies and felt that once the Straits were occupied by France and Britain, she would be left high and dry.

Viscount Grey thus summed up the Russian position, "It has always been British policy to keep Russia out of Constantinople and the Straits; we fought for that object in the seventies of the nineteenth century; of course it was our main policy still. Britain was now going to occupy Constantinople, in order that when Britain and France had been enabled, by Russia's help, to win the war, Russia should not have Constantinople at the peace."¹

The allies felt the great necessity of keeping Russia in good humour and consented vaguely to the demands submitted by Sazonow on March 4, 1915 on behalf of the Russian Government according to the terms of which Russia was allowed to occupy Constantinople, annex the European coast of Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, the Dardanelles together with the important islands of Imbros, Fenedos, southern Thrace and a portion of Asiatic shore along with the Ismid peninsula.² This solution of the long discussed and difficult problem

¹*Twenty Five Years*, Vol. 11, p. 187.

²*Constantinople et les Detroits*, Vol. 1, No. XLIX., P. 175.

of the much coveted Straits set the stage for the making of conflicting secret treaties, created for friction among the contending rivals. The formidable blows of the allies led to the collapse of the last remnant of the Ottoman Empire.

“ It was only to be expected that Turkey should be defeated in the long run. Besides, her fronts in Gallipoli, Syria, and the Caucasus, where she fought against the forces combined or separate, of Russia, England, and France, she was also at war with the Arabs, her own subjects and co-religionists. The entire non-Turkish population, Christian or Moslem, organised itself against her and stabbed her constantly in the back,”¹ After the crushing defeat of 1918, the Young Turks almost entirely disappeared from the scene and a new Cabinet was formed. On October 23, 1918 Izzat Pasha the Grand Vizier declared that his Government was ready to accept a peace, based on the Wilsonian principle of self-determination. On October 30, of the same year an armistice was signed between

¹Halide Edib, *Turkey Faces West* p. 141.


the allies and the Sultan on a warship at Mudros. That is how the Ottoman Empire was liquidated. This liquidation of the Empire again sowed dissension amongst the allied nations, which afforded an excellent opportunity to the rejuvenated nationalist Turks to survive once again under the able guidance of Mustapha Kemal.

CHAPTER IV

TURKEY FACES THE PEACE CONFERENCE

With the armistice of 1918, the World War I came to an end. The victorious powers sought to include the backward and undeveloped countries of Asia and Africa in their respective zones of influence and spheres of interest. But both in Europe and in Asia there were many small communities hitherto lacking in vitality that were seeking for themselves a free and independent status. They looked to the victors for the attainment of their ambitions. On the other hand there came in being a number of secret treaties among the victorious powers, some of these were meant to distribute the territories of the former Ottoman Empire.

We have already noticed the secret settlement entered into between France, England and Russia in 1915 by the terms of which, Russia was to annex Thrace, occupy Constantinople and the peninsula of Gallipoli along with the Asiatic coast



Division of Turkey at the Treaty of Sevres

of the Bosphorus. Then there was the Treaty of London by which Italy obtained the right to annex the group of islands known as Dodecanesia. It was also recognized by this Treaty that 'Italy is interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean and that in the event of a total or partial partition of Turkey in Asia she ought to obtain a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia.'

Another important secret agreement was the Sykes-Picot agreement between Russia, Britain and France by the terms of which Russia was to get Armenia, France was to obtain the coastal strip of Syria and south-eastern portion of Anatolia and Britain was assigned southern Mesopotamia along with the Mediterranean ports of Akka and Haifa. Italy was deliberately excluded from this agreement because none of the powers wished to see her installed in the eastern Mediterranean. But the terms of this treaty became known to the Italian Foreign office, which protested very strongly against this action of the allies. In order to pacify Italy a conference of the powers met at

St. Jean de Maurienne in April, 1917 and it was agreed that Italy should be allowed to annex the whole of the rich south-western portion of Anatolia and that there should be an Italian zone of influence extending north from Smyrna as far as the Gulf of Adramyti (*i.e.*, Smyrna, Adalia and Konia). Neither Britain nor France were happy or satisfied with this agreement with Italy. They thought that Italy was a greater danger to their respective commercial and political interests in the Middle East. Both would have preferred the installation of another power in that region, a power that would have been completely under their control. Such a power, it occurred to them, might well be an enlarged Greece ; weak and submissive, that would never be a source of danger to their interest. Greece was thus brought on the chessboard. England and France pointed to a legal flaw in the treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne, namely that the treaty could not be effective without the consent of Russia, since the zone of influence assigned to Italy lay very near the entrance of the Dardanelles which had by a previous agreement been assigned to

Russia. Russia's consent could not be obtained because of the Communist revolution which had already taken place there. The communists had denounced all the imperialist pretensions and arrangements of the Tsarist Government. On May, 14, 1919 the Turkish Government was informed by the Allied High Commissioner that allied troops would land in Smyrna. Mr. Lloyd George thus wrote about this episode. "There was a race between the Italians and the Greeks as to which of them should be the first to land a garrison in Smyrna. Prompt action taken by Wilson, Clemenceau and myself enabled Venizoles to get a Greek force into the town whilst the Italians were hesitating"

The prestige of the allies was considerably lowered in the eyes of the Turks by the landing of the Greek forces in Smyrna, for these forces let loose a reign of terror on the native population. Prof. Toynbee's account gives a fair description of the violence committed by them on unarmed Turks." "On the 15th May, 1919, a destructive force was let loose in western Anatolia, as sudden and apparently incom-

prehensible in its action as the eruption of a volcano. One morning, six months after the close of the European war, civilians and disarmed soldiers (Turkish) were massacred in the streets of Smyrna; whole quarters and villages were plundered; then the rich valleys in the hinterland were devastated by further arson and bloodshed, and a military front came into existence." The Allies wished also to cut off Arabia from the Turkish Empire. Emir Faisal supported by Great Britain laid claim not only to Arabia proper but also to Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, to be incorporated within an Arab Commonwealth. Such was the State of affairs when the victors sat at the Peace Conference to decide the fate of the Turks.

According to the terms of the armistice the Imperial capital, Constantinople, was occupied by the allied forces and the Sultan became virtually a prisoner in their hands. The Turks as we have seen rose against the excesses of the allies and the high handedness of the Greeks. The nationalist movement had spread all over the country and had its stronghold well established in the east

Anatolian steppes. In the beginning the leaders of the movement tried to persuade the Sultan to co-operate with them and to allow Turkey to fight a last desperate battle for its existence. But all was in vain. The Sultan's Government was completely under the allied control and the nation refused to submit to any foreign domination. Kemal organised military resistance both against the Allies and the Government of the Sultan. He established at Angora (Ankara) a rival Government and adopted the National Pact as its basis for the future government. The Allied plan that the United States should take the mandate for the Straits and Constantinople was upset by the refusal of President Wilson to do so. The powers were at pains to find a satisfactory formula for settling the fate of the defeated Turks and their Empire. After long and anxious discussion the Treaty of Sevres (August 10, 1920) was drafted. But it remained a dead letter, for a resurrected and defiant Turkey had come into existence. In the meantime Kemal had begun to muster his nationalist forces to fight the Greeks and the allies. The war between the Turks and the

Greeks was a turning point in the history of the attitude of the Turkish nation at this juncture. In consequence of the occupation of the capital by the allied armies and of the Sultan's turning a deaf ear to the demands of the nation, Kemal broke away from the Central Government. He declared, "Henceforth Istanbul does not control Anatolia but Anatolia Istanbul." The all-Turkey Congress met at Sivas in September, 1919 and placed the national forces under the sovereign will of the nation. At the same time a constituent assembly was elected. It held its session at Ankara. (April 23, 1920) and drew up a 'National Pact' (February 26, 1921). The pact recognized the principle of self-determination for all subject peoples and rights of the minorities living on the Turkish soil. It demanded complete independence for Turkey and the ending of all arrangements that restricted its sovereignty.

Public opinion in allied countries was of course influenced by the propaganda of the interested persons. Some of the English papers advocated the ejection of the Turks from Europe. Constantinople and

Armenia once for all. Religious antagonisms and religious intolerance deeply rooted in certain sections of the French, English and American people were at the bottom of the policy of driving the Turks back to Central Asia. The Anglican and the Non-conformists constantly demanded "The Turks out of Europe". It is important to note a quotation from the speech of Sulaiman Nazif Bey delivered in honour of Pierre Loti, on January 25, 1920 at the University of Istanbul.

"Let us not forget this : so long as our victory was considered as possible, the powers declared that the principle of the *Status quo ante bellum* should be religiously observed. As soon as we suffered a defeat, a power declared this principle no longer held good ; it 'was the ally of your nation that has been our enemy for two and a half centuries, and yet it was also most adverse to the crafty policy that meant to cheat us.....Every time Europe has conferred some benefit upon us we have been thankful for it. I know the history of my country full well ; in their annals, many mistakes and evil doing have occurred, but

not one line relates to one act of ingratitude. After allowing the Muslims of Smyrna to be slaughtered by Hellenic soldiers and after having ushered in this crime, Europe now wants—so it seems at last—to drive us out of Constantinople and transfer the Muslim Khilafat to Anatolion town, as if it were a common parcel, or shelve it inside the palace of Top-Kapu (the old Seraglio) like the antique curio of the Museum. When the Turks shall have been expelled from Constantinople, the country will be so convulsed that the whole world will be shaken. Let nobody entertain any doubt about this: if we go out of Constantinople a general conflagration will break out, that will last for years or centuries, no body knows, it will set on fire the whole of the globe.

“At the time when Sultan Mohammed entered the town of Constantinople, which had been praised and promised by Mohammad to his people, the Muslim Empire of Andalusia was falling to decay—that is to say, in the south-east of Europe a Moslem state arose on the ruins of a Christian state while in the south-west of Europe a Christian state was putting an end to the life of

a Moslem state. The Victor of Constantinople granted the Christian population he found there larger religious privileges than those granted to it by the Greek Empire. The ulcer of *phanar* is still the outcome of Sultan Mohammad's generosity. What did Spain do when she suppressed the Moslem State in the south-west of Europe? She expelled the other religions, burning in ovens or sending to the stake the Moslems and even the Jews who refused to embrace Christianity. I mention this historical fact here, not to criticise or blame the Spaniards, but to give an instance the Way in which the Spaniards availed themselves of the conqueror's right Heaven had awarded them. And I contrast the Christian cruelty with the Turk's gentleness and magnanimity when they entered Constantinople." The Ottoman Minister for Foreign affairs thus analysed the position of Turkey in a note handed to the Allied High Commissioner in January, 1920.

"The Ottoman Government fully realises the cruel situation of Turkey after the war, but an unfortunate war cannot deprive a nation of her right to political existence

this right being based on the principles of justice and humanity confirmed by President Wilson's solemn declaration and recognized by all the belligerents as the basis of the peace of the world. It is in accordance with these principles that an armistice was concluded between the Allied powers and Turkey. It ensues from this that the treaty to intervene shall restore order and peace to the East.

"Any solution infringing upon the Ottoman unity, far from ensuring quietude and prosperity, would turn the East into a hot-bed of endless perturbation. Therefore the only way to institute stability in the new state of things is to maintain Ottoman Sovereignty. Let us add that, if the reforms Turkey tried to institute at various times were not attended with the results she expected, this is due to an unfavourable state of things both abroad and at home."

'Feeling it is absolutely necessary to put an end to an unbearable situation and wishing sincerely and eagerly to modernize its administration so as to open an era of prosperity and progress in the East, the Sublime Porte has firmly resolved, in a

broadminded spirit, to institute a new organization, including reforms in the judicial system, the finance, the police, and the protection of the minorities.

“As a token that these reforms will be fully and completely carried out, the Ottoman Government pledges itself to accept the co-operation of one of the Great Powers on condition that its independence shall not be infringed upon and its national pride shall not be wounded.”

The moment the spirit and the terms of the treaty which the Allies proposed to impose became known to Turkey, there flared up tremendous opposition against it throughout the whole of the Mussalman world. The anti-Turkish agitation of 1919 and 1920 in Europe and America had an immediate repercussion in India, China, Egypt and Atlas Africa. Monsieur Mukhtar-al-Ferzuk wrote in an article on ‘France, Turkey and Islam’ in the *Ikdam*, an Algerian newspaper on May 7, 1920, “If the Moslem fought heroically for France and turned a deaf ear to the seditious proposals of Germany, they still preserve the deepest sympathy for Turkey,

and they would be greatly distressed if the outcome of the victory in which they have had a share was the annihilation of the Ottoman Empire."

"That sympathy is generally looked upon in Europe as manifestation of the so-called Moslem fanaticism is a mere legend whose insanity has been proved by history. Pan-Islamism, too, only exists in the mind of those who imagined its existence. The independent population, such as the Persians and the Afghans, are most jealous of their independence, and do not think in the least of becoming the Sultan's subject. As to those who live under the dominion of a European Power, they have no wish to rebel against it, and only aim at improving their material and moral condition, and of reserving their personality as a race.

"The true reasons of the Moslem's sympathy for all the Ottoman Empire are historical, religious, and sentimental."

The Mussalmans of India gave similar expressions of their feelings and Maulana Mohammad Ali, the Head of the Indian Muslim delegation on landing in Venice told the correspondent of *Giornale d' Italia*

that, "The country we represent numbers 70 million Mohammedans and 230 million men belonging to other religions but agreeing with us on this point. So we hope that if the Allies really want to establish the peace of the world, they will' take our reasons into account. Italy has hitherto supported us, and we hope that other nations will follow her example."

Mr. Lloyd George received the delegation on March 13 and Maulana Mohammad Ali addressed him as follows, "Islam has always had two centres, the first a personal one and the other a local one. The personal centre is the Caliph, or the Khalifa, as we call him—the successor of the Prophet. Because the Prophet was the personal centre of Islam, his successors or Khalifas continue his tradition to this day. The local centre is the region known as the Jeziratul Arab, or the island of Arabia, the land of the Prophet. To Islam Arabia is not a peninsula but an island, the fourth boundary being the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris. Islam requires temporal power for the defence of the Faith, and for that purpose, if the ideal

combination of piety and power could not be achieved, the Muslims say, 'Let us get hold of the most powerful person, even if he is not the most pious, so long as he places his power at the disposal of our piety.' That is why we agreed to accept Muslim Kings, the Omayyids, and the Abbasids as Khalifas, now the Sultans of Turkey. They have a peculiar succession of their own. We have accepted it for the time being because we must have the strongest Mussalman Power at our disposal to assist in the defence of the Faith. That is why we have accepted it. If the Turks agreed with other Muslims, and all agreed that the Khalifa may be chosen out of any Muslim community, no matter who he was, the humblest of us might be chosen, as they used to be chosen in the days of the first four Khalifas, the *Khulafa-i-Rashideen*, or truly guided Khalifas.

"But of course we have to make allowance for human nature. The Turkish Sultan in 1517 did not like to part with his power any more than the Mamluke rulers of Egypt liked to part with their power when they gave asylum to a scion of the

Abbasids after the sack of Baghdad in 1258.".....Not going into the matter more fully, we could say that after the various wars in which Turkey has been engaged recently, and after the Balkan War particularly, the Empire of the Khalifa was reduced to such narrow limits that Muslims considered the irreducible minimum of temporal power adequate for the defence of the Faith to be the restoration of the territorial *status quo ante bellum*.....When asking for the restoration of the territorial *status quo ante bellum*, Muslims do not rule out changes which would guarantee to the Christians, Jews and Mussalmans, within the scheme of the Ottoman sovereignty, security of life and property and opportunities of autonomous development, so long as it is consistent with the dignity and independence of the Sovereign State. It will not be a difficult matter. We have here an Empire in which the various communities live together. Some are already sufficiently independent and others hope—and here I refer to India—to get a larger degree of autonomy than they possess at the present moment, and consistently with our desire

to have autonomous development ourselves we could not think of denying it to the Arabs or Jews or Christians within the Turkish Empire”...

Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, in an interview with the “Evening Standard” on February 25 said; “If one of the results of war must needs be to take away Constantinople from the Turks, I should take the liberty of respectfully telling Lord Robert Cecil, as President of the Indian delegation in the Peace Conference, that we ought not to have asked Indians to take part in the war against Turkey. Throughout India, all those who had to express their opinion on this subject, whatever race or religion they may belong to are of opinion that Constantinople must remain the seat of the Khilafat if the internal and external peace of India is to be preserved.”

The Turks, who are the chief part of the population of Constantinople, have certainly as much right as any other community to the possession of that city. So we have to choose between the Turks and an international regime. Now in the history of Constantinople examples have occurred

of the latter regime, and the results were not so good that it cannot be said a Turkish Government would not have done better."

The political line of conduct adopted by the nationalists was not merely organising armed resistance, but they also launched a strong religious and political propaganda both in the country and outside. On behalf of the National Assembly Mustapha Kemal Pasha addressed the following letter to M. Millerand in which he strongly protested against the occupation of Constantinople by the Allies."

"I beg to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that, owing to the unjustifiable occupation of Constantinople by the Allied troops, the Ottoman people looks upon its Khalifa, together with his Government, as prisoners. So general elections have been held, and on April 23, 1920, the Grand National Assembly held its first sitting, and solemnly declared it would preside over the present and the future destiny of Turkey, so long as her Khalifa Sultan and her Eternal City should remain under the domination and occupation of foreigners.

"The Grand National Assembly has done

me the honour to charge me of bringing to the knowledge of Your Excellency the earnest protest of its members against that arbitrary deed, which violates the terms of the armistice, and has once more confirmed the Ottoman people in its pessimism as to the results of the Peace Conference. Not long ago our parliament—though a parliament has always been looked upon as a holy sanctuary by all civilised nations—was violated in the course of a sitting; the representatives of the nation were wrested from the bosom of the assembly by the English police like evil doers, notwithstanding the energetic protests of the parliament; many a senator, deputy, general, or man of letters was arrested at his home, taken away handcuffed, and deported; lastly, our public and private buildings were occupied by force of arms, for might had become right.....Now the Ottoman people, considering all its rights have been violated and its sovereignty encroached upon, has, by order of the representatives, assembled at Angora, and appointed an Executive Council chosen from among the members of the National Assembly which the Council

has taken in hand the Government of the country. I have also the honour to let Your Excellency know the desire of the Nation, as expressed and adopted at the sitting of April 29, 1920.

“First Constantinople, the seat of the Khilafat and Sultanary, together with Constantinople Government, are henceforth looked upon by the Ottoman people as prisoners of the Allies ; thus all orders and fetwas issued from Constantinople, so long as it is occupied, cannot have any legal or religious value, and all its engagements entered upon by the would be Constantinople Government are looked upon by the nation as null and void.

“Secondly, the Ottoman people, though maintaining its calm and composure, is bent upon defending its sacred, centuries old rights as a free and independent state. It expresses its wish to conclude a fair and honourable peace, but declares only its own mandatories have the right to take engagements in its name and on its account.

“Thirdly, the Christian Ottoman element, together with the foreign element in Turkey, remain under the safeguard of the

nation ; yet they are forbidden to undertake anything against the general security of the country.

“Hoping the righteous claim of the Ottoman nation will meet with a favourable reception,.....”.....”

The Nationalists under the leadership of Kemal Pasha had to fight many fronts in their struggle for existence. To their requests, entreaties and advice no serious attention was paid either by the prisoner Government of the Sultan or by the Allies. In spite of protests and determined resistance, the Allies were bent upon proceeding with their plans about Turkey irrespective of Turkish sentiments and feelings. This obstinate attitude of the victors in the long run proved disastrous to them and to the Constantinople Government which was a tool in their hands. As soon as the terms of the Treaty of Sevres became known to the people they rose as one man to resist them.

The stiff and cruel attitude of the Allies turned the Nationalists more and more towards the Soviet Union. The Soviets gladly offered them help in their struggle for sur-

vival as a nation. The Sultan at the instigation of his foreign masters sentenced to death Mustapha Kemal, Colonel Kara Vassif Bey, Ali Fuad, Halide Edib Dr. Adnan and a number of other leading nationalists for high treason in absentia. In spite of all these measures however they could not force the country to accept the Treaty of Sevres.

Meanwhile the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference compelled the Turkish delegation sent by the Sultan to sign the treaty. This they did on August 10, 1920. By the terms of this treaty Arabia, Syria and Mesopotamia were separated from the Ottoman Empire. The Hedjaz was declared an independent country under Husain the unlucky Sherif of Mecca ; Palestine was proclaimed a homeland for the Jews under the mandate of Britain and Syria was passed on to the French mandate. The Armenians were given the right to establish an independent state in the north-eastern portion of Turkey. Constantinople was to be retained by the Turks, but its status was to be subject to modification by the Allies, should the Sultan failed to carry out the

terms of the treaty in its entirety. Navigation in the Straits was to be open to all nations both in peace and war for the passage of their merchant vessels, warships and aircraft. It was to be controlled by an international commission.

The Nationalist Assembly passed a resolution rejecting this treaty in toto and declared its resolve to resist its execution at all cost. Mustapha Kemal declared that it was true he had not enough soldiers to make war, but he was in a position to prevent any foreign power in establishing its domination in Anatolia. When the struggle began, the Greeks were already in possession of Smyrna and its hinterland, and the French and the Italians had occupied their respective zones in southern Anatolia. Kemal defeated the French at Narash and launched an offensive against the Armenians who had a government of their own in the north-east. In order to succeed in this campaign, the Nationalists made a pact with the Soviet Union (March 16, 1921) by which Russia renounced all interests in Trans-caucasia, acquired by the Tsars from 1877-78 and recognized the integrity

of Turkey in accordance with the terms of her National Pact. The Armenians were defeated by the Turkish and Russian forces and Wilson's dream of establishing an independent Armenia was thus shattered once and for all. Kemal's next step was to defeat and oust the Greeks from Turkey. The Italian and the French were now opposed to Greek intentions in this region and tried in various ways to help the Nationalists. Kemal purchased arms and munitions both from the French and the Italians. Kemal's right hand man and principal military collaborator was Ismet Pasha (now the President of the Republic) who defeated the Greeks at the famous battle of Inonu. A very big offensive was launched against them at the Sarkaris front on August 18, 1922 and the nationalist forces emerged victorious. A fortnight later they captured Smyrna. Thus the Greek adventure came to an inglorious end and with it their ambition of establishing a second Ionian Empire. After this disaster there was a revolution in Greece. The Greek troops rose against the Government in Crete, Salonika and Mytilene and demanded the abdication

of King Constantine, who was forced to flee for his life. Kemal threatened to oust the Greeks from eastern Thrace as well. France being suspicious of British intentions in the Eastern Mediterranean withdrew herself from the Anatolian muddle and concluded a separate agreement with the Ankara Nationalist Government (Oct. 21, 1921); a little earlier Italy had concluded with the Nationalists a treaty for the economic exploitation of southern Anatolia.¹ Britain was left alone. Mustapha Kemal who had been proclaimed a Ghazi, the "Conqueror" now turned his attention towards the Dardanelles and threatened an armed conflict against Britain. Britain invited the three Balkan powers and the dominions to defend the Allied positions in the Straits. Public opinion in England was entirely opposed to any further military adventures. In the region of the Straits position of the Allied forces was extremely difficult. After the Chanak incident the British signed an armistice at Mudania. This

¹(League of Nations treaty series Vol. 54, p. 177 and Nouveau recueil general de traites Vol. 13 pp. 335)

led to the downfall of Lloyd George. The French and the Italians withdrew from Anatolia and made treaties with the Nationalists and recognized the Ankara Government as the supreme authority in Turkey. In respect of the British, this Government undertook that the Nationalists forces under the command of Mustapha Kemal would not violate the neutral zone of Chanak and the Straits, by moving up to drive the Greeks out of Thrace. In return the British asked the Greeks to evacuate Thrace beyond the river Maritza. This amicable settlement brought the termination of war in the Near East. Turkey was thus saved from extermination. These brilliant military and diplomatic exploits of the Turks determined the whole course of the future Turkish history. Of all the defeated powers, Turkey alone got at Lausaune, the opportunity to secure a negotiated peace treaty. Having achieved such a notable success Kemal and his co-workers decided on the abolition of the office of the Sultan and laid the foundation of the Turkish Republic. On Nov. 1, 1922, the Grand National Assembly passed a decree

abolishing the Sultanate. The Caliphate was retained ; it being provided that the Caliph was to be elected from amongst the princes of the House of Osman. On Nov. 8, the administration of Constantinople was taken over by Raffat Pasha in the name of the Republican Government. Abdul Majid was elected the first Republican Khalifa. He was also the last for two years later the office of Kahlifa was altogether abolished. Thus the centuries old rule of the House of Osman, secular and temporal, came to an end. The war wearied Turks breathed a sigh of relief because they would no longer have to shoulder the burden of the defence of an Empire.

The Government of the Sultan which had signed the offending treaty of Sevres being no longer there so the Allies were forced to recognise the Grand National Assembly of Angora as rightfully and legitimately representing the will of the Turkish nation and it was with this government that they settled terms at Lausanne. The Turkish Republic under the presidentship of Mustapha Kemal authorised its delegation to negotiate a fresh treaty with the victors of the Great war. The

leader of this delegation was Ismet. The Turkish delegates to the Lausanne Conference were not the weak representatives of a defeated or vanquished power; they were determined and self-reliant. The proceedings of the conference began on November 20th, 1922. Ismet a shrewd politician and an able strategist in diplomacy as in war very wisely exploited the traditional hatred of the Italians for the Greeks; the jealousies which had long existed between the English and the French and the opposition of all the capitalist powers to the newly born state of the Soviet Republic of Russia. Owing to disagreement on certain vital questions the conference had to disperse temporarily. It re-assembled on 23rd April, 1923, under the presidentship of Sir Horace Rumbold. After three months of heated discussions and diplomatic manoeuvres the terms of the treaty were agreed upon. The manner in which Ismet conducted the negotiations was in itself wise and practical and absolutely in accordance with the Nationalist Party's principles of Turkish foreign policy, and deserves commendation.

The question of the Straits, as at all previous conferences to which Turkey was

a party, occupied much of the attention and time of the Lausanne Conference. England and Russia were again the chief antagonists in respect of the question of the freedom of the Straits. Ever since Russia assumed the role of a Great power in Europe, Britain was opposed to the opening of the Straits, now she was in favour of it while Russia who had in the past advocated the opening of the Straits to all merchant and warships, stood against it. This reversal of the policies of the two powers was due to changes in outlook and strategy in the Near East, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean. The West European powers felt that communism was a danger to their own interests and that in order to safeguard them and to be able to check the consolidation of communism, the freedom of the Straits should be guaranteed and that the Straits should be placed under an international commission with certain safeguards and concession to the Turks for the defence and security of Constantinople. The Russian representative, Tchichren, vehemently opposed this plan and persuaded the Turkish delegates to press the Russian

view which guaranteed the security of both the new states against West-European intervention in their respective countries. Tchicherin realised the tremendous advantage enjoyed by Britain and France in the Mediterranean because of their naval strength as against Russia's own disorganised and hopelessly inadequate Black Sea navy. He, therefore, pressed for the complete sovereignty of the Turks over the Straits. In spite of all this and notwithstanding the help that Soviet Russia had given to the cause of the nationalist movement the Turkish delegates adopted an extremely guarded and cautious policy. Too much friendship with and reliance on the Soviets, the Turks presumably thought, might alienate the West European powers, who were still quite strong in the Mediterranean and in the east and south east of Turkey. The alienation of these powers would have placed Russia in a dominant position over Turkey. Neither did they wish to alienate Russia by falling in with the British policy which now definitely sought to create dissension between Turkey and Russia¹.

¹Lausanne Conference and Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-25.

The Straits Convention of the Treaty of Lausanne provided the demilitarization of both the Asiatic and European shores of Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Turkey secured the right to maintain a garrison of 12,000 men; she was also allowed to maintain an arsenal and a naval base in Constantinople and she could transport her armed forces across the demilitarized zone. The islands of the sea of Marmara and the islands belonging to Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea commanding entrance to Dardanelles namely Leros, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos and the Rabbit islands were also to be demilitarized. It was provided that if Turkey and Greece became belligerents at anytime, both of them could remilitarize these areas after notifying the signatories of the convention and when the hostilities between these two ceased the *satus quo* was to be restored. The International Straits Commission was composed of one representative of each of the signatories and was authorised to insure the freedom of passage. Turkey obtained the permanent Presidentship of the Commission. Britain, France, Italy, and Japan acting jointly

volunteered to meet and oppose any threat to Turkey and the Straits under the direction of the League of Nations. Another matter of importance for the Turks was that of the position and status of the foreign traders in Turkey. The Turks realised that the system of capitulations had been responsible for much trouble and many disasters to the Ottoman Empire. They were quite alive to the danger of intrigues, jealousies and the maintenance of the spies by the foreign powers in Turkey. So they were as anxious to have it abolished as the foreigners were to retain it. Therefore capitulations were abolished; foreign traders being exempted from taxes and from certain disabilities for a period of seven years and Turkey was recognized as a full Sovereign State and all restrictions on her army, navy and air force which the Treaty of Sevres sought to impose were done away. The Anglo-French-Italian financial control over Turkey was also not enforced. Greece had to lose to Turkey Eastern Thrace with Adrianople and the islands of Tenedos and Imbros. Italy however was allowed to retain in her possession the Dodecanasian group of islands.

Turkey surrendered all her claims in the African and Asiatic possessions of the Ottoman Empire, *i.e.* Egypt, Sudan, Tripoli, Cyprus, Syria, Palestine, Iraq and the rest of Arabia. Nor was the Nationalist Government unhappy about it, the new Turks were not interested in the maintenance of the old Ottoman Empire, and were glad to be relieved of the burden and care of keeping it together and of defending it. The new Republic was more concerned about setting its own home in order. The problem of the minorities as between Turkey and Greece was solved by the method of repatriation. The treaty provided for the compulsory exchange of the Greeks in Turkey and the Turks in Greece. Thus the Treaty of Lausanne signed on the 24th July, 1923, undoubtedly registered a conspicuous triumph for the nationalist Turks and for Mustapha Kemal and Ismet Inonu the guiding brains of the nationalist movement.

The Treaty of Lausanne inaugurated an era of peace and there has been no crossing of swords between the Turks and other signatories since then. More than any other

contemporary treaty, it was what treaty should be, an agreement between the principal parties concerned, in which each had to make sacrifices and bear disappointments, but none was subjected to impossible commitments or intolerable humiliations.¹

Some of the other important clauses of this treaty are as follows :—

(1) Turkey received the control of the railway station at Karayash.

(2) The Kurdistan-Iraq boundary was settled.

(3) Turkey recognized all power contracts and concession in oil and railway rights.

(4) Payment of Ottoman debt was settled by distributing it over all the states that previously formed part of the Turkish Empire.

(5) Demilitarization of special zones on both sides of Bosphorus.

(6) Autonomy for Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Arabia was guaranteed.

¹Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* vi. 115.

(7) Constantinople was made a free port.

(8) 'Open Door' policy for the first time was recognized. Britain got oil mandate in Iraq, France got cotton and tobacco mandate in Syria, and Italy secured economic and commercial rights in Anatolia.

CHAPTER V

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC

The liquidation of the Ottoman Empire was complete when Turkey was defeated by the West-European Powers and had to sign the armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918. Kemal and his associates were convinced that if Turkey wanted to exist and find a respectable place among the civilized nations of the world she must forget the dream of reviving the Empire. The Ottoman statesmen were always haunted in their foreign policy by the ghost of this Empire. The Empire, as we have noticed sprawled over the three continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa ; it had no efficient or well organized administrative machinery to keep it intact. During their days of decadence, the Sultans courted the Germans for the preservation of their Empire. Britain and France were no longer considered friendly and sympathetic as they used to be in the past. Indeed Britain was considered

to be the bitterest enemy of the Turks at that time. The Turks became sensitive to the public utterances such as that of Mr. Lloyd George who on 10th November, 1914 spoke of the Turk as a "human cancer, a creeping agony in the flesh of the land which they misgovern, rotting every fibre of life...who was to be called to a final account for his long record of infamy against humanity." Lloyd George gave his support and blessings to the Greeks when they attacked Anatolia in the hope of establishing a Greek Empire under the aegis of the Allies. The Anglo-French intrigues in Arabia, Anglo-American intrigues in Armenia and the British intrigues in Kurdistan all directed against the Turks, were in themselves a convincing proof of the enmity of the Great Powers towards the Turks.

The Nationalists, from the very beginning of their struggle felt the need of evolving a foreign policy that would be practical, safe, and sound. Fortunately for the Turks there had occurred a big revolution in Russia also. The two countries were similarly placed having identity of interests ; in both the allies had

intervened with military forces; and in both they sought to sow the seed of internal dissension with a view to destroy the fruit of their revolutions. The relations between the two countries were cordial and friendly. Each looked to the other for friendship and *bon voisinage*. But between the revolutionary Turkey and revolutionary Russia a temporary complication was created by the appearance in Turkistan of Enver Pasha. Considered by some to be the Ludendorff of Turkey, during the world war, he was actually the dictator of the country, and, with Talaat and Jemal Pasha, formed a strong and powerful triumvirate. Kemal and Enver were old enemies and nursed hatred and jealousy against one other. When Kemal was rising to power, Enver was falling in disgrace, and in 1919 he was condemned to death. After many dangerous adventures he managed to reach Moscow. At the Baku Conference of Eastern Peoples held under the auspices of the communists he openly declared that he hated the German Imperialism and Imperialists as much as he hated the British Imperialists and Im-

perialism. He avowed firm friendship with the Soviet Union and declared his intention of fighting for the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the world. The Communists first tried to reconcile Enver and Kemal for the efficient prosecution of the war against the Allies but the attempt was a failure. Enver dreamt of re-establishing a mighty Tartar empire stretching from Chinese Turkestan, embracing Russian Turkestan, Kazakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkey with himself as its ruler. Having established this empire, he would, he thought, march through the Himalayan passes and enter India and strike a deadly blow at the nerve centre of the British Empire. He kept a secret of these ambitions and consistently endeavoured to achieve them. The realization of his goal, he thought, depended upon the successful overthrow of Kemal, at a time when the nationalists were engaged in a life and death struggle against the West European Powers. On the other hand the Russian communists trusted Mustapha Kemal and tried to cultivate friendship with him.

In the first instance Enver tried to act

as an intermediary between the Turks and the communists by asserting that he was the real representative of Turkey. He accused Kemal of being a weak man, neither known at home nor abroad. On the other hand he claimed a reputation throughout Turkey and Europe and rightly asserted that every person throughout the Islamic world knew his name and respected him. But Moscow would not listen to him and would not place any reliance on his words. They were pro-Kemal, and at the request of Kemal, signed the Soviet-Anatolian Treaty of March 16, 1921. Thus Enver's chances of supplanting Mustapha Kemal with Russian assistance were doomed. In the summer of 1921 he managed to reach Caucasia where he met his supporters who came in numbers from Turkey. This conference of Envirites planned a *coup d'etat* against Kemal. Kemal vigorously protested to Moscow with the result that Enver was prevented by force from entering Turkey. Enver then went to Bokhara and managed to assume the leadership of the Basmachis who were revolting against the communists. He advocated Pan-Islamism and secured a good

following but on August 4, 1922, in an encounter against the communists he was killed in action.¹ Enver episode gave relief both to Russia and to Turkey and thus relations between Ankara and Moscow became even more cordial and friendly.

On December 13, 1921 the Soviet Government sent a friendly military mission under Michael Frunze, Commissar of war, then Commander-in-chief of the Soviets in Ukraine. Frunze helped the nationalists against the Greeks by giving them valuable advice with regard to the conduct of the campaign. Later Aralov, another Soviet envoy, was sent and he too remained for some time at the front with Mustapha Kemal. Aralov was warmly received at the front by the Turkish soldiers and addressed them and distributed thousands of comfort bags to them. The French also secretly helped the Turks, largely because of their suspicions against the British. The French mission of Monsieur Franklin-Bouillon established contact with

¹Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* Vol. I.

the Nationalist Turks, who utilised this opportunity for bringing about a *rapprochement* between the communists and the French.

Thus it is seen that during their struggle and at the Lausanne Conference the Soviet Government was of tremendous assistance to the Turks. "The classic struggle between Chicherin and Curzon took place at the Lausanne Conference which met in 1922-23 to substitute for the Treaty of Sevres a new agreement based on Kemal's smashing victory over the Greeks. Chicherin was at his best. His brilliance and deftness of argument and his lightning repartee in all Western tongues astonished the conference and the world that watched it with concern....."Curzon felt, moreover, that Soviet Russia separated him from an agreement with the Turks. He has conceived of Lausanne as one of the greatest triumphs of his career....And here was Chicherin preventing him from forcing the easy submission of the Turks, from winning the enthusiastic praise of the British press—he was peculiarly sensitive to unfavourable criticism—and from concluding

a treaty with Angora which he hoped would unlock the door to the highest honour his king and country could grant.... If Chicherin distressed Curzon, Curzon indubitably irritated the Turks. The British Foreign Secretary wished to sign the death warrant of Turkey in Europe. "For nearly five centuries," he had written ; "the presence of the Turks in Europe has been the source of distraction, intrigue, and corruption of European politics". Curzon, his biographer tells us, therefore proposed the 'ejection of the Turks from Europe and the establishment of a much-reduced but compact and homogeneous Turkish State in Asia-Minor.' Constantinople would then be brought under some form of international authority."¹

The Russians at Lausanne advocated the closure of the Straits and absolute sovereignty of the Turks over them. Indeed, they were more Turkish than the Turks themselves. The Treaty of Lausanne was ratified by the Grand National Assembly

¹ L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, Vol. 1. pp. 401, 402, *The life of Lord Curzon* by Ronaldshay Vol. III. p. 262.

on October 1, 1923. The Convention of the treaty contained mostly what Chicherin had fought for in the Conference, *i.e.*, the safety of the Turkish Republic and its sovereignty over the Straits.

The geographical significance and strategic importance of Turkey, as a bridge between Asia and Europe, remained unaltered; the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles remained under her possession as a connecting link between the East and the West. The new boundaries of the Republic brought her in contact with new states and nations. To-day the Republic shares her longest frontier with the USSR and Syria, which is under a French mandate. In Asia she is also bounded by Iran and Iraq and in Europe she has a common frontier with Greece and Bulgaria. Her sea board is about one-third longer than her land frontiers. To her south-west there lie a group of islands known as Dodecanasia which were allotted to the Italians by the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne. At the mouth of the Dardanelles there is also a small group of islands most of which were given to Greece. The total area of the Republic is

296,356 Sq. miles and in proportion to her size and extent it is very thinly populated; the total population is 18 millions with a density of 54 persons per square mile.

The Nationalists from the very beginning of their political career were convinced of the futility of the Empire and the great risk of its maintenance. Therefore, as the 'Nationalist Pact' shows that, in their foreign policy they began to concentrate upon the recognition of the Turkish sovereignty within Turkey; and, in order to achieve this aim, they endeavoured for their self-defence against any aggression, from whatever quarter it would come, by a series of defensive alliances and non-aggression pacts with the neighbouring states.

The first admirable success achieved in this field was the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne itself. Kemal himself described it as 'the greatest diplomatic victory in history'. Absolute sovereignty of the Turks over the Republic was recognized, and the bogey of Armenian and Kurdish states, exploited by her enemies to reduce her to the status of a serf surrounded by enemy countries, came to a miserable end.

Hence Kemal's foreign policy was of a realistic character and in formulating it he took into consideration the new geographical setting and location of his own country and that of the neighbouring states. During the formative period of the Republic, he depended for help and assistance on the Soviet Union with whom Turkey has her longest frontier. But there were conflicting ideas prevailing in the country itself as to the type of foreign policy he should pursue. Before the rise of modern Turkey two ideas were in vogue, each with a large number of adherents.

During the days of the Ottoman struggle for survival, a movement for the union of all the Turkish speaking people had come into existence. It was thought that the moment the Ottoman Turks became linguistically conscious of their nationality, they became conscious also of their linguistic and cultural affinities with other Turkish speaking people living in the region that stretches from Turkey in Europe through Anatolia, Transcaucasia, Northern Iran and Afghanistan to Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan. These people are also spread in a broken

chain round the northern corner and the shores of the Black sea, through Bulgaria, Dobruja, Crimea, Volgan plain and in portions of Siberia. It was the Pan-Turanian movement based on the cultural oneness of the people of the same stock, seeking to bring them all into a single political fold. A large number of these people whose number is forty to fifty millions are under Russia. The Pan-Turaniens claimed that just as Russia had sought to help the Slavs under the Ottomans, and tried to create a number of Slav states, why should the Turks of Turkey not help their brethren of the same stock and culture in carving a big national block. The Russian revolution provided a great opportunity for the realization of this dream but the Turks were themselves engaged in a life and death struggle at that time. Kemal was pressed by a certain section of public opinion to pursue this policy. But he desisted from it as from the very beginning he realized that such a policy would create more enemies than friends for Turkey. That Kemal was right was proved by the fate that befell Enver when he took up the Pan-Turanism. There

was a bitter opposition to it from every quarter for him. Above all Kemal was not prepared to alienate Russia specially at this moment. So he totally rejected this plan.

The other idea was Pan-Islamism which as we have seen was favoured by Abdul Hameed. Enver also had flirted with it for some time. It aimed at the formation of a block of five independent Muslim States—Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Arabia and Afghanistan—which were geographically contiguous to each other. The creation of such a powerful block, its exponents declared, would be a counter measure against France and Britain who had been pursuing an anti-Turkish policy and sought to annihilate the Turks. They also argued that Islam was not only a religion but an efficient social system, its members knowing nothing of race or nationalism are more amenable towards the formation of a strong political bloc. It is an international religion and once people accept Islam they are knit together in a common bond of international brotherhood. Any national or racial distinction would destroy its unity and international character that is why the Muslims of the world must

unite. The anti Pan-Islamists argued that when the Turks accepted the civilizing mission of Islam they had to fight many a bitter battles against its enemies for about a thousand years, and that they had to bear the full brunt of the European Crusaders and that the other Muslim nations had done little to help them. The Turks had also another grievance. They argued that in the last war the defeat of Turkey was largely due to the fact that the Muslims of Arabia, Africa and India had fought against them and had brought about their downfall.

The Kemalist group had however a different programme namely first and foremost to work for the unity of the Turkish people of Anatolia and to save them from being totally annihilated. They were determined not to be dragged into complications that these appealing political ideals would surely lead them into. Kemal, therefore, refused to think of an alliance with the Pan-Islamists, *i.e.* an alliance with Muslim countries on a religious basis, and an alliance with peoples of Turkish origin on a racial basis. No doubt the Turkish Government was officially represented at the first

General Congress of the Muslim Faith in 1926, but on recognizing that such a participation would drag Turkey once again into international intrigues the Turkish Government refused to send representatives to the second conference held in 1931. The Turkish Foreign Minister openly declared that, "Such initiatives are of no value to any country.....and distract peoples from the path of progress. In particular we are opposed to any internal or external policy which makes use of religion as political instrument."

The Treaty of Lausanne contained four points that were extremely unsatisfactory to the Turks which constituted a menace to the independence of the Republic. These were firstly, the demilitarization of the Straits and the freedom of passage through them under international control; secondly, the unsettled frontiers between Turkey and the British mandate of Iraq; thirdly, the status of Sanjak, which was a source of friction between France and Turkey; fourthly, the passing of the Dodecanasian group of islands, to the south west of Turkey in the Mediterranean, to Italy.

In 1925 Britain opposed Turkey's claim to the *Vilayat* of Mosul; a claim that was backed on grounds of racial and national affinity of the people of that region with the Turks. Kemal, in order to offset the British intrigues, strengthened the ties of friendship with the Soviet Union by signing at Paris a treaty of Neutrality and Friendship. By the terms of this treaty each party undertook to refrain from participation in aggression, alliances, coalitions of hostile actions of any kind, directed against the other. The pact was renewed four years later when both the Governments pledged that neither would enter into any commitment in their respective fields of foreign policy without the consent of the other. These cordial relations between Russia and Turkey were of real advantage as a counter measure against any possible coalition of European powers proving detrimental to their respective interests. Russia was also able to help Turkey by lending her money and technicians for the advancement of her schemes of economic reconstruction and development. The considerations which impelled Turkey to enter into closer relations

with the Soviet Union also brought her into closer and more intimate relations with the other countries of West Asia. Fear of Western Imperialism was prevalent in all the independent countries of West Asia. In order to offset it Iran and Afghanistan had already made treaties of Friendship with the Soviet Union. Early in 1921, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey entered into friendly relations with each other and with the Soviet Union; but, unfortunately a dispute over frontiers between Iran and Turkey stood in the way of the formation of a treaty between them. Later on, in the first quarter of 1926, however Friendship and Security Treaty was signed by both. In 1928, another treaty was entered into with Iran, aiming at the development of trade and commerce between Turkey and Iran. The relations between them were further strengthened by the re-opening and re-construction of the road between Trebizond in Turkey and Tabriz, a commercial town in the North West of Iran. In 1932 the frontier dispute between the two countries were finally settled.

The Mosul dispute between the British

and the Turks was largely responsible for bringing Iran and Turkey in closer touch, for both were afraid of Britain's ambitions. Ex-King Amanullah of Afghanistan placed so much reliance on Turkey's friendship that he signed in those early days a treaty of close cooperation and friendship with Turkey. Thus Turkey, co-operating with Soviet Russia, became the recognized leader of the West Asiatic countries. By assuming this leadership of the movement for national independence which was afoot in this part of the world, Turkey's importance increased tremendously.

The West European powers specially France and Britain began to change their attitude and foreign policy in respect of the Near and Middle East. Both of these powers were afraid of communism which if it had spread would certainly have rocked the very foundation of their empires in Asia and Africa. They now definitely began making plans to isolate Russia and win the friendship of these strategically important countries of West Asia. With this move there was a corresponding change in the foreign policies of these countries as well.

The Middle East countries, at this stage, began to realize that too much dependence on the Soviet Union would create for them a sort of Soviet tutelage ; besides, the men in power in these countries were afraid of communism which aimed at a far-reaching revolution in their economic, social and religious systems. The Soviet ideal of a world-wide communist revolution clashed with the interests of the ruling classes of the west Asiatic countries as of other countries. They were in fact, in search of European allies to help them to maintain the pre-existing system.

After achieving independence and having acquired the leadership of West Asia the Turkish Republic made a slight change in its foreign policy. Henceforth it began to observe a policy of neutrality as between Soviet Union and West European Powers without impairing its own friendly relations with Russia. It is obvious that in international dealings, Turkey, because of her geography, could never be wholly Asiatic or wholly European. She had to be both, though differences of emphasis

were inevitable due to changing circumstances and to changes in the *status quo*.

The Balkan countries were the other field of immediate interest for Turkey and here too the Great Powers were busy in creating their respective sphere of influence. By 1930 it was quite clear to Kemal that Turkey must give up her self-imposed isolation. The instability of the Balkans, the Anglo-Russian Trade pact, the ideals of the League of Nations, and the prospects of commercial relations with Europe—all these turned Turkey's attention more and more towards the West. Turkey also realized that hostility of the West European countries would put great obstacles in the way of her getting loans which would hamper her growing business. Above all, the reforms which Kemal had introduced in the country excited much admiration and sympathy for the young Republic throughout Europe. We have noticed that for hundred of years Turkey and Greece were at daggers drawn and had fought many a war for the heritage of the Eastern Roman Empire. Their relations had become more embittered after the subjugation of the Greeks by the

Ottomans, and also when the Greeks ultimately became independent of the Turks in the beginning of the present century. Turkish feeling of hatred for the Greeks was exacerbated when the Greeks, at the instigation of the English, invaded Anatolia, soon after the defeat of Turkey in the war of 1914-18.

After the peace settlement there were further divisions and still more complicated politics in Central Europe and Balkanistan. Bulgaria and Hungary, having been deprived of territories in the peace settlement, were very anxious to get it revised in their favour. Bulgaria, for instance, was keen to secure the return to her of Dobruja which had been given to Rumania, she also wanted some sort of arrangement in the south, at the expense of Greece, to gain an outlet in the Mediterranean, and in the west she wanted portions of Yugoslav Macedonia. Hungary too had grievances. Both these states stood in the way for the formation of a solid Balkan *Entente* or federation. But the common interests of Rumania, Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia led to the formation of an '*Entente*' in 1921. Kemal having realized how delicate the

Balkan situation was turned towards Greece and sought a peaceful settlement of Turkey's differences with her. He very wisely kept the Republic aloof from aligning itself with Bulgaria and Hungary, and refrained from asking for a revision of the peace settlement; in spite of the fact that of all the states Turkey had been the greatest loser in respect of territories. In 1923 he made treaties of friendship with Austria and Hungary. In 1925 similar treaties were signed by Turkey with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

But the Balkan cockpit remained as complicated as before the world war. There was rivalry between Russia, Austria and Germany, and after the war during the nineteen-twenties, there was rivalry between Italy and France for sphere of interests in this region. The activities of both these countries cut across a line of demarcation between the states that wanted the maintenance of the *Status quo* and the states which preferred revision. Turkey and Greece both became involved in the Italian keen search for allies in the Balkans and the Near East. At this time Mussolini gave assurances to Turkey that Italy had no terri-

torial claims on her. In 1928 the Turkish Foreign Minister was invited to Milan and a treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement was signed between the two countries. The Italians made a similar treaty with the Greeks, and it was through their good offices that a rapprochement between the Greeks and the Turks was made. In 1930 Turco-Greecian pact of Neutrality, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement was made. In 1929 Turkey also made a new treaty with Bulgaria. Envisaging danger to the Balkans, she boldly took the first steps, at the Athens Conference of the Balkan States, towards the formation of a Balkan bloc against any possible aggression. At the second Balkan Conference, after the failure of the first, Turkey took initiative in the solution of difficulties which had arisen between Bulgaria and Greece. The Balkan countries, though in varying degrees hostile to one another, were quite friendly with Turkey and this gave her a chance to assume in the Balkans the same leadership as she had secured in the Near East. Throughout this period the aims of Turkey in her foreign policy, were first to resolve all out-

standing difficulties with her neighbours in the Balkans and create relations of cordiality and friendship with them, and secondly to assure that none of her neighbours were to be used as tools by any power against her independence and security. It was in pursuance of these aims that Turkey, though suspicious of the League of Nations, joined it in 1932 with the strong and active support of Greece.

The aim of Kemal, so far as the integrity and the sovereignty of Turkey was concerned, was achieved to a very large extent by the signing of these treaties of friendship and *bon voisinage* with the neighbours states in Balkanistan. During this period he was not only content by making Turkey secure from possible threats by foreign powers but he was also anxious to maintain peace in the Balkanistan, the disturbance of which would have been a source of great danger and concern to the Turks themselves. So he very carefully avoided being entangled in the bungled diplomacy of Central Europe. He was anxious to see the establishment of a *Balkan Entente* by the free initiative of the Balkan

States themselves without the intervention or assistance of any of the Great Powers.

An entirely new set of factors began to crop up in Central Europe and Balkanistan when in February, 1933 Hitler came to power and became Chancellor of the Third Reich in Germany. International politics then began to change and with the inception of the new ideology of the Nazis the danger to smaller states loomed larger. Kemal grew more suspicious of the impending revival of the German slogan of *Drang Nach Osten* to which the Ottoman Empire had fallen a victim in the past. The Balkan countries themselves began to entertain similar apprehensions with the result that the members of the *Little Entente* which was created as early as 1921 began to draw closer to each other. Turkey, Rumania, Greece and Yugoslavia signed a friendly pact of Mutual understanding and Judicial Settlement in February, 1934, and in July 1934 Turkey along with Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia signed the Soviet Convention for the definition of aggression which provided a mutual guarantee by the signatories for their common frontiers, joint

consultation on matters of their common interests, publicity of the intention of any signatory to conduct negotiation with any other Balkan State. A secret protocol was affixed to this convention which laid down that if any of the signatories became a victim of attack by a non-Balkan power assisted by a Balkan State the terms of the pact would immediately be enforced against the latter. Notwithstanding this comprehensive attempt to create a system of collective security in Balkanistan, Italian policy continued to try and create dissension among the Balkan States. For some time Mussolini concentrated on backing Bulgaria and Albania against the Balkan Entente. Albania a small and poor European State entertained fears against Yugoslavia and Greece, and depending on Italian support, became virtually an Italian protectorate, though without the presence of the Italian armies. Bulgaria, as had been stated, was dissatisfied with the treaty of Neuilly and wanted possession of Adrianople.

There was always the danger that Italy might persuade Bulgaria to enter into an alliance with her against Turkey, on a pro-

mise of Italian support for the Bulgarian ambitions. In September 1933 Turkey signed yet another treaty with Greece mutually guaranteeing their common frontiers and pledging armed resistance for their defence. This treaty was definitely designed to counter check any possible Bulgarian aggression against Turkey.

In pursuance of the desire for consolidation and closer co-operation between the Balkan States there was constant diplomatic activity to achieve this aim. In November, 1933 the diplomats of the Balkan countries met in Salonika and, as a result of improved relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, it was hoped that an '*Entente*' of these countries would soon be formed. A pact of mutual understanding was at last signed on February 9, 1934, providing for the mutual guarantee by all the signatories of the security of the already established Balkan frontiers. It was also laid down that no signatory would undertake any political negotiations with any non-Balkan Power without the express permission of the other contracting parties. This pact was signed neither by Albania nor by Bulgaria,

but it was left open to both of them to sign it at any time they liked. Turkey and Greece subsequently entered reservations that they would not be involved in war with Russia or Italy in case either of these attacked Rumania or Yugoslavia. This was another secret protocol to avoid the displeasure of Russia or Italy by Turkey and Greece. The statutes of this organization provided for the establishment of a permanent Council of the Foreign Ministers of the four adherents of the Balkan Entente.

In March 1934 Mussolini declared, "There must be no misunderstanding upon this centuries-old task which I assign to this and the future generations of Italy. There is no question of territorial conquest.....The matter is one of natural expansion which will lead to a close co-operation between Italy and the peoples of Africa, between Italy and the nations of the Near and Middle East." This statement caused great consternation and uneasiness in the minds of the Turkish statesmen. They were already quite sensitive to the claims put forward by Italy for sharing in the spoils of the Ottoman

Empire in the past. The treaty of St. Jean-de Maurienne and Italy's ambitions in the Levant too had not been forgotten by the Turks. In the following year their suspicions against Italy were confirmed when Mussolini attacked Abyssinia. Turkey now became an active supporter of the ideals of collective security and she began to feel that the menace to her peace and independence was no longer from England or France but from Italy and Germany ; for Italy it was clear that she aimed to dominate the Near East and dreamt of establishing an Italian Empire at the expense of Turkey and other West Asiatic countries. As a member of the League of Nations Turkey took decisions along with other members of the Balkan Entente to impose sanctions against Italy. In December of the same year Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia gave their full support to the British proposal addressed to all the Mediterranean States to join with Britain, in case armed hostilities broke out between Britain and Italy, and to enforce the sanctions against Italy for her unprovoked aggression against Abyssinia. From this time onward we notice a marked

change in Anglo-Turkish relations. In the autumn of 1936 the Turkish Government, through her ambassador in London, proposed an Anglo-Turkish alliance. The suggestion though welcomed by the British Government, was shelved temporarily for it was felt in certain quarters in Britain that such a move would result in a further deterioration of Anglo-Italian relations and would destroy the hope of rapprochement between Britain and Italy which was urgently sought for by the advocates of appeasement and which was ultimately confirmed by the 'Gentleman's Agreement of January 2, 1937.'

When the sanctions against Italy were withdrawn Hitler, without the consent of the League, took steps to refortify the demilitarized Rhineland. An intense feeling of insecurity prevailed amongst the states of Central and South-Eastern Europe. These states wondered how far Britain and France would be able to honour their military obligations to resist the aggressor nations. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, made it clear that Turkey would have to consider the primary needs of her own defence in the event

of a threat from the continent of Europe. Turkish policy vigorously pursued two aims firstly, to speed up her armament programme, and secondly, to try and persuade Britain and France, to obtain such a revision of the Treaty of Lausanne as would give Turkey a greater measure of security in the demilitarized zone of the Straits. Turkey, on several occasions, had already protested against the demilitarization of the Straits. The Turkish spokesman on this occasion pointed that the situation now was quite different from what it was in 1918. Britain too was suspicious of Italian ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Soviet Union was also keen on the alteration of the conditions in the zone of the Straits. The attitude of France too was quite favourable. Accordingly a conference was convened at Montreux to discuss Turkey's claim to fortify the Straits. A new Convention was signed on July 20, 1936 by Great Britain, France, Japan, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, which restored to Turkey the right to fortify the Straits. It also modified the regulations governing the transit of warships whe-

ther in time of peace or war. Firstly, a strict limit was imposed on the aggregate tonnage (15, 000 tons) and number of vessels (9) which might at any one time pass through the Straits. An advance notification in respect of the ships passing through the Straits was to be given in all cases. An exception to these rules was however made to placate the Soviet Union. The Black Sea powers were given the right to send their warships through the Straits into the Aegean sea without limitation of number, tonnage or type, but it was laid down that they would have to pass singly. This privilege conferred on Russia her age long ambition to possess an egress from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and which consistently and stubbornly was opposed by France and Britain. At this conference it was also decided that the aggregate tonnage of all the non-reparian powers must be limited to 30,000 tons and the tonnage which any one non-reparian power may send to two thirds of the aggregate tonnage. It was also settled that in time of war, Turkey being non-belligerent, neutral ships would be given the right of passage, belligerent warships were not to be

allowed transit except to execute obligations under the Covenant of the League or render help to a victim of aggression by virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding on Turkey and registered with the office of the League ; in the case of Turkey herself being belligerent or being threatened, the passage of warships was left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government. Turkey enhanced her prestige greatly by the constitutional manner she chose to adopt for the revision of the treaty which imposed restrictions on her sovereignty and endangered her security. The conclusions of the Montreux Convention also conferred on Turkey an enhanced importance as the "Guardian of the Straits." In this way one of the two provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne to which Turkey objected were revised by amicable settlement to the satisfaction of the Turks. ⁽¹⁾

The other provision of the Treaty to which Turkey objected related to the possession of the *Vilayat* of Mosul. The dispute about this came to an end soon after the termination of British mandate over Iraq

⁽¹⁾ See appendix 2.

in 1932 when Iraq was recognized an independent State. Italy and Germany were displeased with the Montreux Convention. The Fascists and the Nazis were ardent enemies of communism and did not relish the idea of the Soviet Union to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean. They were also displeased with France and Britain on the ground that the concessions granted to Turkey and Soviet Union were motivated by the desire of erecting further barriers against German and Italian expansion in the Balkans and the Near East. But the Turks did not pay much heed to the displeasure of either of these powers, for they realized that by once again obtaining control over the Straits Turkey had acquired a position of great importance in the European affairs. It was thought that the big Powers would henceforth seek her friendship and good-will.

In the Middle East Turkey adopted a policy based on the principles of collective security, as she did in Balkanistan, by creating an '*Entente*' bloc. In July 1937 Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Turkey concluded a pact at Saadabad guaranteeing the

inviolability of frontiers and providing for reciprocal non-aggression and consultation in all international questions of common interest. The high contracting parties gave undertakings of non-intervention in one another's internal politics and affairs.

The Nazi occupation of Austria on March 13, 1938 caused great consternation throughout Europe which had its repercussions seen in Balkanistan and Turkey. By the occupation of Austria, Hitler acquired a dominating position over the Danubian States. Thus military and economic control over all the means of communications in south-Eastern Europe came under *Grossdeutschland*-Greater Germany. To the countries of Balkanistan it was quite clear that one day they too might meet the fate of Austria. Conscious of this fact, Turkey immediately took steps to consolidate *Entente's* position *vis-a-vis* Hungary and Bulgaria. On July 31, 1938 Bulgaria signed a pact of Friendship and Non-aggression with the *Balkan Entente* by the terms of which the '*Entente*' gave recognition to the right of Bulgaria for re-arming, and Bulgaria undertook not to effect changes in the existing frontiers by

armed force, and promised to submit all controversies with her neighbours to judicial settlement and arbitration. But Axis propaganda and diplomatic manœuvres stood against the formation of a solid *Balkan Entente*. Turkey, by now, had begun to understand how unreal collective security was in Europe as well as in Balkanistan, because the League of Nations showed its weakness and intransigence over the Abyssinian, Rhineland and Austrian issues. In these circumstances, a policy of strict neutrality in European affairs and of maintaining cordial relations with her neighbour was the best which Turkey could follow. Both Greece and Turkey became more and more keen to find a basis to create cordial and friendly relations with Great Britain, in the hope that her navy in the Mediterranean would be available for their protection in case of need. At the same time precautions were taken against any entanglements which might involve open hostility either with Italy or Germany. That is why Turkey got herself protected in Balkanistan by the Balkan Pacts of neutrality, friendship and non-aggression ; in the

Aegean she made an alliance with Greece ; in the Black Sea she remained quite friendly with the Soviet Union ; in the Middle East she signed the Saadabad Pact and in the south she had settled all her accounts with France and was drawing closer to Britain.

The occupation of Czechoslovakia by Hitler and the establishment of a German *protektorat* over it and the subsequent absorption of Albania by Italy finally transformed the Turkish foreign policy in the spring of 1939. In May, 1939 Mr. Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons that consultations with the Turkish Government revealed the "Customary identity of views" of the two Governments and that the conclusion of a Mutual Assistance Pact was not a distant possibility.

The importance of these statements by the British statesmen can be analysed in the light of the subsequent events in international politics. Great Britain had to abandon the policy of appeasement and in collaboration with France, made treaties of assistance and non-aggression with Poland, Greece and Rumania. To make

these assurances effective it was necessary for France and Britain to seek the friendship of Turkey.

On April 7, 1939 Albania was invaded by Italy and the next day Monsieur Serajoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister and Monsieur Gafencu, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, met at Istanbul and issued a joint statement in which they emphasized the determination of the two nations to pursue firmly the policy of *Balkan Entente*. On April 10, 1939, the Turkish Prime Minister Dr. Refiq Saydam declared that the Turkish foreign policy remained unchanged in spite of the international crisis and the grouping of nations in opposing blocs and the sudden annihilation of states. He also emphasized that Turkey had given proof of her vigilance by taking precautions against contingencies which the Turkish nation might have to face. Faced with an international situation of intense gravity, he said, "the Turkish Government maintain their loyal and correct attitude towards all states both large and small." As collective security had collapsed at Geneva, so it might be in the Balkanistan and this was

being envisaged as a possibility both by the Great powers of the West and by Turkey. The Turks realized that the Axis Powers, if their aggression was not resisted and checked, would lay hands on the Mediterranean and try to seize Asia-Minor, as they had seized and occupied other countries which were not strong enough to oppose them. She looked forward to combine with Britain and France in their stand against the Axis. With this background of facts and psychological factors, a Mutual Assistance Pact was signed, by the representatives of Britain, France and Turkey in October 1939. It was declared that the Pact was not directed against any country but was aimed to assure reciprocal assistance in case of an aggression which might lead to a declaration of war in the Mediterranean area. In a special interview accorded to a correspondent of the 'Daily Telegraph' on July 9, 1939 the Turkish President, Ismet Inonu conveyed the affection of the Turkish people to the British people and expressed his pleasure at the cordiality of relations between the two countries

as manifested by the Anglo.-Turkish alliance. "The British Nation," he declared will find a most loyal ally in the Turkish people, whose feeling in regard to the alliance is as sincere as their intention to carry out the obligations undertaken." He also spoke of the cordiality of Franco-Turkish relations, and said that, after the cessation of Hattay to Turkey, no more problem exists between the two nations. Regarding *Balkan Entente* he expressed the hope that Bulgaria would yet enter the alliance of the Balkan states."

The same day M. Serajoglu declared that the invasion of Albania had been the deciding factor in persuading Turkey to abandon her previous policy of neutrality and to enter the 'Peace Front.' Turkish co-operation with Great Britain and France was, he maintained, the logical outcome of the weakening of the authority of international law as was evinced during the Italo-Abyssinian war, from the failure of sanctions, and subsequent Axis aggressions. With the U. S. S. R. and Balkan countries Turkey's relations remained cordial and friendly. In conclusion, he said, Turkey

intended to preserve correct relations with Italy and Germany provided that these two countries also had similar intentions.¹

These public utterances of the Turkish diplomats show on what lines they were thinking about the international upheaval which was shaking the very foundation of peace and security throughout the world. Turkey tried her best to maintain peace in Balkanistan. There was even some criticism of the Anglo-Turkish Pact by Yugoslavia but the reply of responsible Turkish quarters to it was that such an agreement was strictly in keeping with the terms of the *Balkan Entente*.

The anxiety of the Allies to secure the friendship of Turkey led to the settlement of the dispute about the territory of Hatay of which the French Government was a trustee on behalf of Syria. This territory has a valuable harbour and a large Turkish population. In July 1939, the French Government announced its cession to the Turkish Republic. Thus a difficult problem that had caused a good deal of

¹ (*Prev. req. Anglo-Turkish Pact* 3569D-3620B. Kessings.)

friction between the Turks and the French was settled in a manner favourable to the Turks, and the magnanimity of the French won for them the friendship of the Turkish nation.

The signing of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact, announced on the 23rd August 1939, caused great amazement and alarm throughout Europe. Under the impact of the new development, the whole series of defensive alliances, which Turkey had built up very nearly collapsed. The Turks however were not immediately drawn into taking sides with either of the contending parties. The attitude of Turkey, in the first phase after the declaration of war, was characterised by complete loyalty to all of her undertakings. There was no doubt some revulsion of feeling against Russia for having joined Hitler's camp. There also existed suspicions in Turkish political circles against German and Russian designs in the Balkans and the Near East. This was without doubt a critical period in the history of the Turkish foreign policy. In order to obtain a clear cut statement of the future, Russian policy the

Turkish Government sent their Foreign Minister, M. Serajoglu to Moscow in the last week of September 1939. At this time Russia was, one might say, standing on its head. She had obtained notable concessions from the Nazis in the Baltics, in Finland, and in Poland. Besides the Germans had given her the promise of a secure outlet in the Mediterranean. Russia was therefore making a great show of her friendship for Germany. No authentic information is available about the talk that Stalin had with the Turkish Foreign Minister, but it is surmised that Stalin asked for certain advantages for the Soviet Union in the Straits and in the Balkan which were not agreeable to the Turkish Government. It is also believed that acting on the behest of Hitler Russia tried to persuade Turkey to join the Axis against Britain and France in return for promise of territories in Asia and certain advantages in the Mediterranean. Although a breakdown in the negotiations was not recognised officially but it was known that the Turkish Government refused to enter into a pact with the Soviet Union, such as would have involved

readjustment of Soviet-Turkish relations in conformity with the new friendly relations of the Soviet Government with Germany, regardless of Turkish undertakings to Great Britain and France. The arrival of Herr Von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, put these parleys to an end and M. Serajoglu was left to kick his heels inspecting the Moscow underground. The discourtesy shown by the Russians to M. Serajoglu was strongly resented in the Turkish press. Soon after his return the Turkish Government, realising the great danger facing the Balkan countries and Turkey, declared their intention of signing a full pact with Britain and France. A few weeks later, at Ankara, on October 19, 1939 a Pact of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was signed. Britain and France pledged themselves to assist Turkey in case of aggression by a European power, and in return Turkey pledged to help Britain and France first in case of aggression by a European power, leading to war in the Mediterranean and secondly, and also in case those two countries being involved in hostilities on account of

the guarantee given to Greece and Rumania by France and Britain in April, 1939. The protocol No. 2 affixed to this treaty released Turkey from taking any hostile action against the Soviet Union "having as its effect or involving as its consequences entry into armed conflict with U. S. S. R. and articles 4 and 5 laid down provisions for consultation in case of aggression not specifically involving active participation and secure for Britain and France "at least". Turkey's benevolent neutrality in case of aggression against either of these two high contracting parties. This was followed by military missions and consultations and also granting of credits by France and Britain to Turkey.

The Tripartite Mutual Assistance Pact was not favourably received either in the Axis countries or in the Soviet Union. No credence was attached to the stipulations in the pact, namely that it was not directed against any country and specially not directed against the U. S. S. R. The Soviet Russia at that time, was in an advantageous position to bargain. She hoped that by such a war her nightmare of a united front of

all the capitalist countries against her, ostensibly to prevent the spread of communism, would be banished and the field left clear for her to attain her age-old objective of sea outlets free from winter snow, in the Baltic as well as in the Mediterranean, when England, France and Germany were fully occupied in the western war theatre, the Baltic and the Balkanistan would then become fields for Soviet expansion. Perhaps even the very old ambition of the control of the Straits might be realised. Viewed in this light the Tripartite Alliance between England, France and Turkey took an added significance. Owing to fear, or to good neighbourly feelings, Turkey tried to maintain a friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union. But Russia's proximity to her by land and Russia's rivalry to her in the Black Sea, coupled with threats from Berlin, and probably also from Moscow, Turkey thought that she might become a second Poland. This could not be viewed at Ankara with anything but grave concern. It was also conjectured that Russia pressed for the return of the districts of Kars and

Ardahan ceded to Turkey by the Soviet Union by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918. Under these circumstances, Turkey observed silence and awaited the approach of the inevitable war between the Soviet Union and Germany. She thought that because of her strategic position she would then be courted by both. In the meantime the Turks tried their level best to avoid war. Russia was entangled against Finland and the enemies of the Soviet Union launched an intensive propaganda that the time has come for the Allies to declare war on Russia. The press in Europe, during these uncertain months, debated the possible future developments of war. The German press vociferously declared that the problem of the Straits, would after the question of Finland be resolved and might be the next to be taken up in international politics. The German propaganda machinery launched a story that Turkey was contemplating to allow the Allies to use Anatolia as a base for operation against Batum while Russia was engaged in the Finnish war. The massing of the French troops early in 1940 on the Syrian frontier

and of British troops in Egypt aroused greater suspicion of a contemplated attack on Russia. At this time the French press too was calling for some aggressive action against Russia as the weaker link in Berlin-Moscow axis. In Britain, people like Mr. Hore-Belisha forcefully argued on the same line who seems to have been deadly opposed to Russia. But all this show of strength and might, propaganda and plausible arguments, did nothing to deter Turkey from her attitude of non-belligerency and neutrality. In spite of all this the extent of the anti-Soviet feeling in the Turkish press can be gauged by the following extract from the report of the Ankara correspondent of 'Daily Herald' of March 6, 1940.

"The volte-face in the Turkish outlook regarding Russia has undergone an interesting development. The general conviction engendered by the slow progress of the Soviet war against Finland, that Russia presents no real menace to Turkey has now produced a growing tendency among the younger generation to consider that the time has come to tackle this tradi-

tional enemy while he is occupied in the north and not to wait until he makes an attack.

Information reaches me from reliable sources that the defences which the Russians are feverishly erecting on the northern shores of the Black Sea notably at Batum and at Odessa are not, as has been alleged, in readiness for possible Turkish and Allied retaliation against a Russian advance into the Caucasus and Asia, rather they are measures against a possible Turkish offensive. The growing Allied effectiveness in the Near East have not passed unnoticed in Moscow. This increase in strength is thought to portend a possible Allied-Turkish offensive in the spring in the Black Sea with, as its main objective, the Baku oil-fields and the pipe line to Batum. These are for all practical purposes Russia's main source of petrol supply.....Those who know something about the Russian oil-fields affirm that under the best conditions Russia could provide Germany with relatively little in the way of oil fuel. Today when her own needs must be very great, the quantities that can pass under the new arrangement

for transport across the Black Sea to Varna and Constanza must be even smaller still."

But the leaders of the Republic were certainly averse to this attitude of a minor and insignificant section of political opinion. They declared that they would do their best to keep out of the war if they possibly could. They did not commit any aggressive act against Russia and showed their sincerity of purpose by refusing to pull out chestnut for others out of the fire when the Soviet Union was engaged in a bitter struggle against the Fins ; but, at the same time, they were firmly determined to fight grimly for and to their best to defend their own country against any aggression, whether it came from the German or the Russian side.

In June 1940 with the fall of France and the entry of Italy into the war, the clauses of the Ankara Mutual Assistance Pact became operative. But the Turks argued that the whole basis of the provisions of the pact had disappeared because of the erasion of one of the high contracting parties, namely France. At the same time it

was pointed out in Turkish official circles that the Government would adhere loyally to the terms of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty, but it was stated that the treaty did not impose any specific obligation to enter the war in a situation such as existed at that time. However, a general approval was expressed of the British determination to pursue the war to final victory. It was also declared by an official spokesman in June, 1940 that Turkey was not prepared to permit the installation of a power other than France in Syria and would only accept a declaration of the independence of that country. Dr. Refik Saydam declared on June 26, 1940 that the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty cannot compel her to take any action having as its effect or involving as its consequences armed conflict with U. S. S. R.

Now the foreign policy of Turkey was again marked by a change. It became, on the whole, quite passive, and sought to maintain strict neutrality. The Turks did not rush to help Greece when she was invaded by Italy in October, 40.

At the opening of the Kamutay on November 1, 1940 the President of the Republic dec-

lared that in the previous year a great number of erstwhile free independent countries had to submit to foreign invasion, but the attack directed against the British, following the defeat of France, had met with obstinate resistance. This fact had led the war into a new phase which seemed likely to be of long duration. Turkey did not covet an inch of territory beyond her own frontiers, and she had no intention of trespassing on anyone else's rights. "Our attitude of non-belligerency," he said, "need not constitute an obstacle to normal relations with countries which show the belligerency; it makes absolutely impossible the use of our territory, so long as we take no part in the war. Fresh developments in the conduct of the war, however, require close attention. Our neighbour and friend, Greece, whose territory lies in the zone that security and tranquility of which is of primary importance to Turkey, finds herself dragged into the war. Together with our ally Great Britain, we are carefully studying the situation which has now ensued. We hope that the political principle, which I earlier stated, and which has

kept our country out of the horrors of the war, will in the same maintain our security in the future. In this grave crisis which the world has been facing our relations with other states have followed their normal course. The relations of mutual confidence with the Soviet Union which date from as far back as twenty years ago, have, after experiencing difficulties, the blame for which cannot be attributed either to Turkey or Russia, been restored to their normal friendship. Amidst the vicissitudes of the world Russo-Turkish relations it represented a factor of intrinsic value, and our two countries mean to perpetuate this fact, independent of all other influences. We are convinced that this policy will be as fruitful for both parties to-morrow as it was yesterday and that it will serve the interests of the two countries without harming anyone.....

“While remaining sensitive to all that affects our vital interest, we shall continue to be faithful to our friendships and alliances. At a time when Britain is carrying on under difficult conditions the heroic struggle for its very existence, it is my

duty to proclaim that the bonds of alliance which unite us to her are solid and unbreakable.”¹

The statement of the President of the Republic was in itself a proof of a sincere show of friendship both to the Soviet Union and Britain and a strong desire not to be embroiled in the war. A declaration of war on or by Turkey when her defences and military preparedness was not enough to meet the terrible might of the highly mechanised German army, would have meant a sure death for the Turks. The foreign policy of any country is not conditioned by the ends it wishes to achieve but it certainly depends on the means it possesses to reach that particular end. And in this respect Turkey found herself placed in an extremely difficult position. That is why she was not able to help her ally Greece, or Yugoslavia or Rumania, the same way as she was not in a position to intervene in the Rashid Ali *Coup* in Iraq, and also in Iran on the declaration of war by Reza Shah against Britain.

¹ *Pres. ; req. ; 4294 A. Kessings.*

The supply of war material to Turkey from the side of the United Nations was not coming in enough because of the transport and other difficulties to assure a military triumph over the Nazis who by now had reached her European frontiers. The heroic battle of the Britishers in the Greek island of Crete and its subsequent loss was another handicap for the Turks to enter openly the camp of the Allied Nations. With the loss of this battle Turkey's frontiers were so near the mechanised armies of Hitler that she had to think hundred times before she could declare her intention to join Britain for the defence of the liberty and honour of the civilized nations of the world from the wild ravages of Fascism ; a source of great menace to the security, freedom and liberty of all the peace loving people. At such a critical moment it was rather lucky for the Allies that Turkey did not go to the other side whose offer of friendship, territorial gain and monetary advantages might have been apparently very attractive. The loss of Turkish friendship, at that time, would have meant a severe blow to and a deadly stab

in the back of the United Nations. In July of the same year the Turkish Government had no other alternative except to be passive and in that mood she signed a Pact of Friendship with Germany and bound herself to refrain from anti-German expressions. The Turco-German trade pacts as will be discussed in the subsequent chapter would reveal the needs of Turkey for the disposal of her agricultural products which were not sufficiently met with by the Allies and Germany who happened to be the greatest buyer of her products won the day in this diplomatic battle.

During all this critical period in the life history of the young Turkish Republic, the foreign press was full of rumours that the Soviet Union would profit from her difficulties by attacking her in the rear. The fear was allayed by the mutual declaration of the Soviet and Turkish Governments on March 24, 1941 that in the event of Turkey being forced into war to defend her territories, she could count on the complete understanding and neutrality of the Soviet Union. The relations between Germany and the Soviet Union were

at this time becoming strained. "After the news had spread in the foreign press to the effect that if Turkey was involved in the war, the Soviet Union would profit by the difficulties that Turkey would have to face. The Soviet Government informed Turkey, firstly, that such news does not in any way coincide with the attitude of the Soviet Government, secondly, that in case Turkey should resist aggression and should find herself forced into the war for the defence of her territory, Turkey could then, in accordance with the Non-Aggression Pact between her and the Soviet Government, count on the complete understanding and neutrality of Russia."

The Turkish Government expressed to the Soviet Government her most sincere thanks for the declaration and wished it be known that, should Russia find herself in a similar position, she could count on the complete understanding and neutrality of Turkey.¹

In June 1941 war was declared between Germany and the Soviet Union and

¹Prev. rep. 4519 A. Kessings Archives.]

on April 6, 1941 within a few hours of the German invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, a meeting of the Turkish Cabinet was held and the British, Greek and Yugoslav Ambassadors were received by M. Sarajoglu the Turkish Foreign Minister. On April 9, the Allied diplomatic representatives were informed of the decision taken by the Cabinet on Turkey's attitude in view of the extension of the war to Balkanistan. On the same day *Halk Evi* (people's party) met in *Camera* to hear a report on the situation by M. Sarajoglu which was unanimously approved. The Turkish press was evincing serious tone and some anxiety was felt by the spread of the war to Turkey's doorstep but it continued to reiterate that Turkey would defend her integrity and would remain faithful to her friend Britain. The Ankara radio on April 11, 1941 declared that the Government was following the military situation step by step, and may be obliged to take new decision. It was also said that the present attitude of non-belligerency was in keeping with Turkey's treaty obligations and that this was an initial decision because there was

no way of foretelling future developments of the war now being waged within Turkish zone of security. The Germans taking advantage of this peril and panic in Turkish temper sent Von Papen, as German Ambassador along with well trained propagandists to Ankara who tried to drive wedge between Turkey and the Allies.

By now the relations between the Soviet Union and Germany were becoming more and more strained. In June 1941, when war was declared between the two countries Hitler in his declaration indicted Stalin for desiring to annex the Straits and stated that during the days of peace between the two countries the matter was referred to him and he was asked as to what his reactions to it would be. Mr. Churchill in his broadcast on the occasion of Russia's entry into the war spoke of Russian contribution towards victory in the last Great War, from whose benefits Russia had to be excluded. This was twisted by the Nazis to mean that Mr. Churchill regretted that Russia was unable to take possession of the Straits which was assigned to her along with the Ottoman

capital of Constantinople during the last Great War. To counteract this propaganda a unilateral guarantee was given to the Turks by the British and Russians and on August 10, 1941 the British Foreign Office issued a communique to the effect that the British and the Soviet Ambassadors called on the Turkish Foreign Office and presented the following declaration in identical terms. "His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom confirm their fidelity to the Montreux Convention, and assure the Turkish Government that they have no aggressive intentions or claims whatever with regard to the Straits. His Majesty's Government, as also the Soviet Government are prepared scrupulously to observe the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic. While fully appreciating the desire of the Turkish Government not to be involved in the war, His Majesty's Government, as also the Soviet Government, would nevertheless be prepared to render Turkey every help and assistance in the event of her being attacked by a European power." How fortunate it was for the Allies that in spite

of the allurements of excellent trade terms offered to Turkey by Germany, the Turks did not move towards the Axis Powers. Had they done so, the security of Russia would have been exposed to the greatest possible danger and the position of the British in the Levant and in the Middle East would also have been threatened. Hitler then would have been able to realise the age-long dream of the German *Drang nach Osten* Drive, to reach and attack India. The soil of Turkey would then have been converted into a most horrible and bloody battle field. However the wise and farsighted policy of Ismet prevented this from happening. Nor was Turkey in a position to join the Allies openly, for the defences of her frontiers in the west were so weak. The German and Bulgarian armies were massed on her Thracian frontier. Italian islands of Dodecanasia were in German hands which were well garrisoned and fortified. The Germans were in full control of the Rumanian and Bulgarian Black Sea ports. They were also in complete occupation of the Greek islands at the mouth of the Dardanelles. This being the situation the Turks were deter-

mined that their country should not meet the fate of Yugoslavia and Greece. On November 2, 1941 the President of the Republic stated before the *Kamutay* thus, "Since the last summer, the war, as we have seen has spread in a terrible manner, and we believe it will spread still more. Our country, the meeting place of Asia and Europe, forms an oasis of peace. After the developments in the Balkans, in Syria, Iraq and Iran and the outbreak of German-Soviet hostilities every one of our neighbours have become involved in the war. These military movements so close to us make more determined than ever our will to maintain the honour and safety of the country within the framework of our engagements. The Balkan events to which I have referred constitute delicate problem, both from the view of security and integrity of our country. The independence of the Balkan peoples constituted one of the bases on which Turkish foreign policy was based and our sentiment in this respect remain unchanged for the future. The treaties concluded recently and farther back with the belligerent governments

remain unchanged as the basis of our relations with these Governments. Our relations with Germany underwent severe period of testing during the military movements in the Balkans. At that moment the eminent Chief of the German State, Herr Hitler, in a personal message addressed to myself expressed his Friendship with our country. This with the reply which I sent him created an atmosphere of mutual confidence which formed the basis of German-Turco Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact of June 18, 1941. Since then German-Turkish relations have remained friendly and untroubled and the recently signed trade treaty between the two countries may be considered a happy result of this policy of friendship and confidence. The French defeat in summer of 1940 which placed British in a most difficult position caused not the slightest change in Turkish policy, which remained faithful to the treaty of alliance. Turkey showed one of the greatest powers of the world that she was her friend in bad times also. Our foreign policy will continue to proceed along the path of the defence of our national

honour and fidelity to our engagements. Turkey, therefore, in pursuance of established policy of peace and of observing strict neutrality in the affairs of this world war, means to get time sufficient enough to arm herself for any future eventuality which is bound to come one or the other day. The magnificent Russian resistance against the Nazi onslaught, which has amazed the world, has given Turkey a great respite to equip herself, and she cannot in any way be blamed of intransigence and ambiguity. Her neutrality has been of immense help to the Allied cause."

On August 6, 1942 the new Turkish Foreign Minister M. Menemenjoglu declared, "In foreign policy the Government would follow the same path as that of his predecessor. Turkey has chosen not passive but active neutrality and her foreign policy could be summed up thus: We will meet friendship with equal friendship and goodwill and we will retort to enmity with unswerving energy and courage. The Anglo-Turkish Alliance—the fundamental factor of our practical system would continue to

produce its good effects on both the parties, the Turco-German Pact sealed the mutual friendship and comprehensions between both countries and enhanced the active policy followed by Turkey towards the two principal belligerent powers. If our independence and territory were attacked our whole existence would be devoted to one ideal to fight to the last man."

On December 23, 1942 the *Volkischer Beobachter*, a leading German daily wrote in an article in answer to an enquiry from the editor of *Aksam*, an important Turkish paper regarding the position reserved to smaller states in the 'German New Order,' thus stated, "Countries which are planning to become springboard for an allied invasion of Europe should meditate on the fate of Poland."

Aksam published a rejoinder on the position of the smaller countries under the title "*New Order of Hitler*" in which it was stated that the subservient political and economic position reserved for smaller nations under the absolute sway of Germany and Italy would not suit the Turks, who were convinced that the only honour-

able state for them was to be completely independent and masters within their own frontiers."

The public statements of responsible high Turkish personages and the comments in the Turkish press go to prove the fact that Turkey, in the conduct of her foreign policy at such a critical stage of the development of war, had always entertained fear, suspicion and apprehensions against the Axis Powers and relied more and more upon the friendship and the guarantees given by the Allied Nations.

The German propaganda machinery was all the time busy trying to create a rift between Turkey and her friends, Britain, Soviet Union and the United States of America. The situation was given a dramatic turn by the personal visit of Mr. Churchill to the President of the Turkish Republic and the conferences took place between them at Adana on the 30th and 31st January, 1943. In these conferences several Turkish and Allied high officials took part and frank and freindly talks furthur strengthened the ties of friendship between the two countries. The general

situation in Europe was discussed with particular reference to those regions in which Turkey was directly concerned and interested. Agreement was reached at on the manner in which Britain and U. S. A. would be able to help Turkey materially so that she might consolidate and strengthen her security arrangements. Later on diplomatic and military missions were exchanged with the object of achieving a better understanding of the situation and to decide how best Turkey could be helped and equipped to become an active partisan of the Allied Nations. The Ankara radio announced that, "Our policy was made clear Mr. Churchill, having acquainted himself with the actual problems from close at hand, has found the means of imparting them to President Roosevelt. This solidarity of thought and opinion was not confined to the present situation but extended to the period after war. Mr. Churchill would go down in world history as a statesman of energy, political insight, and patriotism, and Turkey had never hesitated to recognise his energy and statesmanship. Turkish policy had always been fully

appreciated by the British leaders, as well as by the British people and press. The Adana Conference had opened new possibilities of strengthening the defence and security of peace-loving Turkey, and the friendship so frankly established and expressed between the two nations thus gained a new impetus".

The main object of this meeting was to explore further possibilities of reinforcing the defences of Turkey by supplying her with all the required material and equipment so that she might be placed in a stronger position to resist the German aggression. The British Ambassador to Turkey thus told the press representatives, "After the Axis forces have been cleared out of North Africa, the decisions taken at Casablanca may result in an extension of hostilities to regions close to Turkey in which she possesses important interests, in that case Germany might exert pressure on Turkey either to establish a defensive line which possibly might include part of Turkish territory, for example, the Straits, or under the pretext of preventing an Allied offensive through Turkish territory might attack her. "The

only way to stave off this danger would be to enable Turkey to resist such pressure. Russia, he added, had been kept fully informed of the questions discussed at Adana. He also denied emphatically German-inspired reports that Britain had asked Turkey to enter the war and that Turkey had refused¹''.

The Adana conference aroused greater suspicion in the Axis circles. However the position of Turkey was made clear to Herr Von Papen, the German Ambassador to Turkey by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. Later on February 24th, 1943 it was announced by the President of the Republic in an address to the people before the general elections, that it was not entirely a matter of his country's volition whether she was to remain a neutral or become belligerent; it all depended on the turn of events in international affairs. We shall do everything possible not to get involved and contaminated by the world upheaval which afflicts us and from which we suffer, but it was Turkey's duty to be

¹ The Bulletin of International News, February 20th, '43.

vigilant and be prepared. Four years before no one would have supposed that she would have remained so long outside a world war ; since then more had been spent on defence than ever before and an increasing number had been called to colours. By reason of this sacrifice and furthermore the fact that we have no secret aspirations to attack others, Turkey has been able to keep her policy steadfast and above board. She must, however, be ready to face any sacrifice. As a people who harbour no hostility to anyone, we wish to live, while safeguarding our territory, our rights, and interests.”¹

(The materials promised by the Allied Nations continued to come to Turkey, though not in such large quantities as was promised. Exchange of views and missions between the two countries also continued. Admiral Sir John Cunningham arrived in Ankara on June 13, 1943 and was received by Ismet Inonu and had many important conversations and discussions with the Turkish officials. On June 15th the Turkish

¹B. O. I. N. A., March 6, 1943

Prime Minister speaking at the People's Party Congress said that during the last four years his country had been faced with the peril of war on many occasions, but by following Ataturk's policy, they had been able to avoid it. Russo-Turkish friendship was cemented in a cordial agreement and an agreement of alliance had been signed with England. "The people's party recognises the necessity of a large family of independent nations enjoying equal rights, of which the Turkish nation would be an essential member. Nationalism should be the means by which the Turkish nation will reach the highest level of human progress, and Turkish nationalism must be understood in a progressive and constructive sense, wishing no harm to other peoples, and conducive to an appreciation and encouragement of the contribution of other nations to the welfare of humanity."

The loyalty and sincerity of the Turkish nation and those who guide its destiny could be gauged by the following reproduction of an article written by M. Yalchin in the *Vatan*, an important Turkish paper. "Turkey had signed the treaty of alli-

ance with Britain and France after the outbreak of the war and therefore she had committed herself to enter the war by the side of her allies in case hostilities spread to the Mediterranean or if some other contingencies arose. Consequently Turkey had not proclaimed and could not proclaim her neutrality in the conflict between Great Britain and France on the one hand and Germany on the other. When the war spread to other countries, Turkey proclaimed her neutrality towards the conflicts in which those countries were involved without changing her status of expectant non-belligerent in the war of Britain against Germany and Italy. This particular position of Turkey had been recognised by Germany when she signed the pact of friendship with Turkey, but German propaganda tried to embroil the issue by insisting too much unqualified Turkish neutrality and hinting that Britain was pressing Turkey to abandon her neutrality."

Further M. Yalchin clarified the position of his country in another article of August 14, 1943 in which he wrote that responsible Turkish diplomats had often repeated that

their country would not enter the war unless attacked and also that Turkey had no territorial claims to make. At first, he wrote, these two principles might look contradictory so far as Anglo-Turkish Alliance is concerned in which both the parties had contracted some binding and positive obligations towards each other. In fact there does not appear any such contradiction. The Germans were extremely angry when Turkey signed the alliance with Britain because they were afraid that Britain might trick Turkey to enter the war on her side, the same way as they had tricked Turkey to enter the last war by their side. However their apprehensions proved baseless, and by 1941 they began to hint that Turkey should join the Axis Powers to attack Syria and Iraq or at least give passage to the German troops through Turkey. It was then that the Turkish officials proclaimed loudly of Turkey's determination to resist any encroachment on her independence and laid emphasis on the fact that Turkey did not covet any territory which belongs to her neighbours. These two principles, wrote, M. Yalchin, should be

interpreted as additional to, not limitative of the Anglo-Turkish Alliance. This was proved by the fact that Britain had never regarded them as derogatory to the Alliance. Mr. Churchill's visit to Adana and the assistance so lavishly given since then by Britain to Turkey showed that Britain had never ceased to consider Turkey as her sound, trusted, and loyal ally.¹

Meantime the situation of the war changed in favour of the Allied Nations on every European and African front with the result that it became imperative on Britain, Russia and U. S. A. to demand passage through the Straits to render effective assistance to a very old ally of the Republic, the Soviet Union, and release the Balkans from the yoke of Hitler.

On November, 20, 1943 the Son Posta reported that the Foreign Minister had informed the diplomatic corps in Ankara of the result of the meeting with Mr. Eden, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs. He intimated that the British Government had demanded Turkey to fulfil her obliga-

¹ B. O. I. N. August 21st, 1943.

tion under the treaty of alliance, to which he replied that circumstances and conditions prevent his country from doing so at present. He also mentioned that an exchange of views was taking place between the representatives of the two countries to make decision under which Turkey might be able to fulfil her obligations by entering the war on the side of the Allied Nations.

On December 6, 1943 it was reported that President Ismet Inonu and the Turkish Foreign Minister M. Menemenjoglu flew to Cairo to confer with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill and on December 7, the following statement was issued.

“Participation in this conference of the head of the Turkish State in response to the cordial invitation addressed to him by the United States, British and Soviet Governments bears striking testimony to the strength of the alliance which unites Great Britain and Turkey and to the firm friendship existing between the Turkish people and the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

“Presidents Roosevelt and Inonu and Prime Minister Churchill reviewed the general political situation and examined at length the policy to be followed, taking into account the joint and several interests of the three countries.

“The study of all problems in a spirit of understanding and loyalty showed that the closest unity existed between U. S. A. Turkey, and Great Britain in their attitude to the world situation. The conversation in Cairo have consequently been most useful and most fruitful for the future of the relations between the countries concerned.

“The identity of interest and of views of the Great American and British democracies with those of the Soviet Union, as also, the traditional relations of friendship existing between these Powers and Turkey, have been reaffirmed throughout the proceedings of the Cairo Conference.”

There was throughout the world much speculation about the exact nature of the understanding between the heads of these three countries. It was surmised that the Mediterranean, after the German reverses in Africa had been rendered safe from

German menace and the Mussolini regime collapsed in Italy, and the Badoglio Government had taken its place, the Allies might have made one or both of these demands on the Turks; firstly, the cession of certain territory temporarily to be converted into an allied base for an attack on the South-Eastern Europe; secondly, an open declaration by Turkey of hostility against the Axis Powers. The object of both of these demands would have been to enable an allied attack on the German strongholds in Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia so as to give more effective aid to the Soviet Union by sending her more war material through the Straits.

The Germans felt very nervous about the situation thus created and Von Papen sought and was accorded an interview with the Turkish Prime Minister on December 6, 1943. Much fuss was made in the German press. On December 8, M. Menemenjoglu told the press that Turkey's foreign policy remains unchanged and Turkish non-belligerency as defined by *Halk Evi* (the people's party) meeting on November 17, remains unaltered. "He also declared, that the Cairo

Conference was, "One of the most important events of this phase of the war" the relations of his country with Britain had been further strengthened and that their relations with U. S. A. and the Soviet Union were equally strong. In spite of these professions, it appeared from the press reports that relations between Turkey and Britain underwent some slight change, perhaps due to Turkey's declaration that she would adhere to non-belligerency. The British military mission which had gone to Turkey returned back. Mr. Eden however declined to comment for sometime on the attitude of the British Government towards Turkey. The greatest difficulty in the way of the Turks joining the Allies at that time was the fact that the greater group of Dodecanasian islands was still in the possession of Hitler ; the islands of Mitylene and Mudros are at a stone's throw from the rich Ismir (Smyrna) coast. In this region lie the newly developed and important industrial towns of Turkey, which could have been devastated in no time by the Nazis should the Turks openly have declared war against the Nazis.

No doubt the Germans were driven by the Russians from the Crimean coast but there was Nazi supremacy on the Rumanian and the Bulgarian coast ; a factor no less menacing to the security of the Turks. Lastly there were the devastating earthquakes and floods in Turkey, resulting in great losses both of men and property. It is not difficult to understand that these were the circumstances when the Turks decided not to become a belligerent nation. For a correct appreciation of Turkey's relations, past, present and future, with Britain, Soviet union and U. S. A. one must constantly bear in mind the fact that Turkish statesmen are, above anything else, Turks, bent on serving Turkish interest. Turkey signed the Anglo-Turkish alliance, not to please Britain, but because she saw in it effective means of protecting herself. "If she takes an active part in the war, she will do so, not "for the blue eyes of the Allies" but only if she can thereby obtain a guarantee for her future security and welfare. Concerning the future the dilemma confronting Turkey is whether she should spare herself all peril

or sacrifice by staying out of the war at the risk of finding herself isolated at the end of it and in the post-war period, or whether she should accept her part of the responsibilities and danger and, by so doing, acquire an honourable place among the United Nations, on whom will devolve the task of the reconstruction of the world after the war. Responsible Turkish statesmen have repeatedly stated that the Anglo-Turkish alliance is the main pillar of Turkish foreign policy and that it should continue to be effective after the war. These statements could have no other meaning than this that the Anglo-Turkish alliance is, to the exclusion of any other foreign commitment of Turkey, the best guarantee for the present and the future safeguarding of Turkish interest." In March, 1944 it was thought in Turkey that it is permissible to assume that the Allies may have drawn up alternative plan including or excluding Turkish co-operation. Some of them surmised that the time has come, if indeed it has not passed already, for a decision to be taken whether Turkey will have her share in these plans or not.

In spite of her ostensible neutrality for a long time, Turkey's position was an extremely delicate and difficult one. The geography and the trend of the global war placed her in a dilemma as can be judged by the series of the treaties which Turkey made with the belligerent countries since the beginning of the war. In the midst of furious storms she has stood like an island whose shores have been constantly threatened by the sweep of mighty waves of destruction. That is why her statesmen were still undecided as to the course they should adopt. In the light of the events in international affairs she was bound and committed by three very important treaties which prevented her to become a belligerent nation for a long time. These are, as have been discussed in the previous pages, firstly the 'Mutual Assistance Pact' signed by Turkey with Britain and France in 1939, secondly the 'Turco-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact' of 1939, and lastly the 'Turco-German Pact of Friendship and Non-aggression' signed in 1941. All these were more or less hedges against Turkey's very old

apprehension of Russian ambition to obtain control over the Straits and also the dread of the German *Drang Nach Osten* slogan. At the beginning of the Russo-German war both Russia and Britain assured Turkey of their adhering to the *status quo* of the Straits. Soviet Russia wanted the entry of Turkey into the war on her side so that some of the German armies might have been diverted from that front. But for about four years Britain and, after December 7, 1941 U. S. A. did not actually want Turkey to become belligerent. These powers at that time lacked troops and other war materials to protect her from an immediate German attack nor had they at their disposal good and efficient means to transport such materials even if they were available. If Turkey would have declared war on Germany at that time it would probably have put a severe drain upon U. S. A. and Britain than upon Germany. As late as February, 1944, Mr. Churchill himself told the House of Commons: "It is no part of our policy to get Turkey into trouble." Later on what we see is that both Britain and U. S. A. requested Turkey to aid the Allied Nations in the form of land and air bases

for use against the German stronghold of South-Eastern Europe. But the Allied failure to hold the important Aegean Sea islands off Turkey's shore did not allow Turkey to adopt such a course. In October 1943, just on the eve of Eden-Hull-Molotov conference at Moscow Russia insisted on Turkey's entry into the war and in order to achieve this aim Mr. Eden was chosen to secure commitments from Turkey. The Turks were quite suspicious of the Moscow Conference and their suspicion was confirmed at the Cairo Conference when Mr. Eden demanded Turkey's full entry into the war. The Turks felt no hesitation in declaring that they would not come in openly until they were assured of their relations how they stand with the Soviet Union after the war, and at the same time pointed out the vulnerability of Istanbul and Ankara to indiscriminate German bombing. There matters stood until the opening of the Tehran Conference. This Conference convinced the Turks that U. S. A. and Britain would not split with the Soviet Union and would not leave Turkey empty handed, isolated and helpless.

President Roosevelt invited Ismet Inonu and his party to Cairo. The Turks were not happy but they were ready to attend the conference. The communique issued after the Conference could not conceal that: (i) Turkey, risking war, had granted everything short of war; (ii) the Cairo Conference may have lessened but had not erased the Turco-Soviet differences. Such was the Turkish travail which forced her to remain non-belligerent for a long time but the recent favourable trends in international affairs forced Turkey to decide quickly as to which side she preferred to adhere openly. Mounting U. S. A. and British might, German losses and Russian admirable victories forced Turkey to be more practical in her foreign policy and as a consequence of which she decided to put a complete stop to the supply of Turkish chrome to Germany. It was another step onward to side with the Allied Nations. No doubt during all these years of Turkish welcome neutrality the Allied Nations benefited without incurring any serious loss or disadvantage. The strategic value and significance of Turkey was in no

way lessened and the Allied Nations could not afford to lose her friendship. During April and May, 1944 Turkey was again persuaded by the Allied Nations to end her neutrality in their favour but her statesmen thought that the country was not prepared to open hostilities against Germany when her army and defences were not in a position to meet the German onslaught through her Thracian frontiers and South-West landing from Dodecanasia.

The Allies were somewhat incensed at this attitude of Turkey Mr. Churchill opening a two day debate on May 24, 1944, on foreign affairs thus stated in the House of Commons :

“.....First of all let us survey the Mediterranean and Balkan spheres. The greatest disappointment which I had last October when I was not able to procure the necessary forces for gaining command of the Aegean Sea following upon the collapse of Italy and gaining possession of the principal Italian islands. That disappointment has of course been accompanied by an exaggerated attitude of caution on the side of Turkey. The hopes we cherished of

Turkey boldly entering the war in February or March or of at least according us the necessary bases for air action—these hopes have faded.

“After giving 20 million pounds worth of British and American arms to Turkey in 1943 alone, we have suspended the process and ceased to exhort Turkey to range herself with the victorious united powers with whom she has frequently declared that her sympathies lie and with whom, I think there is no doubt, that her sympathies do lie. But the Turks in these discussions at the end of last year and at the beginning of this have magnified their danger. Their military men took the gloomiest view of Russian prospects in south Russia and Crimea. They never dreamed that by early summer the Red armies would be on the slopes of the Carpathians drawn up along Pruth and the Sereth Rivers or that Odessa and Sebastopol would be liberated and regained by the extraordinary valour, might and energy of the Soviet onslaught. Consequently, the Turks did not measure with sufficient accuracy what might occur or what occurred in Rumania and Bulgaria

nor I might add, Hungary, and what would be the result on those countries of these tremendous Russian hammer blows struck even in months which are particularly unsuitable for operations in these regions and which would normally be devoted to the process of replenishing the advancing fronts for future action. Having over-rated their dangers, our Turkish friends increased their demands for supplies to such a point that, having regard to means of communication and transport alone, the war would probably be over before these supplies could reach them. We have, therefore, with great regret, discontinued the process of arming Turkey because it looks probable that in spite of our disappointment in the Aegean the Allies will be able to win the war in the Balkans and generally throughout South-Eastern Europe without Turkey being involved in it at all, though of course the aid of Turkey would be a great help and acceleration in that process.

This, of course, is a decision for Turkey to take, and we have put no pressure other than the pressure of argument and of not giving supplies we need for ourselves and

other nations that are fighting on our side. But the course which is being taken and has been taken; so far by Turkey will not, in my view, procure for the Turks the strong position at peace which would attend their joining the Allies. I must, however, note the good service and the significant gesture rendered to us by the Turkish Government recently and it is said that it has been rendered to us on the personal initiative of Turkey's honoured President, General Inonu, namely the complete cessation of chrome exports to Germany. It is not too much to expect that the assistance given to us in respect of chrome will also be extended shortly to cover other commodities, the export of which, even if of less importance than chrome, is of material assistance to the enemy. If so, we shall endeavour to compensate the Turkish people for the sacrifices which their cooperative action may entail by other means of importation.

“I thought it right to speak bluntly today. Turkey and Britain have a long history. They entered into relations with us before the war, when things looked very different and they did their best in difficult

Notwithstanding anything I have said in criticism, we hope with increasing confidence that a still better day will dawn for the relations of Turkey with Britain and, indeed, with all the great Allies.

Always in recent decades, there had been in the Mediterranean a certain tendency between Turkey and Italy on account of Italian ambitions in the Greek islands and also possibly in the Adana province of Turkey. The Turks could never know which way the Italian dictator would take his would be conquering sword. On that score Turkey's anxiety has been very largely removed."

The aforesaid declaration of the British foreign policy did not suggest any break or rupture between Turkey and the Allied Nations. It only created a temporary lull which gave time to Turkey to revise her attitude towards the Allied Nations in the light of important changes which took place in the various theatres of war in Europe. This lull was further accentuated when in June, 1944 Turkey allowed passage to German ships through the Straits from the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea. Consequently

there was great uproar against it both in U. S. A. and Britain. In the House of Commons, in London, it was taken to be a serious breach of the articles of Montreux Convention. Replying to a question, Mr. Eden, disclosed that the British Government had addressed a note of protest to the Turkish President and advised the members to watch the further progress and turn of events. Realising the intricacy of the situation and acting on better counsels M. Menemencioglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, resigned. The office of the Foreign Minister was taken up by Premier Sarajoglu who told the Allied representatives that in future no such repetition will take place and assured them of an enquiry into the matter. Some of the German vessels were held up and further passage was totally refused. This wise and sagacious policy of the Turkish Government prevented further deterioration of relations between the Allies and Turkey, which was itself a proof of the fact that Turkey was not prepared to risk the friendship of her Allies. The whole position was thus explained, as to why Turkey was not

in the war with the allies by the following comment of an Istanbul editor.

"The reasons why Turkey, although an ally of Britain, has not yet entered the war are still not fully understood by world public opinion," declares Huseyin Cahid Yalchin, editor of *Tanin*, Istanbul, in a recent article in the *Manchester Guardian*. He wrote:—

"When the Ankara pact was signed in 1939, war had already broken out between Britain and France on the one side and Germany on the other, and as the character of the pact was only defensive, Turkey was not then obliged to enter the conflict. Turkey was to help her ally with everything in her power only in case the war, as a result of aggression against Britain and France, extended to the Mediterranean, and also in case Britain, obliged by the guarantees she had given, had to come to the aid of one of the Balkan countries. Further, any help that Turkey could give her ally was not supposed to drag her into an armed dispute with Soviet Russia. Even were we to leave aside the legal considerations of the pact, Turkey's entry into the war at that period would only

have meant disaster both for herself and for her allies. Geographically Turkey is separated from Britain. Had Turkey, despite the risk of dispute with Russia, participated in the war when the conflict, after Italy's entry, extended to the Mediterranean (that is, after the defeat of France and the retreat from Dunkirk), she would not have received the slightest aid from Britain. Turkey, with an army which although for the Balkans was considered redoubtable, would be primitive in front of the Nazis, was not at that moment in a position to attack Germany.

"Turkey did not enter the war, but this was of more help to Britain than winning a great battle. Turkey, in closing the road to Syria, Iraq and Egypt, was protecting the rear of the British forces in North Africa. Turkey's entry into the war at that moment against the Nazis would only have served to open for the Germans the road to Egypt and Basra. Towards the end of 1942 I had answered the question, 'Why is Turkey not entering the war?' asked me by a newspaperman in a private gathering, of journalists in America, by

saying, 'First chase the enemy out of North Africa and the Mediterranean so that your cruisers can come as far as the Dardanelles, then will be the time to ask that question.' If Turkey were to fight alone, her offensive would not even help to draw on herself a sufficient number of German divisions to bring about any change in the situation on the east and west fronts. The Germans have as reserve, the Bulgarian Army. There are German forces waiting in the Balkans, and it is unlikely that any forces they would be obliged to send to reinforce the Balkans would matter much in the east or west. Even if it did matter, the way for the Turkish Army must first be cleared. Is it certain today that Turkey would not be hindered from entering Bulgaria? I cannot tell, but there is no one who would be sure on the point. Even if we were to admit that the road was open for the Turkish Army, the question remains, 'whether Turkey is well enough equipped with modern arms to fight with success combined Bulgarian and German armies.' We have enough faith in the good-will

and sincerity of the military experts of our Allies to leave them to answer this question. As far as our opinion is concerned, there is still much to be done in this field.

“Thus there remains at this moment for Turkey no other way to enter the conflict except by a formal declaration of war against Germany and cession of the bases to the Allies. But of what help would this be to the common cause? The advantage which would be obtained by a number of Allied planes taking off from Turkish bases would be nothing compared to the blows which Turkey would have to put up with. Use of the Turkish bases would help the Allies neither to win nor to shorten the war. Today bombers taking off from Africa are able to bomb the oilfields of Rumania. On the other hand, bases in South and Central Italy, which are still nearer, are at the disposal of the Allies. Planes taking off from these bases could back up a landing on the shores of Western Greece, Albania or Yugoslavia, as well as keep under effective fire the Balkans and South and Eastern Germany.

“On the other hand, Turkey declaring war and remaining passive would result in her receiving blows at her most vital points. Cities like Zonguldak, Izmir and Istanbul, which are most vulnerable, would be subject to the heaviest raids of the enemy. Further, the sea route leading through the Straits would still be under the control of the enemy, and help to Soviet Russia would still be impossible. Although the enemy might not succeed in occupying the Straits, he might try to descend on the shores of the Sea of Marmara with an audacious push. In these conditions the Turkish Army would only serve as cannon fodder, and such a war could never meet with the comprehension of the Turkish nation. But if Turkey were given a section of the front in a general military and political offensive, forming with the Allies a part of the general framework, then only would the Turkish Army, thus acknowledged as fit to receive equal respect and care with the forces in other sections of the front, be able to do valuable service in the cause of justice in international relations and

independence of small nations. Such alone is a war which could meet with the full understanding of the Turkish nation."

Turkey after sometime realised that her future was being worked out on the battlefields of the present war and watched the progress of the war with great and keen interest. The opening of the long awaited Western Anglo-American front in summer of 1944 against Germany, furnished proof of their strength and vast resources. The Russian offensive in the east and the American-British offensive in the west largely minimised the fear of German aggression against Turkey from Balkanistan. The trend of the war at that time made it clear that Germany, howsoever she was strong in the reserves of men and material, was not in a position to fight successfully on all the fronts. This favourable change relieved Turkey of a potential danger and that is why the Turkish Government stopped the passage of the German ships through the Straits and disallowed the delivery of her chrome to that country in favour of Britain. Her neutrality henceforth was no longer a

welcome neutrality for the Germans. These circumstances and turn of events demanded broad vision both by the Allies and the Turkish statesmen for an important change in their respective foreign policies. Turkey's importance both from the view point of strategy and potentiality was in no way minimised. She is destined to play an important part to-day and tomorrow. The signs are undoubtedly ominous. This was the time for Turkey to exercise greater freedom of action in her foreign policy which was no longer limited or largely hindered. At the same time it is highly desirable on the part of the Allies to see that Turkey is left in a strong position to shoulder the joint responsibility of bringing peace to the destitute and the suffering millions of the world. In order to be secure in the replanned post-war world, Turkey has no other way except to build up a system of collective security in company with nations whose ideal is to defend the human right and liberty against aggression and brutal force. That is why the Turkish statesmen began to think very seriously of abandoning their

neutrality in favour of the Allied Nations. The Turkish General Staff and military attaches most probably advised their Government of the German failure to check the Russian and Anglo-American offensives. They were quick to realise the ultimate defeat of Hitler. Besides, the Turkish statesmen themselves began to see very clearly the fate of German armies on all the war fronts and became convinced of the ultimate defeat of Nazism. Turkey thought it, very wisely, an opportune moment to side openly with the Allies, lest she may be exposed to the greatest perils and severe tests at the time of Peace Conference, when the victors of war would decide the future planning of the world.

We have seen that in May 1944, the Allied Nations were successful at every front of the war and the whole world began to repose confidence in the United Nation's demand for an earlier termination of the war so as to relieve the suffering humanity from further tortures of blood and hunger. Turkey too being anxious to see the restoration of peace joined

the Allied Nations openly and sever all her diplomatic relations with Germany on 12th August 1944, in spite of the entreaties and intimidations of Herr Von Pappen, the German Ambassador at Ankara. With this remarkable change in the Turkish Foreign policy there came a corresponding change in the foreign policies of other countries of Balkanistan, namely, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Saner people of these countries lost every hope for a German victory and began to drift towards the Allied Nations. They got the lead from Turkey and endeavoured to follow the footsteps of the Turks. The result was the signing of the terms of armistice by Bulgaria and Rumania with the Soviet Union.

When the Turks broke off with the Germans, the Nazi Army of Balkanistan was rendered quite ineffective for other uses except self-defence. Hitler could not dare to make use of his Balkan divisions either at the Russian front or at the Italian and Western fronts because he knew fully well that a hostile Turkey in combination with the Allies was be a bigger menace.

to threaten the speedy destruction of the Hitlerite Germany. Therefore he and his associates did not venture to attack Turkey either from the Thracian frontier or from the garrisons stationed in the Dodecanasian group of islands lying to the south-west of Turkey. No doubt Hitler's attack on Turkey from either of these sides would have exposed Istanbul and the rich hinterland of Izmir (Smyrna) to ruthless aerial bombardment, but this step was very wisely not taken by the German General Staff.

It has been shown in the previous pages that Turkey does not seem to be happy over the recent attitude of the Soviet Union. She still entertains fear of the old Russian dream of dominating the Straits. This is quite evident of the apprehensions showed by the Turkish President and other notable statesmen at the Cairo Conference. They expressly demanded in clear words the clarification of the Soviet attitude and the steps she proposes to take with regard to Balkanistan, the Straits, and the Middle East. Without getting satisfactory reply from the U. S. A. and Britain she politely

refused their demand of entering the war at that time. She joined the Allied Camp against world Fascism, perhaps with the express understanding, that both Britain and U. S. A. would assist her at the peace conference in case her 'Guardianship of the Straits' is exposed to any form of danger. The troubled and uneasy days of Turkey have not yet come to an end. She still finds herself placed in a suspensive dilemma. She aspires to take the leadership of Balkanistan as she led the Balkan countries in the pre-war days. Such a step seems to be vital for her security not only in Balkanistan but it is equally valid in the Middle East. Her geographical location has placed her in the midst because she occupies a nodal position between Asia and Europe. Naturally in order to maintain herself she has had to look towards the safety of the Middle East as well as that of South-Eastern Europe. This does not mean in any way that Turkey aspires the revival of the old Ottoman Empire. Her responsible public men on many occasions have voiced their sentiments against any such coalition of people or

countries on racial or religious grounds. Very recently at the youth's rally at Ankara, the Turkish President, Ismet Inonu, himself spoke and advised the youngsters, not to indulge in the formation of any racial blocks because such an idea will in no way be beneficial to the Turks, on the contrary it would injure the good neighbourly relations. Obviously he hinted against the Pan-Turanian movement which involves strained relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union in whose territory there inhabit millions of Turkish speaking people belonging to the same race as the Turks of modern Turkey.

In short, at present, it is in the best of Turkish interest to try to maintain the pre-war *Status Quo* to a large extent. There is every possibility that Russia may seek an entry into the Persian Gulf through Iran as she is seeking in the Mediterranean through the Straits which naturally would jeopardise the security and sovereignty of both Turkey and Iran. The British and Americans, perhaps would not approve of this idea, because of their respective interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and

the Middle East countries. Both Britain and U. S. A., are very much interested in the exploitation of the Iranian and Arabian oil-fields and would not like any outside interference. Therefore Turkey finds two strong supporters at the peace conference to back her own view point.

Russia strives for her security and seeks an entry into the Mediterranean and the Indian Oceans in either of the following ways. First, either by converting through persuasion, intimidation, threat and propaganda all possible rivals and enemies in the unification of the community of Nations both in the Middle East and South-Eastern Europe under her own aegis. Or, secondly by establishing some sort of coalition of Powers by which she should act in cooperation against common dangers, and lastly 'by playing off rivals and enemies against one another in a balance in which the enviable role of the *Tetius Gaudens* becomes politically practicable.' All these avenues are left open by the Kremlin and that is why one often notices inconsistencies in the Soviet foreign policy and also because of the above

mentioned conflicting and contradictory channels of Soviet diplomacy.

Turkey in spite of her long neutrality never thought of putting any obstacle in the achieving of an Allied victory, on the contrary the responsible leaders of this country always spoke openly against the Fascist aggressions and showed their full sympathy to the cause of the Allies. The Turks on many occasions were induced by the Germans, on very attractive terms, to declare their hostility against the Allies but never it was done. She never thought of betraying either the Soviet Union or Britain when both the States at one time or the other were placed in most dangerous and critical positions. In those critical days of 1941-43 her neutrality was a welcome neutrality to the Allied Nations. In a way her neutrality was the first line of defence for India when Hitler's mechanised armies were hammering the gates of Caucasasia and were endeavouring to enter Iran and seek a forced entry in India. But that dream of Hitler was never realised because of Turkish neutrality. The Iranian and Rashid Ali *coup d'etat* was nipped merely

because Turkey declared her neutrality and unconcern in any of these.

The Turkish Republic proved her fidelity and sincerity to the Allied Nations and showed the world that she is quite capable of being literally true to all her commitments which enhanced her prestige in the eyes of all the truth-loving-peoples of the existing civilized world. But we see that a new struggle to get control of the Balkans and of the Straits began when Hitler's European fortress began to crack in 1943. In the beginning of the war the Nazi Germany endeavoured to realise the old German dream of *Drang Nach Osten* but as soon as the liquidation of Prussian militarism began to appear in Europe the old wine of Pan-Slavism was being put in a new Soviet bottle by U. S. S. R.

It is also evident by the geographical location of modern Turkey that she is vulnerable to an attack through Thrace, the Black Sea and from her North-Eastern frontier by the Soviet Union. She is also exposed to such dangers from the Rhodes and the Dodecanasian group of islands in the

South-West. At the same time she feels quite uncomfortable so long as the French and the British mandatory systems exists in the Middle East. Thus we see that throughout the whole course of-the pre-war and war days she was very much afraid of an accommodation or rapprochement between the Great Powers at her expense. It can be judged from the preceding pages that in September 1939, M. Sarajoglu, then Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, rushed to Moscow where he had to deal very cautiously with an impending rapprochement between Hitler and Stalin. The reported Russian suggestion of a 'Protective' Soviet occupation of the Straits was shrewdly refused by Turkey. Such a dangerous move became an eye-opener to the Turks and henceforth nearly the whole of the country became very suspicious of the Russian designs. The *pis aller* for the Turks was to drift more and more towards Britain and France. At that time the Anglo-Soviet relations were not very cordial and the Russians too became suspicious of a combined Anglo-French attack on the Soviet Union through Turkey. Such an

apprehension was found an excuse for the German propagandists to sow dissension and create discord between Turkey and U. S. S. R. Turkey's hands were quite clean but she was placed in a very awkward position. All such misgivings were removed when in June 1941, Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. A collateral Anglo-Russian guarantee was soon furnished to Turkey and the things became smoother. Being afraid of her security Turkey's foreign policy became of an extremely cautious nature and that is why one notices that she did not declare war against the Axis till she was forced to do so in February, 1945.

As soon as the 'Big Three' concluded their parleys at Yalta, in Crimea, Britain asked Turkey to declare war against Germany which she willingly did. The Ankara radio announced on the 23rd February, 1945 that the British Ambassador to Turkey invited the Republican Government to take part in the San Francisco Conference. It was also announced that the condition for Turkey's participation in this Conference was that Turkey should declare

war against the Axis by March, 1, 1945. This was a sequel to the British Ambassador's visit to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, when in the name of his Government the British Ambassador, handed to the Turkish Foreign Office a memorandum in which it was stated that in accordance with the decision of the Crimea Conference taken by the three great Allied leaders those nations will be qualified as Associative Nations by the side of the United Nations who will have declared war on the Axis powers before March 1, 1945.

"These nations will be invited to take part in the Conference convoked at San Francisco for April 1945 next to discuss a future world organisation. Qualified for Associative Nations are Turkey, Egypt, Iceland, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. It was announced to *Kamutay* by the Turkish Foreign Minister that,

"The British Ambassador has been instructed by his Government to inform the Government of the Turkish Republic of the condition under which Turkey would

be invited to the Conference at San Francisco. He stated that if the Government of the Turkish Republic decides to declare war before March 1, 1945 it would then be necessary for Turkey to let the United States know that she wishes to adhere to the United Nations declaration.

It was also declared by the Turkish Foreign Minister that,

“The National Assembly’s objective has always been the maintenance of sincere and friendly relations among all nations so that they may live in full security and independence. In line with this policy of the Assembly the Government of the Turkish Republic having embraced this principle as the foundation of its foreign policy took its stand at the side of the peace-loving nations before the outbreak of this world war at a time when peace-loving nations made every effort to preserve world peace and security to protect them from the dangers of aggression which were already then taking shape on the political horizon.

“Everyone knows that in face of the most varied dangers and crisis the Govern-

ment of the Turkish Republic has continued insistently to abide by the requirements of these alliances and to march without wavering on the path she has taken since the beginning of the world war which is now in its sixth year.

“Thus by the two resolutions of August 2, 1944 and January 3, 1945 respectively, the Turkish Government severed relations first with Germany and then with Japan in the interests of the cause which we have taken up together with the Allies.”

“Turkey’s foreign policy since the outbreak of the war has been one of close relations with the Western Powers. In October, 1939 an Anglo-French-Turkish pact of assistance was signed, valid for 15 years. Under this pact, Turkey was to aid Britain and France in the event of aggression by a European power leading to war in the Mediterranean.

“But Turkey remained neutral after Italy’s entry into the war and also refused co-operation in the Balkan defence when Hitler invaded Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941.

“The British Government’s suggestion

made to the Government of the Turkish Republic in the framework of the decision adopted by the Allies at Crimea Conference now provides for our country and our nation an occasion and a possibility of contributing yet another decisive effort in favour of the Allied cause.

"Our Government, having thoroughly examined the aforementioned suggestion has reached the conclusion that its acceptance would be completely in keeping with our alliance and would serve the interests of the policy which we always have followed unfalteringly.

"Therefore, our Government has informed the Ambassador of our ally, Great Britain, that the question of declaring war on Germany and Japan and the other question of Turkish adherence to the United Nations declaration would be submitted to your approval.

"In placing this motion before you we are inspired by the unshakable faith that any decision which you reach, like all decisions that concern the vital interests of our nations, will contribute to the happiness of the nation."

In March, 1945 Prof. Carr and the 'London Times' put forward the idea that the U. S. S. R. should be recognized as the dominant Great Power in the East and Great Britain in the west of Europe. The small states of the Balkans and presumably Turkey be grouped as within the zone of Russian sphere of interest. Such a suggestion again aroused great feeling of resentment in Turkey. Leonard Wolf offered the following criticism against this idea. He wrote that 'the proposed organisation of Europe would be a return to the 19th century system of European politics in an extreme and most dangerous form, in which peace, stability, and prosperity would depend upon a balance of power between two loose groups or alliances composed of satellite small states precariously controlled by and attached to two Great Powers.....History proves conclusively that this is not the case; once the common danger of defeat and the urgency of common policy to ensure victory are removed, no foundation for a permanent "alliance" necessarily remain. In peace the international situation is not static; it is fluid, relations between states

continually change under the emergency of common divergent national interests. The relative power of States is also not fixed eternally, it is continually changing''¹

Therefore there now exists a strong feeling of resentment in Turkey against any possible threat to her security, sovereignty, and independence. The present Government never tried to offend any of the Great Powers specially the Soviet Union. This can be judged by the famous trial of 23 Turks opened before the Istanbul Court of Martial Law on September 18, 1944 for spreading racial and Pan-Turanian doctrines. Zaki Valid Togan, professor of Turkish History at the University of Istanbul was implicated as the head of this organisation. These persons were persistently advocating the unification of Turks of Asia with Turkey to create one racially pure Turkish State. In Asia majority of people belonging to the Tatar-Turkish race inhabit the Soviet Union and in order to show that the Turkish Government had no sympathy with such a move-

¹L. Wolf. *Political Quarterly*, July-September, 43.

ment this trial was conducted in a spirit of sincere friendship to Russia.

When critically analysed it will be seen that the problem of Turkey is only part of the much wider problem of all the States of South-Eastern Europe and the Middle East. In this tangle Turkey is naturally more interested in the turn of political events both in Asia and Europe. We have seen that ever since the rise of Hitler the Balkan States were confronted with a dilemma : to join Hitler and share the loot, yet become political and economic vassals of Germany or to pursue an independent policy and suffer the consequences of total absorption. In the early days of the war, at one stage or the other these States lost their integrity and independence. Turkey as the leader of the Balkan Entente was left all alone and was helpless to render any assistance to them against the Axis because of the intransigence of the West European Powers. With the defeat of Hitler and Mussolini a new realignment took place which placed the Soviet Union on an extremely firm footing. The trump cards of diplomacy are now in

Stalin's hand. No one knows exactly his mind. There is a big mark of interrogation round him.

Past experience shapes present definition of interest and future expectations and demands. The experiences of the Soviet Union centre around a few decisive events of history ; for instance 'military defeat of Russia at the hands of Imperial Germany during the last war, isolation, blockade, intervention and invasion of the Soviet Union during 1918-19, at the hands of the Allied Powers. The Allied efforts to strangle the Soviet State at birth were thwarted by the narrowest margin. Then was the renewed invasion of 1920 from Poland, the promotion and the defeat of a world wide communist revolution, rapproachment with the Republican Reich Government in 1922 of the West European Powers, new danger from the Nazi Reich met by the Soviet efforts which ultimately proved futile to build a global "People's Front' against the Axis so as to make common cause with the other prospective victims of the Axis through a 'Grand Alliance' and through the League

of Nations and lastly was the supposed threat of an attack on the Soviet Union advocated by a certain section of the British and American opinion through Turkey in 1940-41 when the Russians were engaged in war against Finland.

These are some of the very bitter experiences which are indelibly imprinted on Stalin's mind. The present day Soviet foreign policy is governed largely through these past experiences. Stalin is bent upon the creation of a position in the Balkans, central Europe and the Middle East which will form the basis of a complete collaboration with U. S. S. R. so that the smaller states may never again be misguided at the instigation of other Great Powers to direct their activities against Russia. In this respect Stalin seemed to have achieved a great success in the Balkans and central Europe. So far as Turkey and the Middle East are concerned he is directing his efforts towards the achievement of this aim. Realising this the 'London Times' urged cooperation of all principal powers to ensure security of the Middle

East and on the 10th April, 1945 it was thus reported by this paper.

"The responsibilities shouldered by Britain in the Middle East should not in future be incurred by any single power. Britain must take the initiative in suggesting to the United Nations the need for a common approach to common problems.

"The initial steps towards framing a policy for security and well-being in the Middle East must be taken in London. But such a policy now requires the active co-operation of all principal powers. The Middle East supply centre must not be allowed to disappear for it has an obvious future as an instrument of the United Nations not only in the first critical months of peace but also during the years when relations between the Middle East and the Western Power can be permanently harmonised by friendly co-operation.

"Its control is already shared between Britain and America. It should be enlarged to include representatives of Russia and France so that it can take its place among other regional bodies which the United

Nations may set up for economic planning.

“In the political field, the case for the creation of a regional commission, representing the same four powers, is equally clear for Britain cannot sustain alone the burden of safeguarding international security and of solving by herself problems in which other powers are equally interested.

“Among these are, the task of reconciling strategic safeguards necessary to international order with the independence and self-respect of the Middle East countries : provision of leadership and assistance in building up the strength and unity of a region until it is capable of discharging its own responsibilities for world security ; resolution of traditional rivalries among the western powers into that co-operation for the advancement of the Middle East which circumstances now demand.....

“But will this opportunity be grasped unless Britain takes the lead in proposing the necessary measures ? At the moment, it is her word that counts most in Middle East affairs. The general reception accord-

ed to the covenant of the Arab League justifies the hopeful view taken of it by all member-States. The war has shown once again that no system of international security can be effective unless it embraces the Middle East. This area controls land, sea communications between Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean zones and the aggressor who seizes it, has both at his discretion."—(Reuter).

This view in Turkey, was considered to be another example of the intransigence of some of the British diplomats who might be prepared to appease Russia at the Cost of Turkey and Iran.

The exact deliberations and conclusions of the Yalta Conference are not yet known but Russia, by recently denouncing her treaty of 1925 with Turkey, made it clear among other things that she does feel that the present arrangements governing the Straits and the status of Turkey correspond to present day power politics. In some Turkish quarters it is suggested that it seems likely that the Yalta Conference agreed upon secret protocols which, to avoid the sinister quota-

tions of that phrase, should perhaps be called 'gentlemen's agreement'. If these secret agreements relate merely to an assurance on the part of M. Stalin to accord good neighbourly treatment to the Turkish Republic in exchange of extended Russian frontiers west of Armenia? The Soviet Union has now put forward a demand on Turkey to cede the district of Kars and Ardahan to the Union which means that the Yalta Conference was a complete negation of the foreign policy of Russia which started its existence with a renunciation of all the secret pacts of its predecessor and which it is presumed is still being adhered.

On April 8, 1945 a news emanated from New York that Turkish Ambassador at Moscow M. Selim Sarper, who was returning to Ankara, was believed to have brought Soviet demands for changes in the 1925 treaty with amity. There is little doubt that that demand included Soviet control of Dardanelles and possible adjustments on the Caucasus frontier. It has been discussed in the preceding pages that ever since the rise of Russia as a 'Great Power' she

cast covetous eyes on the Straits. This policy was pursued by the Tsarist Russia and, since history repeats itself, it is now being pursued by the Socialist Russia. We see that Turkey like Greece is located where Russian and British spheres of influence clash. Turkey now definitely chooses partnership with Britain. She declared war against the Axis, hoping Britain will stand by Turkey in protecting Turkish interests against any Russian encroachment. But there are a number of Turks who are fearful of Britain's shifting Balkan Policy, as it had dropped support to the Greek king, Constantine. They also argue that they have not forgotten how Britain dropped her former ally King of Mecca, Sherif Hussein, when it became apparent that Ibn-Saud was getting the upper hand in Arabia. At the same time a majority of the Turks say that Turkey—the last remnant of the sprawling Ottoman Empire and Balkan's only successful manipulator of neutrality, which alone is going to see the consequences of the termination of this global war now gingerly faces one very big question. What will be the next chapter

in the three hundred year history of Russo-Turkish relations? They are of opinion that this cannot be solved without Britain and U. S. A.

Later, on June 27, 1945 it was reported from London through A. P. A. and U. P. A. that

“Great Britain and the United States are being kept informed by Turkey of developments in the preliminary exchange of views on a new treaty of friendship with Russia which possibly will bring the question of the Dardanelles before the “Big Three” meeting at Potsdam.”

Authoritative sources in London professed ignorance of the unconfirmed Istanbul rumour that Moscow was demanding a revision of the present administration of the Straits in which Russia wanted a privileged position as well as the return of Kars and Ardahan to Soviet Union. Such rumours have been persistent since March 22, 1945 when the Soviets denounced the amity treaty with the Turks. Both were agreed that the time had come for a new understanding. Presumably any change in the Dardanelles arrangement discussed by the

“Big Three” would have to be laid before other signatories of the Montreux Convention of 1936—France, Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Turkey and Japan.

“Russian desire to gain free entry into Eastern Mediterranean by breaking Turkish control of Dardanelles will be pressed upon Mr. Churchill and President Truman at the “Big Three” meeting, diplomatic quarters believed to-day. The Turkish sources said: Turkey has declined to negotiate directly with Russia regarding the Montreux Convention governing the Straits because Turkey considers it an international matter in which other big powers must have their voice. Turkey probably would be satisfied to see the “Big Three” tackle the problem.

Russia is said to be seeking special privileges in Dardanelles to further her economic and political aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean but just what nature the proposals will take has not been disclosed. However it is undoubtedly on the right of free passage for Russian ships of all types.

The ‘London Times’ despatch from Istanbul the same day said that “the Soviet

Ambassador has presented a note to the Turkish Government asking for revision of the Straits control and return to Russia of the districts of Kar and Ardahan which were ceded to Turkey by Russia in 1921. Russian interest settles mainly on the Straits question and territorial adjustment is a secondary matter it is believed here."

A London Foreign Office commentator suggested the possibility of the question of Dardanelles being taken up at the next meeting of the "Big Three Powers." Turkey and Russia, he said, were already considering a new treaty to take the place of the pact which was denounced earlier in the year by Moscow. The spokesman said that the United States and Britain were being kept informed of the developments. (A.P.A.).

One notices the fact that 18,000,000 Turks are the only neighbours of the Soviet Union who have not seen either German or Red army troops cross their frontiers. They are the only people in South-Eastern Europe who have escaped the sufferings of war. As the "Guardian of the Straits" Turkey attempts to maintain a stoic official

calm, but throughout the country there is a growing sense of fear, and tendency to seek protection wherever it is offered.

In this respect Turkey's fears are not new. For more than three centuries the Dardanelles and Bosphorus—slim spits of water lacing the Black Sea to the Aegean—have been her chief national prize. With the shrivelling of the Ottoman Empire the Straits have assumed an even more important position in Turkish eyes. Yet the simplest map illustrates the inescapable truth that through these waters lies Soviet Russia's only gateway to the Mediterranean, her sole outlet to the South. For centuries Imperialist Russia eyed the Straits and triangle of European soil tipped by the port of Istanbul. Under such circumstances an amicable settlement between Turkey and U. S. S. R. assumes a difficult form. But the modern air power development, first of all, removes the Russian complex of insecurity, secondly Turkey never desires to obstruct Russia's passage into the Mediterranean. Then why make a fuss about it?

The Montreux Convention, signed in

1936, not only formalized Turkey's status as the Guardian of the Straits, but allowed passage of the Straits to the merchantships of all nations. Contrary to widespread belief, the Government of Turkey never closed the Straits to allied or enemy shipping during the course of the present war. The Straits were always theoretically open but strong German garrisons and air bases on the Greek mainland and in islands of the Aegean sea blocked the way to the Straits for allied shipping. The freedom of the Straits, therefore, during that period worked in favour of the Germans, but through no connivance of the Turks. That situation was only changed when Soviet troops cleared the Balkans. The first Liberty ship to sail past Istanbul was the U.S.A. "William Blount", on January 23, 1945. However, it was widely felt in U. S. A. that the Soviets will only demand revision of the Montreux Convention to eliminate such signatories as Spain, Portugal, Sweden and other neutrals whose interest is not a prime one. Official Turkey for sometime did not give credence to rumours of Soviet designs on Turkish territory. But the great

unofficial mass of Turkey—the country's 82 per cent of peasantry for instance—preserves the inherited prejudices of centuries and the chief among these is the fear of Russia.

We have seen that Soviet Russia was the first state to recognise the infant Turkish Republic in Europe under Kemal Ataturk. During those years he was careful to preserve strong official friendship with U.S.S.R.

But during the present war and after the passing of Ataturk there has been an evident decline in the warmth of Turco-Soviet relations. In 1941 Turkey and Russia entered into a formal pact declaring that in the event of an attack on either the other would maintain strict neutrality. Nevertheless, the two nations drifted farther and farther apart. Within a year the Moscow radio was engaged in almost daily attacks directed against the Turkish external and internal affairs criticising the Turkish Government as an Axis sympathiser and a reactionary, and bitterly reproaching Turkey as a waverer.

To-day's real fear in Turkey—unexpres-

sed but close to the surface at all times—is that Russia will exert pressure to change the Turkish regime. It is more sharply defined than a nebulous fear of Communism. It is a genuine fear of a small nation which has stepped warily throughout the war and which never wanted any entanglement in it. Now its powerful and victorious neighbour asks for a sharp reckoning.

In the face of these fears Turkey turns to Britain, glances longingly at the United States, practices the smooth diplomacy which is her heritage, and keeps a constant weather eye on any storm from the North.

The Turkish officials on the initiative of Russia went to discuss a fresh treaty of alliance in which the question of the Straits was taken up in all seriousness but it was announced late in July, '45 that the negotiations broke down without any understanding. This obviously shows the firm stand taken both by Turkey and U. S. S. R. in respect of the Straits and cession of some of the North-Eastern districts by Turkey. The Russians are now Turkey's close neighbours. The Black Sea is under

their complete control. Neither the Turkish Republic nor its people want strained relations with the Soviet Union and every one in Turkey understands that Turkey must live at peace with U. S. S. R. and Britain.

It was reported from London on September 15, 1945 that the Turkish Government communicated to the Council of Foreign Ministers holding their sessions in London that Turkey was not prepared to establish joint Soviet-Turkish bases in the Dardanelles nor was she prepared to lease bases in her territory to the Soviet Union. Turkey, it is reported, has also informed the Foreign Ministers that she regards the latter problem as a matter of life and death. On the other hand the Soviet Union is endeavouring her best to seek an absolutely free entry into the Mediterranean. It can rightly be presumed that besides her demand in Turkey, the Soviet Union would have also pressed the cession of the Aegean Sea islands lying at the mouth of Dardanelles at the same time wishing to have some sort of control over the Dodecanasian group of islands in which both Turkey and Greece are interested.

Turkey, Britain and U. S. A. would not tolerate such a demand of Russia, if pressed, because of their own strategic and commercial interests. France too might join such an opposition to the Soviet demands.

The United Press of India sent the following report from London on September 17, 1945 :—

“While in most parts of the world armies are being demobilised, the Turkish reserve officers have been called to colours and full war time establishment of the army of 1,50,000 men is maintained by Turkey”. This is revealed by the Liberator in “Sunday Observer”. The Liberator visualises this owing to the rising tension of Turkish Soviet relations and discloses that the council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London has now in possession Turkey’s “last word” on the issue under dispute.

These make it clear that (1) Turkey is not prepared to have joint Soviet-Turkish bases in Dardanelles nor is she prepared to lease bases to Russia. However, she seems to be prepared to share control of the Straits as equal with the Soviet Union, America, Britain, and France. (2) The Turks are

unwilling even to discuss territorial adjustments on Soviet-Turkish Frontier in eastern Turkey. (3) The Turkish Government will not accept any decision made in her absence and would resist such decisions, if necessary by force. (4) The Turkish army is to be kept for the time being at war-time strength.

It is now obvious that the Soviet Union does not seem to be justified in forcing Turkey to accept her demands.

At the moment, Britain, France, U.S.A., and U. S. S. R. are the only states that try to influence the Mediterranean and the Middle East countries by means of diplomacy, strength, wealth or culture. The Russian thrust southwards remained in welcome abeyance from 1917 to 1940. She assisted Spain during the civil war but did not reveal her latent desire and strength till the out-break of this war. Her importance as a force in Mediterranean affairs remained negligible till then but after having achieved brilliant victories over the Balkan fortress of Hitler her diplomacy turned in other directions. Her expansionist aims in the Mediterranean, for

reasons of so-called security, are not confined only to get control of the Straits but '*L'appetit Vient en mangement*'. Hence her wish is to achieve Mediterranean greatness. To achieve real control she first needed control of the Balkans which she has already obtained ; secondly she needs control of the Dardanelles either by threat or by persuasion and finally hopes to acquire, somewhere in the Mediterranean more or less the same degree of control which at present is enjoyed by Great Britain. That is why at the London Conference of the Foreign Ministers in September, 1945 M. Molotov showed his eagerness to share the control and administration of Tangier. He also hinted to share the possession of the Italian colonies in North Africa and East Africa and acquire some say in matters of the disposal of the Dodecanasian and Aegean Sea Islands. Russia has already gained greater influence in Yugoslavia and all of us know the dispute between the "Big Three" over the Yugoslav port of Trieste. In this way her chief aim is to gain footholds over the convenient spots in the Mediterranean, and in case Turkey becomes

a hard nut to crack plausible arguments be put that without obtaining greater control over the Straits the Soviet Union would find it difficult to reach her favoured spots in this *mare nostrum*. Once, the Russians think, they are put on the road of their long cherished ambition of an undisputed mastery over the Straits, they would be able to create spheres of interest in the Middle East countries as well. It was reported that the Russian Government, as a gesture of goodwill, have allowed the Russian Muslims to participate in the Haj performance at Mecca, forbidden ever since the inception of the Communist regime. The oil rivalry in Iran between the Soviet Union, England and U. S. A. is quite obvious and needs no repetition here which foretells the Russian ambition to seek an entry into the Persian Gulf. In this way the control of the Straits in the west and the Persian Gulf in the east would place them in a sound position of dominating the whole of Middle East.

These ambitions of Russia are greatly responsible for the failure of the London

Foreign Ministers Conference. England looks upon this sea and stretch of land as a road along which depends the important sea, land and air communications of her with the east and that is why the divergence between the expansionist desire of Russia and the wish of England, France, U. S. A., Turkey, Egypt, Iran and Iraq to preserve the *status quo*. In spite of all this it is certain that Turkey would ever remain on the defensive and would always endeavour her best to arrive at some satisfactory solution but she would always put every ounce of her effort in seeing that her integrity, sovereignty, and independence are in no way impaired or damaged. A strong fear of preying neighbours would cause each of the Middle countries to seek firmer friendship of U. S. A. and Britain which would vanish from the newly acquired front rank position of Russia in Europe and Asia.

The Turkish paper *Ulus* commented on the opening of the London Conference that both in procedure and substance the treaties to be made now would be different from those made at the end of the last war.

“Future historians will not compare this conference with the peace conference that followed the Napoleonic wars and World War No. 1. This conference differs as much as it will be determined to create a world in which all nations will live at peace, and no particular state shall be allowed to become aggressive towards her neighbours... The distinctive features of this conference will be that the victor nations alone will not be allowed to have free hand in the settlement of international affairs..... dependent and slave peoples will be encouraged on to the path of liberty and independence of all nations, large and small, will be given adequate recognition. The system of spheres of influence, the root cause of all international conflicts, will be abolished altogether.”

When M. Molotov laid claim to the trusteeship of Tripolitania the Ankara radio quoting Reuters said: “It is now clear that Tripolitania is the object of Russian aims at a mandate or trusteeship, while Eritrea, stretching along the Southern shores of the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden to the frontiers of Egypt is another

possible Russian trusteeship area....trusteeship willed by a single nation." Further it is said that now the question to be determined was "What place the Soviet Union will take in the Mediterranean, and at whose expense?"

The Turks are quite aware of the fact that the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Saxon world had nursed many grievances against each other. In the past they had wrangled often very bitterly. They have joined hand only recently for the eradication of world Fascism but the deep social and ideological differences between them still remain unsolved. The Labour Government of Britain does not differ much on the fundamentals of the foreign policy of its predecessor. Mr. Bevin's policy on foreign affairs was applauded by Mr. Anthony Eden himself and his associates. Therefore in view of the hostile Russian attitude Turkey has no other alternative except to build up a collective security cordon in combination with Britain, France, and U. S. A. along with the Arab League, Iran and Afghanistan. Hence if the victors of the war really wish to have a

stable settlement of peace they must all join with all sincerity of purpose to lead the world to a new order based on equality, peace, liberty, justice and fairplay. In this way it becomes certain that peace will be won by the combined efforts of all the great and small nations which will finally represent the unanimous opinion of the peoples concerned. The new world order must be based on democratic principles, and not on the avarice of interested powers wishing to carve slices out of the territories of small and weaker nations.

From the time the Council of Foreign Ministers broke down in London the greatest question of all has been—what will be the next move of the Soviet Union? Every move in Soviet foreign policy is being studied anxiously in Turkey, but so far each step seems to be like a move on a chess-board which does not yet betray the master strategy of the game. Hopes and ideas are changing from day to day, and people think that no one would expect Russia to cease trying to achieve security by expansion and influence beyond its borders upto a limit beyond which it would

be dangerous for the peace of the world. The "Cordon Sanitaire" of the Soviet Union is now being considered as a constant penetrating urge of Russian influence, the proof of which can be obtained from their efforts to achieve security leading to a probable expansionist aim in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Pacific.


To avoid any untoward event happening in the Middle East conversations between the British and American Governments to devise a common attitude on the question of a future international agreement on the administration of Straits began to take place throughout the months of October and November, 1945. The main desire, it is supposed, is to clarify the Anglo-American attitude in order to meet the Soviet and Turkish views when real bargaining begins on this issue. It is a general feeling that the Allied signatories to the Montreaux Convention of 1936 plus U.S.A. believe that a revision of that agreement is desirable especially when several enemy powers like Japan were a party to the Convention. Britain and U.S.A. have now acknowledged that the best way to secure such a revision

is by resorting to an International Conference with which the Turks are in accord.

President Truman, it is conjectured, has altered his conception between last August when he mentioned the Black Sea-Mediterranean Straits by name among the waterways to which all nations should have freedom of access and his speech of the 3rd November. This leaves the Straits out as they and the Bosphorus are totally within Turkish territory. Turkey meanwhile is anxiously awaiting clarification of the Anglo-American views, though the Turks are very much against granting any passage to the Soviet Union but they seem to be satisfied with the idea of another truly international agreement. They feel that if a real International Peace Organisation is formed and if mutual contracts can be developed with Russia the importance of the question of the Straits will diminish automatically.

On November 25th it was reliably reported from Ankara that Sir Maurice Peterson, the British Ambassador to Turkey, has passed to the Turkish Government a memorandum which outlines the views of

the British Government on the question of Dardenelles and Bosphorus. It was also reported from Washington on November 7th by Mr. Brynes, the United States Secretary of State, that U.S.A. had proposed that the Straits should be opened at all times to all merchant men and warships of Turkey, Bulgaria and Roumania. It was also proposed by U.S.A. that non-Black Sea powers should not be granted passage through the Straits for warships, except for limited tonnage by arrangements for peacetime and by consent of the Black Sea Powers or a ruling of the United Nations' organisation. What the exact state of affairs at this stage is it is difficult to conjecture and the world still awaits as to the correct attitude of Britain, U.S.A. and the Soviet Union.



Turkey's Industries and Industrial Towns

CHAPTER VI

FOREIGN TRADE AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

After the events of July, 1923 it became quite clear that the Turkish Republic was destined to play an important part politically and economically to set her home right and secure for the young Republic a place of safety, honour, and respect amongst the civilized nations of the world. It was the dominant will of Kemal that his country and people must not remain dependent economically upon other nations. He was quite alive to the danger of the economic penetration of the country by foreign entrepreneurs. Besides securing political independence he was very keen for the economic emancipation of his people and country. At the same time he recognised and acknowledged the scientific and technical triumph of the West European countries and concluded that if Turkey wanted to live and exist in the great struggle for the survival of the fittest, she must

change her old outlook and modernise herself as Japan, another Asiatic country, had already done.

Under the regime of the Sultans the economic enterprise was the preserve of foreigners and of the non-Turkish population of the empire mostly the Armenians or the Greeks. Both industry and commerce were undeveloped and the economic resources of the country and the empire were mostly unexploited.) The principal public amenities and public works like water-supply, electricity, gas, telephones and the railways were generally controlled by foreign capitalists, important of whom were the French and the Britishers. To Kemal and his lieutenants the whole of the Ottoman system was obnoxious and detrimental to the interests of the country. The Republican Government, therefore, undertook the programme of industrialising the country so that Turkey may in future not depend to a very large extent upon the mercy and good will of foreigners. Every enterprise of this nature was to be started afresh. It must also be pointed out that those concerned in such schemes were

politically inexperienced and most of the leaders of this period were the revolutionaries and politically branded people of the preceding phase. They had to encounter opposition from the reactionaries at home and the saboteurs abroad. Capital, financial organisation, experienced administrative machinery, developed natural resource and skilled labour were almost extinct and non-available when the Kemalist regime undertook the reconstruction of the country. On the other hand there was huge accumulated debt incurred by the previous regime which the allies insisted at the Lausanne settlement to be paid gradually by the Republic.

Turkey is still preponderantly an agricultural country where four-fifths of the population has to depend in one way or the other upon the produce of the land. They produce only a third of the national income. In 1935-36 the income derived came to 432 million Turkish pounds out of a total income of 1,330 million. Her products are no doubt varied but to a large extent they are agricultural. The total area of the Republic is about 294,000 square

miles which is as big as Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Jugoslavia put together and is larger than the Greater Reich (Germany).

Seeing the size of the population, unlike Germany, it is underpopulated. Land therefore, is not scarce and there is no question of *lebensraum* in Turkey. The mineral resources of the country are important from the view point of her industrialisation. For a considerably long time coal has been obtained from the Eregli-Zonguldak region whose reserve is estimated to be about 1.5 milliard tons. The iron ore mines have been discovered in Divriki and are estimated to contain a reserve of about 15 million tons. There are three important copper mines at Moghul, Ergasi and Kuvarshane. There are also important lead, silver, and gold mines whose exploitation has been undertaken by the *Eti Bank* of Turkey. To the industrialised world Turkey's importance lies in its excellent chrome ore deposits. There are about 117 deposits scattered throughout the country, and out of these only twenty-four are being properly worked. After the planned

exploitation scheme she produced nearly a quarter of the world's output of rich chrome.¹

With all these rich and varied resources the Kemalists undertook the scheme of speedy industrialisation of the Republic but this could not be achieved by an isolationist foreign policy. At the same time the Government, in the beginning, was very reluctant to enter into financial obligations, and treaties with other foreign states. But gradually she had to drift along that path and had to accept credit from foreign countries.

At the time of the Treaty of Lausanne the new Government was not agreeable to concede the demands of the permanent Debt Council for administering the sources of revenue of the country as a measure of surety for the repayment of the Ottoman debt. The negotiations led to the accepting of 40 p. c. of the pre-war debt by the Republic and the Debt Council abrogated its right of administering the revenue of the country. Turkey, in return, had to

¹The Ottoman Bank Circular for January and March, 1938.

accept for 5 years the imports of the Allies at low rates of duty. Therefore between 1923 and 1929 she imported £T. 259 million worth of foodstuffs and cereals *i.e.* £T. 600 million worth of textile products, and £T. 244 million of metal goods and machinery. Import from Britain was the highest and varied between £T. 25 and £T. 37 million. Throughout this period her balance of trade remained quite unfavourable to her. She was exporting abroad tobacco, fruits and nuts but not in sufficient quantity to pay for the huge imports. After the lapse of five years, Turkey repudiated her existing commercial and trade commitments and invited proposals for fresh treaties. It was obvious that she definitely wanted to increase her exports so as to cover the cost of imports essential for the industrialisation of the country. From 1929 onward we notice an important change in the foreign commercial policy of Turkey, which was to limit the imports only to such commodities and goods which were essential for the economic reconstruction of her people. Henceforth, her imports of tools and machinery increased instead of other

things. From that period upto 1933 her statistical abstracts reveal that import of foodstuff and cereals went down to £T. 42 millions, textiles goods were reduced to £T. 152 and machinery and metal goods accounted for £T. 119 million.

In 1929 there was a fall in the income of the custom duties because of the large quantity of the goods brought in the country at the old rate and there was a corresponding increase in the demands for foreign exchange for the payment of these piled up commodities. The strain on the public treasury was very great. Besides, there came the period of the world-wide economic depression and, therefore, Turkey demanded a new arrangement with regard to the unpaid portion of the previous Ottoman debt.

The Paris agreement of 1928 fixed Turkey's obligation to pay an annuity of 2 million gold pounds, to be increased to more than 3 millions by 1952 after which it was to be reduced again. In 1933 on the request of the Republic this agreement was revised and the total amount of the debt was considerably reduced in favour of Turkey. Now it is reduced from 92 to 7

million gold pounds. In this way, by her wise and most practical diplomacy, she managed to lighten her financial obligations. Upto this period, in spite of attractive terms, the Turkish Government was quite unwilling to contract any new debt. But at the same time the Republic was quite willing to negotiate short term business credit from foreigners without attaching any political commitment or condition. The only large long term foreign loan accepted by the Government before 1933 was the Swedish Match loan of ten million dollars from Ivan Kreuger. In return the Government granted the monopoly of match production but after the financial collapse of Ivan Kreuger, a Turkish company was granted the monopoly and the obligation to open a match manufacturing factory in the country.

{The Government launched a big enterprise of large scale industrialization of the country from 1934 which made it essential to import capital goods and machinery on a larger scale.) Hence she had to give up her policy of not accepting loans from foreign concerns. Under the scheme of the

first five year plan 1934-39 she contracted a loan of 10 million dollars from her close neighbour the Soviet Union for the development and expansion of her textile industry. The Government devised a plan to cover its imports by increasing the value of her exports to foreign countries. This object was achieved by the development of the productive capacity of the country. A Central Office for Foreign Trade Service (*Turkofis*) was established in the capital with a number of its agencies both inside and outside the country. This establishment has two important functions to perform ; one function is connected with the general survey work and supervision of commercial arrangements and clearing agreements ; the other function is to study the demand of the Turkish commodities and explore avenues of opening new markets abroad.

The first clearing agreement was made between Turkey and Britain in 1935. Before the outbreak of the war she used to buy more from Britain than she sold to her. Some of the British exports were put under the credit scheme, or under private compensation and beyond the scope of

clearing arrangements. In order to make payments more feasible and easy the above agreement was signed. Turkey then imposed quotas on goods of British origin and discouraged private compensation with the English by demanding that 30 per cent of the sterling should be set apart at the free disposal of the Turkish Central Bank and another ten per cent into the clearing fund.

The financial position of the Republic was again eased a little during 1935 because of intense rivalry created in Europe soon after the coming into power of Hitler in Germany. France made an agreement with Turkey which permitted the payment of Turkey's obligations including her share of the Ottoman debt and payments of some railway loans on a basis of 50 per cent in exchange and 50 per cent in goods. The Chairman of the Ottoman Bank expressed himself thus—"The French Government by agreeing to admit additional imports of Turkish minerals has rendered to the bond holders and to the other creditors of Turkey a service for which in the pre-

sent circumstances they should be particularly grateful".¹

In 1938 Turkey was again involved in serious financial difficulties when the visible balance of trade was unfavourable and in the same year she negotiated a loan with Britain. When she got a loan of 16 million pounds from England she allotted a sum of 6 million pounds for her armament because of the impending threat of the outbreak of a general European war. In this way once again the financial hold of Britain and France became strong in Turkey. The Chairman of the Ottoman Bank at its General Meeting in May, 1936 mentioned the fact of a considerable fall in the trade with England and France which were the two countries to which Turkey was liable for a major part of financial obligations arising out of the exigencies of public debt, repurchase of foreign concessions and liabilities under recent agreements. No doubt there existed a favourable balance of trade between the countries from the

¹Annual General Meeting of the Ottoman Bank, May, 1936.

Turkish point of view, yet there was still a huge sum due to Britain in the clearing account, when that difficult position was ameliorated to some extent by the May, 1938 agreement. The Turkish policy of accepting loans from foreigners was dictated by her economic necessities, particularly with the object of achieving economic self sufficiency to some extent. She had adopted the policy of gradually purchasing all the foreign companies operating in Turkey which held vital controlling interests in Turkish railways, telephones, tramways, and coal mines etc. Hence, by the end of 1937 the Prime Minister, Celal Bayar, introduced changes in Turkish foreign policy. It was first decided to accomplish the 'Three Years Mining Plan, and the 'Second Five Year Plan, with the help of foreign credits. It was realised that the international situation of Europe was such that Turkey could easily make use of it in her favour without being exposed to any very great risk or danger.

The Government realised that the Balkan States, her neighbours, were all like her at a low level of industrialization and they

wish to sell their agricultural products and buy manufactured goods. In Balkanistan, Turkey used to export to Rumania small quantities of her cotton and tobacco and in return imported oil and timber; she also exported wheat and cattle to Greece and imported dyes and cotton thread in return. Nazi Germany did not sit idle. She had her own peculiar methods of trade drive in all the countries of south-East Europe, Turkey and the Middle East countries. Both for commercial and political motives Germany felt the strong need of cultivating commercial and friendly relations with all the countries lying between Vienna and Baghdad. With the rise of Hitler the ancient dream of Mittel Europe or the *Drang nach Osten* was revived in its new form. To compete successfully in this trade drive Germany adopted the method of paying attractive prices for the export products of these countries and began to buy large quantity of their commodities. The balances in blocked markets to the credit of the supplying countries accumulated and in order to get paid they had to buy the German goods. She also introduced

the method of granting long term credits to these countries so that they might be placed in a position to buy goods of every description of German origin. The whole system was put under the control of the state and all the prices of imports and exports were fixed as desired by the controlling authorities. Thus by 1937, we notice from statistics, Germany became the greatest buyer of Turkish exports. The following figures of the six important countries then trading with Turkey clarify the whole position thus :

Countries	Percentage of Turkish exports	Percentage of Turkish Imports
Germany ...	36.53	42.08
Britain ...	7.08	6.23
U. S. A. ...	13.92	15.13
Italy ...	5.27	5.33
U. S. S. R. ...	4.72	6.21
France ...	3.81	1.08
Rest of the world ...	28.87	23.94

The main idea behind all this trade-drive of Germany was to associate the economics of Turkey and Balkanistan so closely with her own as to make it extre-

mely difficult to sever their trade relations with her in case the war broke out. Turkish exports under these circumstances, rose from 39 million in 1935 to somewhat 60 million in 1936 which created an adverse balance of trade for Turkey and therefore the Government had to restrict her exports to Germany to 50 millions in 1937 and in 1938 it was further reduced to 39 million ltq. In spite of all these measures Germany still remained the most important buyer of Turkish commodities. Exports to U.S.A. which rose from 13 million ltq in 1936 to 19 million ltq in 1937, declined to 9 million ltq. in the first ten months of 1938 whereas exports to Britain remained only 10 million ltq. in 1937 and declined to 4 million during the corresponding period of 1938. Luckily Germany did not find herself in a position to import to Turkey the required materials. The heavy fall of German imports gave U. S. A. and Britain a chance to capture the Turkish market. Imports from U. S. A. which were at 9 million ltq. in 1936 nearly doubled in 1937 (17 million ltq) and again fell down to 14 million ltq. upto November 1938. Similarly,

British imports which were 6 and 7 million ltq. in the years 1936 and 1937 rose upto 15 million ltq. in 1938 because of the new British credits granted to Turkey.

It has been the intention of the Turkish Government to buy her requirements from her customers and in 1937 about 90 p. c. of her trade was done under the clearing agreements, but she did not fail to understand all the demerits and disadvantages accrued to her from the barter system. Besides, there was another genuine apprehension as to what would happen if the German trade drive obtained a firm grip on their foreign trade which would be not an easy task to divert again towards other countries. It was also thought that Germany might charge heavy prices for her articles imported to Turkey and reverse her programme of industrialization. The German method of trade drive can be understood by the following passage of Mr. Hudson's speech delivered in the House of Commons : ".....Our complaint is that Germany is, by her methods, destroying trade throughout the world.....As regards

Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe, I here got out some figures which, I think, will interest the House. As far as we can make out, because it is difficult to get very exact information as to the way in which things are done in Germany, the basis of their hold is that they pay to producers in Central and South-Eastern Europe much more than the world price.....At a particular date this year the Germans were paying over £ 10 a ton for wheat, at a time when Manitoba No. 1 wheat was selling at £ 7 in the London market, that is the official rate of exchange provided for in the German agreement. We found, also that she was buying barley at £ 7-10s a ton when the London price was £ 5-6s. She was buying eggs at £7-12s. the metric quintals when the price in London was £ 5-18s. She has followed the same course in regard to cotton, hides, meat, poultry, oil seeds and cereals, buying them at prices so high that producers sending to other markets cannot hope to obtain similar prices. In the case of Turkey, for example, to take the case of mohair, owing to her

action imports of mohair to this country which were £190,000 in the first ten months of last year, have decreased to £24,000 in the corresponding period this year because of the increase in price.....

“I am trying to explain that by these methods Germany is obtaining a stranglehold on the countries in that part of Europe, an uneconomic stranglehold at the expense of her own people, because it means raising the cost of living to her own people and, in fact, exporting goods at less than cost price”.¹

Dr. Schacht's scheme of enabling the debtor state to call the tune in foreign trade was quite successful in Turkey. The process of more and more buying with blocked marks was, thus, successful throughout the Balkanistan. In the first quarter of 1939 till the outbreak of the present war Germany's aggression in political fields were multiplied to the degree of great alarm and consternation in Turkey, and in order to offset the Nazis, the Turks attempted to remain at a respectable dis-

¹Hansard, November. 1928 Coll. 502-4.

tance from Germany. Therefore, she moved more and more towards France, Britain and U. S. A.

The hope of stemming the German political and economic drive in Turkey and the Balkans was temporarily achieved by the Anglo-Turkish financial agreement of 1938. In order that Turkey might fulfil her obligations to England an "Anglo-Turkish Commodities Ltd." company was started for the sale of Turkish export commodities within the British Empire. Germany could not see eye to eye with this counter drive of Britain against her. Soon after the grant of British credit to Turkey, the German Minister of Economics, Walter Funk, proceeded to Turkey for fresh negotiations and granted her a credit of 150 millions RM which comes to about £12.6 million. In 1938 no doubt Turkey obtained loan from Britain but her share of Turkish trade was nearly halved. It diminished from 7.1 p. c. to 3.4 p. c., but her share of imported trade increased from 6 p. c. to a little over 11 p. c. It shows that Turkey because of German predominance in her external trade, had to negotiate and

accept the German loan of July, 1938. In that year Germany imported within the Reich about half of the total exports of Turkey and likewise Turkey received more than half of her imports from Germany.

Throughout the summer of 1939 economic negotiations continued between Turkey, Britain, France, and U. S. A. to devise means so that Turkey may be relieved of German economic pressure. Increased trade with Britain and France was made possible by the Ankara Pact of October, 1939. This pact had an integral part for an economic agreement of a comprehensive character. On the other hand Turkey did not renew the Turco-German trade pact with the result that a number of German firms working in Turkey were obliged to close. The allied blockade also reduced exports from and imports to Germany. The figures of 1940 show that during January and February, 1940, the Turkish exports to Germany were reduced from 30 p. c. to 2 p. c. which necessitated Britain and France to buy all the surplus products thus rendered available. Instead of importing in their countries 6 p. c.

of Turkish commodities they were importing 28 p. c. at the beginning of 1940. A Franco-English economic office was set up whose function was to see and purchase Turkish products which used to be imported to Germany. Both these countries placed separate contracts for the supply of Turkish fruits. At the same time various British firms were also endeavouring to equip Turkey with all the necessary requirements of her speedy industrialization and armament. The Turkish Government granted a contract of £ 2,000,000 to Swan and Hunter and Wigham Richardson for the construction of 11 merchant vessels, whereas Metro-Vickers were given contract to electrify Catalagani at a cost of £ 15,00,000. The German monopoly of medicinal chemicals was given to Boots Ltd., an English concern. A contract previously given to a German firm for the construction of a dockyard and a naval base was rejected and given to an English concern at an estimated cost of £ 7,000,000. Another British firm was credited for the construction of Karabuk steel works. Sir Alexander Gibb and Partner remained for

a period of two years the economic adviser to the Turkish Government.

The Mutual Assistance Pact of 1939 had a clause to supply Turkey with most of the material necessary for her armament and defence against any foreign aggression. The French and the British Governments provided Turkey with a credit of £ 25 million to be repaid within a period of twenty five years with an interest of 4 p. c. The Pact also provided for another loan of £ 15 million to be paid at Ankara bearing an interest of 3 p. c. to be repaid within the same period. In addition it finally approved a further loan amounting to 13.6 million for the settlement of the clearing accounts.

The Turkish Republic on its side was doing all in her power to facilitate the trade with these countries. The Takas Ltd. an organisation to deal in compensation premiums was set up by the Turkish Government. To make the trade exchange with France and Britain easier it was suggested that Turkish requirements be reviewed and indication be given of the urgency of various materials to be supplied by these

countries. The delays in the Turkish payments were greatly removed by the Government.

The Nazis were carefully observing and watching all these political, financial and commercial moves of the Allies. First they instigated Italy, a junior partner, to step in their shoes and develop her trade with Turkey. Italy could not stand the Franco-British competition and her trade, therefore, remained of a very limited nature. On the other hand the Allies persuaded U. S. A. to make a trade agreement with the Turks which was done after some time. The German real offensive against the Franco-British trade-drive in Turkey was first confined to the withdrawing of the advertisements from certain German-controlled Turkish papers and bribing the pro-German element to bear pressure on the Government for the renewal of German trade pacts with Turkey. At this stage Turkey was forced to play in the hands of the German Foreign office. The collapse of France in June, 1940 and the subsequent entry of Italy into the war closed the Mediterranean temporarily for the safe outlet of the Turkish exports.

Besides the Turks suffered heavily from ephemeral calamities, from earthquakes and violent floods in Anatolia. About 30,000 people died and 100,000 rendered homeless with casualties of about 1,500,000 live stocks. The customs receipts went down rapidly and taxes had to be increased between 23 to 100 per cent; the cost of living soared high to about 50 p. c. All these unforeseen and untoward events were exploited by the Nazis to bear pressure on the Republic to trade with Germany.

With the virtual closure of the Mediterranean as a result of Italy's declaration of war the Turkish goods could find only two alternative trade routes. One was the Danube-Black Sea route and the other was the Besra route, but the latter was unable to bear heavy movement of commodities. Therefore Turkey's *pis aller* was to choose the former route and from that time another marked change was noticeable in her foreign policy. Hence in July, 1940 the Turco-German Trade Pact of 21 million ltq was signed and in order to gain the favour of the Turks, Germany granted loan to the Republic on a very

favourable term. She undertook to transport Turkey's exports to Germany and also volunteered to deliver her imports to the Republic in Turkey itself. No doubt the terms were very attractive when Turkey was facing the most critical days. Not only that. Even the satellite states of Germany were forced to buy Turkish goods not required by Germany on good prices. The United Kingdom Corporation continued to do its work in Turkey but it had to meet much harder competition and above all the problem of transport became menacing for the transit of the Turkish goods to England and her Empire. In spite of all this Turkey remained loyal to her obligations and commitments given to Britain and did not sell her chromium to Germany until the British purchases were over.

The invasion and fall of Greece and the capture of Crete added fuel to the fire. Germany was now placed in a more advantageous position to control Turkey's trade because the Black sea ports from Sulina to the Turkish frontiers were completely under Hitler's control. In spite

of all these embarrassments Turkey signed yet another trade pact with Britain on September 29, 1941 in Ankara under the terms of which she undertook to export to Britain foodstuffs valued at 4000,000 ltq including raisins and figs. Hardly a month passed when M. Sorajoglu was forced by Herr Von Papen and Dr. Clodius to sign another Turco-German Trade Pact which provided for the exchange of foods valued at 1000,000,000 ltq from each side valid upto March, 1943. Germany undertook to furnish steel, industrial products and war materials and Turkey undertook to provide Germany with raw materials, minerals, cereals, cotton, tobacco, and olive oil. Dr. Clodius pressed for the provision of Turkish chrome which was resisted by Turkey on the ground that her output until 1943 was pledged to Britain. She eventually agreed to give to Germany 90,000 tons in 1943 and a similar amount in 1944 against equivalent deliveries of war material, provided that Germany had already delivered 18,000,000 ltq worth of war material by the end of 1942.

On June 2, 1942 it was announced both

from Ankara and Berlin that a trade agreement was again concluded between Germany and Turkey which provided for a credit of 100,000,000 RM. to Turkey for the purchase of war material in Germany against the Turkish supplies of copper, cotton and barley to an annual value of the above sum. The agreement, in fact, was a revival of the Turco-German Trade Pact of June 1939. This agreement fell in abeyance when Turkey refused to renew the old trade agreement. At this time Germany was fighting against Russia and was very much afraid of Turkey's joining hand against Germany with the Allies. On April 18, 1943 a new Turco-German trade agreement was signed in Ankara by Dr. Clodius, Head of German Economic Mission and M. Menemenjoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, which was to be valid until May, 1944, providing for the exchange of goods to the value of 1200,00,000 RM. Germany undertook to supply industrial goods such as equipments, spare parts, locomotives, trucks and chemicals in exchange of Turkish cotton, tobacco and dried fruits (Prev. rep. 4638 E.)

The signing of this trade pact between Germany and Turkey was very unfavourably received in the Allied diplomatic circles. Since then Britain and U. S. A. concentrated their diplomatic activity in persuading Turkey to sever her economic and diplomatic relations with Germany. Mr. Churchill promised adequate compensations to Turkey in respect of the disposal of Turkish goods and raw materials. It was pressed on Turkey to break off economic relations with the Nazis which the Allies thought would be the first step leading towards the breaking up of diplomatic relations. Therefore, Allied negotiations were started in June, '44 in all seriousness in order to implement Mr. Churchill's promise of an adequate compensation if the Turkish Government first of all stopped chrome supplies to Germany. It was also urged that her export quotas of other materials for Germany must also considerably be reduced. But in the beginning of June, 1943 it was made known to the Allied Governments by Turkey that an agreement in principle had been reached with the German officials on the basis that all the

quantities on the previous years' list had to be reduced by 50% for Germany.

The German trade colony in Turkey was getting nervous and considered this move as a prelude to a total diplomatic and economic breach with the Nazis. M. Atay, the editor of *Ulus* wrote, "The war now in its decisive stage may necessitate at a moment's flash the taking of grave decisions. Turkey must stand united."

The Republican Government at last decided to stop all the chrome supply to Germany which was later on followed by a diplomatic break between the two countries with the result that the Nazis first of all lost their best "Sounding board" for all kinds of affairs in South-Eastern Europe. Secondly, they lost great quantities of hides, copper, chemical and other important raw materials essential for war. Thirdly, German prestige received a deadly blow because Turkish opinion was relied upon by the states of Balkanistan.

Besides, this meant not only the cessation of all Turkish trade with Germany but also the packing up of all German commercial services and institutions which

were in fact nothing but Gestapo service extension in Turkey. The German consulates in the whole of Turkey and especially in Istambul, Izmir and Adana were liquidated.

This break with Germany gave Turkey a set of economic problems to ponder over. Since the outbreak of war the Turks acquired a good position in the commercial field between the belligerents and a good chance of making money out of them. The Germans for long supplied Turkey with essential goods, some war material and nearly dumped the local market with fancy goods. They were also great buyers of Turkish agricultural products and industrial raw materials. The belligerent nations had to buy Turkish goods and there was cut throat competition between them which sent up the price of Turkish goods to artificial heights. But things began to change with the severance of economic and diplomatic relations with Germany. Therefore all these advantages came to the debit side of Turkey's economic life. Esat Tekelf wrote in the *Ulus* that "...although our trade with Germany since the outbreak of war

was not as voluminous as in pre-war years it still represented an important total in 1943, when 23.80 per cent of Turkish exports went to Germany, and when German goods constituted 37.70 per cent of our total imports."

The Balkan countries were also good customers of Turkish products. Now for the moment these markets are closed and Turkey is confronting a great economic crisis unless U. S. A. and Britain find out market for the disposal of Turkish products. The United Nations will soon be in a position to spare shipping since Turkey is conveniently situated with good short routes to the Danube Basin and the Mediterranean. There also exist rail and road facilities from Turkey to Europe and Turkish goods may come in conveniently when the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration starts its work in Balkanistan. There are also possibilities of trade development between Turkey and the rest of Middle Eastern countries. Likewise India may also welcome a move of establishing trade and commercial relations with Turkey.

APPENDIX 1

Extracts from the treaty signed at Sevres,
August 10, 1920.

Text from British Treaty Series No. 11 (1920)
Cmd. 964.

Political clauses.

Section I.—Constantinople.

ARTICLE 36.

Subject to the provisions of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that the rights and title of the Turkish Government over Constantinople shall not be affected, and that the said Government and His Majesty the Sultan shall be entitled to reside there and to maintain there the capital of the Turkish State.

Nevertheless, in the event of Turkey failing to observe faithfully the provisions of the present Treaty, or of any treaties or conventions supplementary thereto, particularly as regards the protection of the rights of racial, religious or linguistic minorities, the Allied Powers expressly reserve the right to modify the above provisions, and Turkey hereby agrees to accept dispositions which may be taken in this connection.

Section II.—Straits**ARTICLE 37.**

The navigation of the Straits, including the Dardenelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, shall in future be open, both in peace and war to every vessel of commerce or of war and to military and commercial aircraft, without distinction of flag.

These waters shall not be subject to blockade, nor shall any belligerent right be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within them, unless in pursuance of a decision of the Council of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 38.

The Turkish Government recognises that it is necessary to take further measures to ensure the freedom of navigation provided for in Article 87, and accordingly delegates, so far as it is concerned, to a commission to be called the "Commission of the Straits," and hereinafter referred to as "the Commission," the control of the waters specified in Article 39.

The Greek Government, so far as it is concerned, delegates to the Commission the same powers and undertakes to give it in all respects the same facilities.

Such control shall be exercised in the name of the Turkish and Greek Governments respectively, and in the manner provided in this section.

ARTICLE 39.

The authority of the Commission will extend to all the waters between the Mediterranean, mouth of the Dardenelles and the Black Sea, mouth of the Bosphorus and to the waters within three miles of each of these mouths.

This authority may be exercised on shore to such extent as may be necessary for the execution of the provisions of this Section.

ARTICLE 40.

The Commission shall be composed of representatives appointed respectively by the United States of America (if and when that Government is willing to participate), the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Russia (if and when Russia becomes a member of the League of Nations), Greece, Roumania, and Bulgaria and Turkey (if and when the two latter States become members of the League of Nations.) Each Power shall appoint one representative. The representatives of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy,

Japan and Russia shall each have two votes. The representatives of Greece, Roumania, and Bulgaria and Turkey shall each have one vote. Each Commissioner shall be removable only by the Government which appointed him.

ARTICLE 42.

The Commission will exercise the powers conferred on it by the present Treaty in complete independence of the local authority. It will have its own flag, its own Budget and its separate organisation.

ARTICLE 44

In the event of the Commission finding that the liberty of passage is being interfered with, it will inform the representatives at Constantinople of the Allied Powers providing the occupying forces provided for in Article 178. These representatives will thereupon concert with the naval and military commanders of the said forces such measures as may be deemed necessary to preserve the freedom of the Straits. Similar action shall be taken by the said representatives in the event of any external action threatening the liberty of passage of the Straits.

ARTICLE 48.

In order to facilitate the execution of the duties with which it is entrusted by this Section, the Commission shall have power to organise such a force of special police as may be necessary. This force shall be drawn so far as possible from the native population of the zone of the Straits and islands referred to in Article 178, part V (Military, Naval and Air Clauses), excluding the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, by foreign police officers appointed by the Commission.

ARTICLE 56.

Ships of war in transit through the waters specified in Article 39 shall conform in all respects to the regulations issued by the Commission for the observance of the ordinary rules of navigation and of sanitary requirements.

ARTICLE 57.

(1) Belligerent warships shall not revictual nor take in stores, except so far as may be strictly necessary to enable them to complete the passage of the Straits and to reach the nearest port where they can call, nor shall they replenish or increase their supplies of war

material or their armament or complete their crews, within the waters under the control of the Commission. Only such repairs as are absolutely necessary to render them seaworthy shall be carried out, and they shall not add in any manner whatever to their fighting force. The Commission shall decide what repairs are necessary, and these must be carried out with the least possible delay.

(2) The passage of belligerent warships through the waters under the control of the Commission shall be effected with the least possible delay, and without any other interruption than that resulting from the necessities of the service.

(3) The stay of such warships at ports within the jurisdiction of the Commission shall not exceed twenty-four hours except in case of distress. In such case they shall be bound to leave as soon as possible. An interval of at least twenty-four hours shall always elapse between the sailing of a belligerent ship from the waters under the control of the Commission and the departure of a ship belonging to an opposing belligerent.

(4) Any further regulations affecting in time of war the waters under the control of the Commission, and relating in particular to the passage of war material and contraband destined for the enemies of Turkey, or revictual-

ing taking in stores or carrying out repairs in the said waters, will be laid down by the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 58.

Prizes shall in all respects be subjected to the same conditions as belligerent vessels of war.

ARTICLE 59

No belligerent shall embark troops, munitions of war or warlike materials in the waters under the control of the Commission, except in case of accident, hindrance of the passage, and in such cases the passage shall be resumed with all possible despatch.

ARTICLE 60.

Nothing in articles 57, 58, or 59 shall be deemed to limit the powers of a belligerent or belligerents acting in pursuance of a decision by the Council of the League of Nations.

APPENDIX 2

Convention Regarding the regime of the Straits signed at Montreaux, July 20, 1936.

Text from British Treaty Series No. 30 (1937) Cmd. 5551.

His Majesty the King of the Bulgarians, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Majesty the King of the Hellenese, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, His Majesty the King of Roumania, the President of the Turkish Republic, the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and His Majesty the King of Yugoslavia ;

Desiring to regulate transit and navigation in the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus comprised under the general term "Straits" in such manner as to safeguard, within the framework of Turkish security and of the security, in the Black Sea, of the riparian States, the principle enshrined in Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923 ;

Have resolved to replace by the present

Convention the Convention signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923.....

ARTICLE 1.

The High Contracting Parties recognise and affirm the principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the Straits.

The exercise of this freedom shall henceforth be regulated by the provisions of the present Convention.

Section 1..... Merchant Vessels.

ARTICLE 2.

In time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits, by day and by night under any flag and with any kind of cargo, without any formalities, except as provided in article 3 below. No taxes or charges other than those authorised by Annex I to the present Convention shall be levied by the Turkish authorities on these vessels when passing in transit without calling at a port in the Straits.

In order to facilitate the collection of these taxes or charges merchant vessels passing through the Straits shall communicate to the officials at the stations referred to in article 3

their name, nationality, tonnage, destination and last port of call (provenance).

Pilotage and towage remain optional.

ARTICLE 3.

All ships entering the Straits by the Aegean Sea or by the Black Sea shall stop at a sanitary station near the entrance to the Straits for the purposes of the sanitary control prescribed by Turkish Law within the framework of international sanitary regulations. This control, in the case of ships possessing a clean bill of health or presenting a declaration of health testifying that they do not fall within the scope of the provisions of the second paragraph of the present article, shall be carried out by day and by night with all possible speed, and the vessels in question shall not be required to make any other stop during their passage through the Straits.

Vessels which have on board cases of plague, cholera, yellow fever, exanthematic typhus or small pox, or which have had such cases on board during the previous seven days and vessels which have left an infected port within less than five times twenty-four hours shall stop at the sanitary stations indicated in the preceding paragraph in order to embark such sanitary guards as the Turkish authorities may direct.

No tax or charge shall be levied in respect of these sanitary guards and they shall be disembarked at a sanitary station on departure from the Straits.

ARTICLE 4.

In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, merchant vessels, under any flag or with any kind of cargo, shall enjoy freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits subject to the provisions of articles 2 and 3.

Pilotage and towage remain optional.

ARTICLE 5.

In time of war, Turkey being belligerent, merchant vessels, not belonging to a country at war with Turkey shall enjoy freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits on condition that they do not in any way assist the enemy.

Such vessels shall enter the Straits by day and their transit shall be effected by the route which shall in each case be indicated by the Turkish authorities.

ARTICLE 6.

Should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war, the provi-

sions of article 2 shall nevertheless continue to be applied except that vessels must enter the Straits by day and that their transit must be effected by the route which shall, in each case, be indicated by the Turkish authorities.

Pilotage may, in this case, be made obligatory, but no charge shall be levied.

ARTICLE 7.

The term 'Merchant vessels' is applied to all vessels which are not covered by Section II of the present Convention.

Section II.....Vessels of War.

ARTICLE 8.

For the purposes of the present Convention, the definitions of vessels of war and of their specifications together with those relating to the calculation of tonnage shall be as set forth in Annex II to the present Convention.

ARTICLE 9.

Naval auxiliary vessels specifically designed for the carriage of fuel, liquid or nonliquid, shall not be subject to the provisions of article 13 regarding notification, nor shall they be counted for the purpose of calculating

the tonnage which is subject to limitation under articles 14 and 18, on condition that they shall pass through the Straits singly. They shall, however, continue to be on the same footing as vessels of war for the purpose of the remaining provisions governing transit.

The auxiliary vessels specified in the preceding paragraph shall only be entitled to benefit by the exceptional status therein contemplated if their armament does not include, for use against floating targets, more than two guns of a maximum calibre of 105 millimetres, for use against aerial targets, more than two guns of a maximum calibre of 75 millimetres.

ARTICLE 10.

In time of peace, light surface vessels, minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea Powers, and whatever their flag, shall enjoy freedom of transit through the Straits without any taxes or charges whatever, provided that such transit is begun during daylight and subject to the conditions laid down in article 13 and the articles following thereafter.

Vessels of war other than those which fall within the categories specified in the preceding paragraph shall only enjoy a right of transit

under the special conditions provided by articles 11 and 12.

ARTICLE 11.

Black Sea Powers may send through the Straits capital ships of a tonnage greater than that laid down in the first paragraph of article 13, on condition that these vessels pass through the Straits singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers.

ARTICLE 12.

Black Sea Powers shall have the right to send through the Straits, for the purpose of rejoining their base, submarines constructed or purchased outside the Black Sea, provided that adequate notice of the laying down or purchase of such submarines shall have been given to Turkey.

Submarines belonging to the said Powers shall also be entitled to pass through the Straits to be repaired in dockyards outside the Black Sea on condition that detailed information on the matter is given to Turkey.

In either case, the said submarines must travel by day and on the surface, and must pass through the Straits singly.

ARTICLE 13.

The transit of vessels of war through the Straits shall be preceded by a notification given to the Turkish Government through the diplomatic channel. The normal period of notice shall be eight days; but it is desirable that in the case of non-Black Sea Powers this period should be increased to fifteen days. The notification shall specify the destination, name, type and number of the vessels, as also the date of entry for the outward passage and, if necessary, for the return journey. Any change of date shall be subject to three days' notice.

Entry into the Straits for the outward passage shall take place within a period of five days from the date given in the original notification. After the expiry of this period, a new notification shall be given under the same conditions as for the original notification.

Then effecting transit, the Commander of the naval force shall, without being under any obligation to stop, communicate to a signal station at the entrance to the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus the exact composition of the force under his orders.

ARTICLE 14.

The maximum aggregate tonnage of all foreign naval forces which may be in course of

transit through the Straits shall not exceed 15,000 tons. except in the cases provided for in notice 11 and in Annex III to the present Convention.

The forces specified in the preceding paragraph shall not, however, comprise more than nine vessels.

Vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea Powers, paying visit to a port in the Straits, in accordance with the provisions of article 17, shall not be included in this tonnage.

Neither shall vessels of war which have suffered damage during their passage through the Straits be included in this tonnage; such vessels, while undergoing repair, shall be subject to any special provisions relating to security laid down by Turkey.

ARTICLE 15.

Vessels of war in transit through the Straits shall in no circumstance make use of any aircraft which they may be carrying.

ARTICLE 16.

Vessels of war in transit through the Straits shall not except in the event of damage or peril of the sea, remain therein longer than is necessary for them to effect the passage.

ARTICLE 17.

Nothing in the provisions of the preceding articles shall prevent a naval force of any tonnage or composition from paying a courtsey visit of limited duration to a port in the Straits, at the invitation of the Turkish Government. Any such force must leave the Straits by the same route as that by which it entered, unless it fulfils the conditions required for passage in transit through the Straits as laid down by articles 10, 14 and 18.

ARTICLE 18.

(1) The aggregate tonnage which non-Black Sea Powers may have in that sea in time of peace shall be limited as follows:—

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) below, the aggregate tonnage of the said Powers shall not exceed 300,000 tons; (b) if at any time the tonnage of the strongest fleet in the Black Sea shall exceed by at least 10,000 tons the tonnage of the strongest fleet in that sea at the date of the signature of the present Convention, the aggregate tonnage of 30,000 tons mentioned in paragraph (b) shall be increased by the same amount upto a maximum of 45,000 tons. For this purpose, under the present Convention, that Power will inform the

Turkish Government, on the 1st January and the 1st July of each year, of the total tonnage of its fleet in the Black Sea ; and the Turkish Government shall transmit this information to the other High Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

(c) The tonnage which any one non-Black Sea Power may have in the Black Sea shall be limited to two-thirds of the aggregate tonnage provided for in paragraphs (a) and (b) above ;

(d) In the event, however, of one or more non-Black Sea Powers desiring to send naval forces into the Black Sea, for a humanitarian purpose, the said forces, which shall in no case exceed 8,000 tons altogether, shall be allowed to enter the Black Sea without having to give the notification provided for in article 13 of the present Convention, provided an authorisation is obtained from the Turkish Government in the following circumstances ; if the figures of the aggregate tonnage specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) above has not been reached and will not be exceeded by the despatch of the forces which it is desired to send, the Turkish Government shall grant the said authorisation within the shortest possible time after receiving the request which has been addressed to it if the said figure has already been reached or if the despatch of the forces

which it is desired to send will cause it to be exceeded, the Turkish Government will immediately inform the other Black Sea Powers of the request for authorisation, and if the said Powers make no objection within twenty-four hours of having received this information, the Turkish Government, shall, within forty-eight hours at the latest, inform the interested Powers of the reply which it has decided to make to their request.

Any further entry into the the Black Sea of Naval forces of non-Black Sea Powers shall only be effected within the available limits of the aggregate tonnage provided for in paragraphs (a) and (b) above.

(2) Vessels of war belonging to Non-Black Sea Powers, shall not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days, whatever be the object of their presence there.

ARTICLE 19.

In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, warships shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation through the Straits under the same conditions as those laid down in articles 10 to 18.

Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not, however, pass through the Straits

except in cases arising out of the application of article 25 of the present Convention, and in cases of assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and registered and published in accordance with the provisions of article 18 of the Covenant.

In the exceptional cases provided for in the preceding paragraph, the limitations laid down in articles 10 to 18 of the present Convention shall not be applicable.

Notwithstanding the prohibition of passage laid down in paragraph 2 above, vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers, whether they are Black Sea Powers or not, which have become separated from their bases, may return thereto.

Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not carry out any hostile act in the Straits.

ARTICLE 20.

In time of war, Turkey being belligerent, the provisions of articles 10 to 18 shall not be applicable; the passage of warships shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government.

ARTICLE 21.

Should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war she shall have

the right to apply the provisions of article 20 of the present Convention.

Vessels which have passed through the Straits before Turkey has made use of the powers conferred upon her by the preceding paragraph, and which thus find themselves separated from their bases, may return thereto. It is, however, understood that Turkey may deny this right to vessels of war belonging to the State whose attitude has given rise to the application of the present article.

Should Turkish Government make use of the powers conferred by the first paragraph of the present article, a notification to that effect shall be addressed to the High Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

If the Council of the League of Nations decide by a majority of two-thirds that the measures thus taken by Turkey are not justified, and if such should also be the opinion of the majority of the High Contracting Parties signatories to the present Convention, the Turkish Government undertakes to discontinue the measures in question as also any measures which may have been taken under article 6 of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 22.

Vessels of war which have on board cases of plague, cholera, yellow fever, exanthematic typhus or small pox or which have had such cases on board within the last seven days and vessels of war which left an infected port within less than five times twenty-four hours must pass through the Straits in quarantine and apply by the means on board such propyhlactic measures as are necessary in order to prevent any possibility of the Straits being infected.

Section III.—Aircraft.

ARTICLE 23.

In order to assure the passage of civil aircraft between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the Turkish Government will indicate the air routes available for this purpose, outside the forbidden zones which may be established in the Straits. Civil aircraft may use these routes provided that they give the Turkish Government, as regards occasional flights a notification of three days and as regards flights on regular services, a general notification of the dates of passage.

The Turkish Government moreover undertake, notwithstanding any remilitarisation of the

Straits, to furnish the necessary facilities for the safe passage of civil aircraft authorised under the air regulations in force in Turkey to fly across Turkish territory between Europe and Asia. The route which is to be followed in the Straits zone by aircraft which have obtained an authorisation shall be indicated from time to time.

Section IV.—General Provisions

ARTICLE 24.

The functions of the International Commission set up under the Convention relating to the regime of the Straits of the 24th July, 1923, are hereby transferred to the Turkish Government.

The Turkish Government undertake to collect statistics and furnish information concerning the application of articles 11, 12, 14 and 18 of the present Convention.

They will supervise the execution of all the provisions of the present Convention relating to the passage of vessels of war through the Straits.

As soon as they have been notified of the intended passage through the Straits of a foreign naval force the Turkish Government shall inform the representatives at **Ahgora** of the High Contracting Parties of the composition of

that force, its tonnage, the date fixed for its entry into the Straits, and, if necessary, the probable date of its return.

The Turkish Government shall address to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations and to the High Contracting Parties an annual report giving details regarding the movements of foreign vessels of war through the Straits and furnishing all information which may be of service to commerce and navigation, both by sea and by air, for which provision is made in the present Convention.

ARTICLE 25.

Nothing in the present Convention shall prejudice the rights and obligations of Turkey, or of any of the other High Contracting Parties members of the League of Nations, arising out of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Section V—Final provisions

ARTICLE 26.

The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible.

The ratifications shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic in Paris.

The Japanese Government shall be entitled to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic representative in Paris that the ratification has been given, and in that case they shall transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

A proces-verbaux of the the deposit of ratifications shall be drawn up as soon as six instruments of ratification, including that of Turkey shall have been deposited. For this purpose the notification provided for in the preceding paragraph shall be taken as the equivalent of the deposit of an instrument of ratification. The present Convention shall come into force on the date of the said proces-verbaux.

The French Government will transmit to all the High Contracting Parties an authentic copy of the proces-verbaux provided for in the preceding paragraph and of the proces-verbaux of the deposit of any subsequent ratifications.

The present Convention shall, as from date of its entry into force, be open to accession by any Power signatory to the Treaty of Peace at Lausanne signed on the 24th July, 1923.

Each accession shall be notified, through the diplomatic channel, to the Government of the French Republic, and by the latter to all the High Contracting Parties.

Accessions shall come into force as from the date of notification to the French Government.

ARTICLE 28.

The present Convention shall remain in force for twenty years from the date of its entry into force.

The principle of freedom of transit and navigation affirmed in article 1 of the present Convention shall however continue without limit of time.

In two years prior to the expiry of the said period of twenty years, no High Contracting Party shall have given notice of denunciation to the French Government the present Convention shall have been given. Any such notice shall be communicated by the French Government to the High Contracting Parties.

In the event of the present Convention being denounced in accordance with the provisions of the present article, the High Contracting Parties agree to be represented at a conference for the purpose of concluding a new Convention.

ARTICLE 29.

At the expiry of each period of five years from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention each of the High Contract-

ing Parties shall be entitled to initiate a proposal for amending one or more of the provisions of the present Convention.

To be valid, any request for revision formulated by one of the High Contracting Parties must be supported, in the case of modifications to articles 14 or 18, by one other High Contracting Party, and, in the case of modifications to any other article, by two other High Contracting Parties.

Any request for revision thus supported must be notified to all the High Contracting Parties three months prior to the expiry of the current period of five years. This notification shall contain details of the proposed amendments and the reasons which have given rise to them.

Should it be found impossible to reach an agreement on these proposals through the diplomatic channel, the High Contracting Parties agree to be represented at a conference to be summoned for this purpose.

Such a conference may only take decisions by a unanimous vote, except as regards cases of revision involving articles 14 and 18, for which a majority of three-quarters of the High Contracting Parties shall be sufficient.

The said majority shall include three-quarters of the High Contracting Parties which are Black Sea Powers, including Turkey.

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